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Abstract
Using a fully harmonized panel dataset across 14 European countries between the early-
1990s and 2001, the European Community Household Panel, we fill a gap in the literature
with a cross-national comparative study which explores the trends in persistent inequality
and transitory inequality across countries belonging to a common economic area, but with
different systems and with different rates of adaptation to the economic reality of the 1990s.
The covariance structure of earnings is estimated using minimum distance methods. We
find a substantial degree of convergence in the overall inequality among the Mediterranean,
the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon countries, which reflects a convergence in both per-
manent and transitory inequality. Among the Nordic/Flexicurity countries we find a strong
divergence in the overall inequality, driven by a divergence in both permanent and transi-
tory inequality. Pooling most countries in Europe, we find evidence of a strong convergence
in earnings instability. The Nordic/Flexicurity countries have a lower overall inequality, a
lower persistent inequality and a higher earnings mobility. These cross-national differences
in persistent inequality and earnings instability across Europe can be partly explained by
the labour market policies and institutions linked with the wage-setting mechanism. The
stricter the regulation in the labour and product market, the higher the persistent inequality.
The higher the unionization, the degree of corporatism, and the tax wedge the lower per-
sistent inequality. Corporatist systems are associated with a lower earnings instability than
decentralized ones.
Keywords: earnings dynamics; permanent inequality; transitory inequality
JEL classification codes: C23 ; D31 ; J31
∗This research is part of the “Earnings Dynamics and Microsimulation” project supported by the Luxembourg “Fonds
National de la Recherche” through an AFR grant (PDR no. 893613) under the Marie Curie Actions of the European Commission
(FP7-COFUND). Earlier versions of this paper are registered as “Earnings dynamics and inequality in EU, 1994-2001” IZA
Discussion Paper, No. 4012, 2009; and CEPS/INSTEAD Working Papers, No.35, 2010.
1 Introduction
Understanding the source of earnings inequality has become a major research topic in economics over the
past decades, fuelled by the rise in earnings inequality experienced by many developed countries during
the 1980s and 1990s. In the US, there is a widespread consensus that wage inequality increased because
the relative demand for skills rose faster than the relative supply due to the skill-biased technological
change. Other factors include changes in international trade, changes in labour market institutions and
changes in the labour force composition (e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Katz and Autor (1999), Haider
(2001), Acemoglu (2002)). Across (continental) Europe, inequality did not increase, or increased much
less over the same time period, despite experiencing the same technological developments (Freeman and
Katz, 1994, Bell and Nickell, 1996, Katz et al, 1995). The difference in the inequality trends between
Europe and the US is attributed, among other factors, to the rigidity of the European labour market in-
stitutions (Freeman and Katz, 1994, Acemoglu, 2002). The economic reality of the 1990s in Europe,
however, increased the pressure on the European labour markets to become more flexible.1 Since 1995,
several reforms were implemented to increase wage flexibility, lower non-wage labour costs and allow
relative wages to better reflect individual differences in productivity and local labour market conditions
and induce wage modernization and competitive wage bargaining (OECD, 2004, Dew-Becker and Gor-
don, 2008, Keune, 2008).2 As a result, real wage growth has been depressed and low pay and working
poor have become major concerns (Keune, 2008). The pace of change was different across Europe, lead-
ing to an increased country-heterogeneity in welfare state characteristics and labour market institutions
(Palier, 2010).
Recent evidence concerning this period in Europe reveals an increased cross-country heterogeneity
also in the distribution and the structure of labour market income. The qualitative evidence indicates
considerable cross-country differences in the level of inequality, the structure of inequality and the pat-
terns of inter-temporal change in hourly earnings inequality in Europe (Cholezas and Tsakloglou, 2008,
OECD, 1996, 1997). These inequality decompositions, however, neglect an important dimension of
inequality: whether the source of cross-sectional inequality is permanent or transitory. The distinction
between permanent (lifetime) earnings inequality and transitory inequality is useful in evaluating the wel-
fare implications of changes in cross-sectional earnings inequality, as is emphasized in numerous recent
studies for the US (Moffitt and Gottschalk, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2011, Baker, 1997, Haider, 2001), Canada
(Baker and Solon, 2003), the UK (Dickens, 2000b, Kalwij and Alessie, 2003) and Europe (Cappellari,
2004, Ramos, 2003, Daly and Valletta, 2008, Gustavsson, 2007, 2008, Sologon and O’Donoghue, 2010).
1The 1990s in Europe are dominated by the implementation of the single market in 1992 and the preparation of the single
currency (Maastricht criteria adopted in 1993).
2The 1994 OECD Job Strategy played a central role in the EU labour market policy changes in the 1990s.
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The permanent component of earnings reflects persistent personal characteristics, such as ability,
education and training. An increase in cross-sectional earnings inequality, triggered by an increase in
permanent inequality (e.g. increasing returns to education, on-the-job training and other persistent abil-
ities (Mincer, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1974, Hause, 1980) signals an increase in lifetime earnings inequality.
As permanent or lifetime earnings are a measure of long-term resources which reflect individual con-
sumption, increasing persistent differentials imply increasing consumption differentials, with a negative
impact on social welfare for most social welfare functions (Friedman, 1957, Cutler and Katz, 1992, At-
tanasio and Davis, 1996, Blundell and Preston, 1998, Haider, 2001). The transitory component captures
the volatility in the labour market, random events and other factors influencing earnings in a particular
period, and is expected to average out over time (Friedman and Kuznets, 1954). If the increase in cross-
sectional earnings inequality reflects an increase in transitory inequality, lifetime earnings inequality
may have increased very little or not at all, but individuals are facing an increase in year-to-year earnings
fluctuations (instability) (Baker and Solon, 2003).3 The welfare implications for increasing earnings
instability are not straightforward. Consumption is well insulated from transitory shocks, therefore in-
creasing earnings instability is unlikely to reduce welfare through consumption (Attanasio and Davis,
1996). Increasing earnings instability reduces social welfare if individuals are averse to earnings vari-
ability and future risk (Blundell and Preston, 1998, Creedy and Wilhelm, 2002, Gottschalk and Spolaore,
2002).
While there have been a number of single country analyses, no studies have attempted to explore the
trends in permanent and transitory inequality in a fully comparative fashion across Europe.4 We aim to fill
part of this gap in this paper. We explore the cross-national trends in persistent and transitory inequality
across 14 EU countries using the 8 waves (1994-2001) of the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP). The consistent comparative perspective on earnings dynamics across Europe offers valuable
insight with respect to persistent earnings differentials and earnings instability in countries belonging
to a common economic area, but with different systems and with different rates of adaptation to the
economic reality of the 1990s.
The OECD indicators measuring the labour market policies/institutions linked to the wage-setting
mechanism - union density, corporatism, employment protection legislation (EPL), the degree of labour
market support in the form of unemployment benefits replacement rates (UBRR) and spending on labour
market programs (ALMPs), non-wage labour costs (tax wedge) and product market regulation (PMR) -
3Increasing transitory inequality is attributed to the weakening of labour market institutions, increasing labour market insta-
bility, increasing competitiveness and an increasing temporary workforce insufficiently protected by collective agreements.
4The only cross-national comparative study on the trends in permanent and transitory inequality is Daly and Valletta (2008),
which compares Germany, the UK and the US. The most representative single country studies for the UK and Europe are
Dickens (2000b), Kalwij and Alessie (2003) and Ramos (2003) for the UK; Cappellari (2004) for Italy; Gustavsson (2008) for
Sweden.
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signal a high degree of country heterogeneity across Europe (Bassanini and Duval, 2006a,b).5 We find
that the institutional country-heterogeneity explains part of the cross-national differences persistent and
transitory inequality.
Figure 1 shows the institutional country-heterogeneity in 2001. The indicators are re-scaled by setting
the UK, a typical Anglo-Saxon model with the lowest regulation, the lowest labour market support, a low
corporatism, among the lowest union densities and tax wedges, as the base. The OECD indicators are
defined in Table A1. The Anglo-Saxon countries (UK and Ireland) have the lowest regulation in the
labour market, the lowest tax wedge and a medium union density. They differ substantially from one
another in the level of labour market support, in corporatism and PMR, with the UK having the lowest
values in Europe. The Northern countries (the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands), Austria6 and
Belgium, which adopted the "Flexicurity" model with relatively low levels of regulation in the labour
market coupled with relatively high levels of unemployment benefits and ALMPs, also have a high
corporatism, among the highest union densities (except the Netherlands) and tax wedges, and among the
lowest PMR. Denmark and Netherlands, the pioneers of “Flexicurity” stand out with the highest levels of
labour market support. The Continental countries (Germany, France and Luxembourg7) have a relatively
stricter EPL and a substantially lower unionisation than the Nordic/Flexicurity countries. The degree of
labour market support is lower than in Denmark and the Netherlands. In Germany, the other institutions
are similar to the ones in the Nordic/Flexicurity countries. In France, PMR is higher and corporatism
is lower than in Germany and the Nordic/Flexicurity countries. The Mediterranean countries (Portugal,
Spain, Greece8 and Italy) have among the strictest regulation in the labour and product market, among the
lowest levels of labour market support, among the lowest union densities, an intermediate corporatism
and medium-high tax wedges. Italy differs with a lower EPL and a high corporatism.
We use minimum distance methods to estimate the covariance structure of earnings and decompose
earnings inequality into a permanent and a transitory component by cohort.9 Blundell and Preston (1998)
argue there are strong welfare grounds for analysis within cohorts as the evolution of the distribution
within the whole population is influenced by changes in the age structure that obscure the role of per-
manent and transitory components of earnings. The aggregation to obtain the overall inequality from the
within-cohort inequalities for each country follows the Shorrocks sub-group inequality decomposition
5The data was obtained by email from the authors (Bassanini and Duval, 2006a,b). Following Milberg and Winkler (2009),
the labour market support indicator is computed as the arithmetic average of the spending on active labour market policies
(ALMPs, as% of GDP) and the unemployment benefit replacement rate.
6The success of the “Flexicurity” model in Austria is discussed in Auer (2002) and European Commission (2006)
7Luxembourg has the highest union density among the Continental countries. The other institutional variables are missing.
8Greece has a higher EPL and union density than Portugal. The other indicators are missing.
9This is a well-established methodology implemented also by Dickens (2000b), Baker and Solon (2003), Ramos (2003),
Kalwij and Alessie (2003), Cappellari (2004), Gustavsson (2007, 2008), Doris et al (2010a), Ostrovsky, (2010), Moffitt and
Gottschalk (1995, 2002, 2011).
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(Shorrocks, 1984, Chakravarty, 2001). Section 2 discusses the common parametric models of earnings
dynamics that we use to estimate the covariance structure of earnings across Europe. Section 3 de-
scribes the consistent cross-national comparative panel and graphically inspects the variance-covariance
structure of (log) hourly earnings over time across Europe. Section 4 discusses the trends in perma-
nent inequality and earnings instability in Europe and the associations between the two components of
earnings inequality and the labour market institutions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Parametric models of earnings dynamics
This section presents several models that have been used to model the dynamics of earnings over the past
30 years, which serve as the basis of our cross-national comparison. In order to differentiate life cycle
effects from secular changes in earnings inequality, earnings differentials are explored by cohort. The
empirical specification of earnings follows the structure:
Yict = Y¯ct + rict, t = 1, ..., Ti, i = 1, ..., Nc
Yict is the natural logarithm of real hourly earnings of the i-th individual, from the c-th cohort in the
t-th year, Y¯ct is the year-cohort specific mean and rict is the individual-specific deviation from the year-
cohort specific mean.10 The demeaned earnings, rict, are assumed to be independently distributed across
individuals, but autocorrelated over time. The simplest specification in the literature decomposes earn-
ings into a permanent time-invariant individual specific component, µi, (e.g. ability) and a transitory
component, vit, both independently distributed across individuals and over time:
rit = µi + vit, µi ∼ iid(0, σ2µ), vit ∼ iid(0, σ2v)
This model imposes rigid restrictions on the covariance structure of earnings. The variance of earnings at
a certain point in time as a measure of earnings dispersion is: σ2r = σ
2
µ+σ
2
v . The covarianceCov(rit, ris)
= σ2µ, t 6= s. σ2µ is the persistent dispersion of earnings or permanent earnings inequality. The transitory
variance σ2v captures the transitory shocks.
The empirical evidence rejects the rigid restrictions imposed by this model. The models we estimate
in this paper relax several restrictions. We summarizes the features of these models, as follows:
Model (1) = Canonical with time and cohort shifters
Model (2) = Model (1) + AR(1) in the transitory component
Model (3) = Model (2) + cohort-specific initial transitory variances
10The demeaned earnings rict adjusts for year, age and cohort effects in a less restrictive way than the preliminary regressions
typically used, which assume that the age and cohort effects within any year can be approximated by a polynomial in age (Baker
and Solon, 2003).
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Model (4) = Model (2) + correction for left-censoring
Model (5) = Model (3) + random growth in age in the permanent component
Model (6) = Model (5) + correction for left-censoring.
We explain each model in turn. In Model (1), first, we allow the covariance structure of earnings to
vary across cohorts, as suggested by Blundell and Preston (1998), which bring strong welfare arguments
for the analysis within cohorts. Some studies reject the hypothesis that the return to education is the
same across cohorts. These differences could be attributed either to cohort effects or to the larger impact
of labour market shocks on younger than on older cohorts of workers (Katz and Autor, 1999). Freeman
(1975)’s "active labour market" hypothesis postulates that earnings instability, determined by changes in
labour market conditions, such as changes in the supply and demand for skills, affect the youngest gener-
ations of workers the most, as they have a weaker attachment to the labour market compared with senior
workers, and a lower protection from the labour market institutions. The cohort effects are incorporated
by cohort-specific shifters on both components (γjc, j = 1, 2) (Baker and Solon, 2003, Cappellari, 2004,
Ramos, 2003, Kalwij and Alessie, 2003, Gustavsson, 2008, Sologon and O’Donoghue, 2010). Second,
we allow the covariance structure of earnings to vary over time by incorporating time-specific loading
factors on both components (λjt, j = 1, 2) (Katz, 1994, Moffitt and Gottschalk, 1995, Dickens, 2000b,
Haider, 2001, Baker and Solon, 2003, Cappellari, 2004, Ramos, 2003, Gustavsson, 2007, 2008, Sologon
and O’Donoghue, 2010). The first model we estimate is basically the canonical model with time and
cohort shifters, and offers a general insight into the cross-national trends and differences in permanent
and transitory inequality across Europe.
rict = γ1cλ1tµi + γ2cλ2tvit, V ar(rit) = γ
2
1cλ
2
1tσ
2
µ + γ
2
2cλ
2
2tσ
2
v (1)
λ1t is interpreted as the time-varying return to skills or the skill price. A rise in λ1t increases the perma-
nent or long-run inequality, suggesting that the relative labour market advantage of high-skilled workers
is enhanced. An increase in λ2t increases transitory inequality, indicating an increase in earnings in-
stability. λ1t maintains the rank of the individuals in the earnings distribution, but causes a persistent
increase in the spread of the distribution. An increase in λ2t changes the rank of the individuals in the
short-run (Katz and Autor, 1999). The time shifter λt in the first wave and the cohort shifter γc for the
oldest cohort are normalized to 1 for identification.
We proceed by extending Model (1) with additional structural components. Model (2) is obtained
from Model (1) by incorporating serial correlation in the transitory component of earnings. vit is assumed
to follow an AR(1) process (MaCurdy, 1982):
vit = ρvi,t−1 + it, it ∼ iid(0, σ2 ), vi0 ∼ iid(0, σ20) (2)
it is assumed to be white noise, the variance σ20 measures the volatility of shocks in the first period
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and σ2 the volatility of shocks in subsequent years. ρ is the autoregressive parameter measuring the
persistence of shocks.11
When working with ARMA(p,q) processes in the context of panel data, MaCurdy (1981, 1982), and
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) underline the need for a treatment of initial conditions. The autoregressive
process induces a recursive structure in the moments: the variance-covariance in year t depends on
the transitory variance-covariance in year t-1. Tracking the recursion back to the first sample year for
each cohort raises the question of what the initial transitory variance should be for each cohort. Earlier
literature restricted the initial transitory variance to be equal across cohorts. In line with the recent
literature, we acknowledge that earnings volatility varies across cohorts, and, in Model (3), we extend
Model (2) by incorporating cohort-specific initial transitory variances. Following MaCurdy (1981, 1982),
in Model (3) the cohort initial transitory variances are treated as 4 additional parameters to be estimated:
σ2c,0, c = 1/4.
vit = ρvi,t−1 + it, it ∼ iid(0, σ2 ), vi0 ∼ iid(0, σ2c,0) (3)
Two recent studies (Ostrovsky, 2010, Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2011) argue that treating the initial
transitory variances of each cohort as unrestricted parameters to be estimated may be problematic be-
cause it affects the time trend for the left-censored observations. To test the robustness of the predicted
components to this problem, following Moffitt and Gottschalk (2011), we alter Model (2) by introducing
an alternative parameter ξ which allows the transitory variances in the first wave to deviate from what
they would be if λ2t = 1 for the years before the first wave. Thus Model (4) is the same as Model (2),
except that the transitory variance in the first wave is defined as:
σ20leftcensored = (1 + ξ(age0 − 20))σ20, (4)
where age0 is the central age of the cohort in the first wave. Next, in Model (5) we extend the specifica-
tion of the permanent component. Starting from Model (3), which has a time-invariant permanent com-
ponent, an AR(1) process with cohort-specific initial transitory variances in the transitory component,
with time and cohort shifters on both components, we extend it by specifying the permanent compo-
nent as a "random growth rate model" ("profile heterogeneity model") (Hause, 1977, Lillard and Weiss,
1979, MaCurdy, 1982, Baker, 1997, Cappellari, 2004, Ramos, 2003). The random growth model, which
captures the persistent heterogeneity across individuals in their levels of earnings and their growth rates,
is:
µit = µi + ϕi(ageit − 20)
µi ∼ iid(0, σ2µ), ϕi ∼ iid(0, σ2ϕ), Cov(µiϕi) = σµϕ,
(5)
11We experimented with an ARMA(1,1) in the transitory component, but in a few countries the parameter θ could not be
identified or did not differ significantly from 0. In order to keep the same model across countries, we opted for the AR(1)
process.
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where ageit is the age of the individual in wave t. 20 is the youngest age in our sample. Each individual
has a unique age-earning profile with an individual-specific intercept (initial earnings µi at age 20) and
slope (earnings growth ϕi).12 The variances σ2µ and σ
2
ϕ capture individual heterogeneity with respect
to time-invariant characteristics and age-earnings profiles. The covariance between µi and ϕi, σµϕ rep-
resents a key element in the development of earnings differentials over the active life. A positive σµϕ
implies a rising inequality in the permanent component over the life cycle. This is consistent with the
school-matching models where the more tenure one individual accumulates, the more is revealed about
his ability. Thus highly educated people are expected to experience a faster growth in their earnings as
the quality of the match is revealed to their employers. A negative σµϕ implies that the two sources
of heterogeneity offset each other, which is consistent with the on-the-job training hypothesis (Mincer,
1974, Hause, 1980). A negative covariance is expected to generate mobility within the distribution of
permanent earnings (Cappellari, 2004).13 In Model (6), we test the robustness of Model (5) to the left-
censoring problem by incorporating the alternative method specified in equation (4).
For Model (5), the set of parameters to be estimated is:
θ = (γ1,c1/c4, γ2,c1/c4, λ1,1994/2001, λ2,1994/2001, σ
2
µ, σ
2
ϕ, σµϕ, ρ, σ
2
c1/c4,0)
Models (1) to (3) are nested in (5). For Model (6) we estimate the same parameters as for (5), except
one common parameter σ20 for all cohorts and the correction for left-censoring ξ. The parameters of the
models are fit to the covariance structure for each cohort using equally weighted minimum distance meth-
ods of estimation, similar to Abowd and Card (1989), Moffitt and Gottschalk(1995, 1998, 2002, 2011),
Baker (1997), Dickens (2000b), Cappellari (2004), Baker and Solon (2003), Ramos (2003), Kalwij and
Alessie (2003), Gustavsson (2007, 2008), Sologon and O’Donoghue (2010). For a complete technical
description of the estimation method, please refer to Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009) (also available in
Sologon (2010)). In a nut shell, we fit the variances and autocovariances implied by Models (1) - (6) to
the corresponding empirical moments in each country using minimum distance methods. The minimum
distance estimator choses θˆ to minimize the distance function D(θˆ) = [m− f(θˆ)]W [m− f(θˆ)]′, where
m is a column vector of moments of dimension (144 × 1). W is the identity matrix, following (Al-
tonji and Segal, 1996) and (Clark, 1996). For estimating the asymptotic standard errors of the parameter
12This structure is equivalent to a random coefficient model where the intercept and the coefficient on age are randomly
distributed across individuals.
13An alternative specification which allows the permanent component to vary with age is the "random walk in age model"
("unit root model") which accommodates earnings shocks with permanent effects: the current value depends on the previous
one and an innovation term pia, which accommodates any permanent re-ranking of individuals in the earnings distribution
(MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card, 1989; Moffitt and Gottschalk, 1995, Dickens, 2000b, Baker and Solon, 2003, Gustavsson,
2008, Sologon and O’Donoghue, 2010). The estimates of this model can be provided upon request from the authors. Baker and
Solon (2003) and Ramos (2003) incorporate both a random growth and a random walk in the specification of the permanent
component. In this specification, however, the length of our panel prevented the identification of all parameters in the permanent
component.
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estimates, we apply the delta method, following Chamberlain (1984).
3 Data
3.1 Data description
In order to explore the cross-national trends in permanent inequality and earnings instability across Eu-
rope, we use a comparative panel dataset which contains earnings data for selected European countries.
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP)14 is a harmonised cross-national longitudinal sur-
vey across the individual countries of the European Union, with information on household income and
living conditions, health, education, housing, migration, demographics and employment characteristics.
Its standardization is the most valued feature of the ECHP, making it well-suited for cross-country com-
parisons within the EU in various socio-economic aspects, including cross-country comparisons of earn-
ings dynamics (Behr et al, 2005). Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK took part between 1994 and 2001, Luxembourg and
Austria between 1995 and 2001, and Finland starting with 1996.
Earnings are expressed in real log net hourly wage adjusted for CPI. The hourly earnings are con-
structed using the information on current net monthly wage and the number of hours worked per week.15
We use hourly earnings as we want to separate the variance-covariance of earnings from the variance-
covariance of the number of hours work. Hourly earnings are a measure of the productivity of the
individual, whereas annual earnings are a measure of the productivity multiplied by the labour supply.
Only observations with hourly wage lower than 50 Euros and higher than 1 Euro are considered in the
analysis. Following the tradition of previous studies, our analysis focuses on men to avoid the selec-
tion bias typically associated with women’s earnings. We restrict the analysis to male workers aged 20
to 57, born between 1940 and 1981, recording positive earnings at least once between 1994 and 2001.
The individuals are allowed to exit and (re)enter the panel. The resulting sample for each country is an
unbalanced panel. Table 1 shows the sample size with positive earnings for each country. The choice
of using unbalanced panels for estimating the covariance structure of earnings is motivated by the need
to mitigate the potential overestimation of earnings persistence that would arise from balanced panels,
where the estimation is based only on people that have positive earnings for the entire sample period.
Separate identification of age and time effects requires earnings observed at different phases of the life
cycle in each year, which is achieved by exploiting the variation in age across birth cohorts, Individuals
are tracked in cohorts over time. Each cohort is formed of men born in 10 adjacent years instead of 1
14The European Community Household Panel provided by Eurostat via the Department of Applied Economics at the Uni-
versité Libre de Bruxelles.
15Hourly wage = Current net monthly wage/(4.33*Hours per week). For France, earnings are expressed in gross amounts.
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year due to the limited number of observations. The two oldest cohorts contain men born between 1940
and 1950, and between 1951 and 1960. The youngest two cohorts contain men born between 1961 and
1970, and between 1971 and 1981.
One of the causes of movements out of the earnings sample is attrition over time. Several studies
explore the extent of attrition in ECHP and its impact on a typical empirical analysis. Behr et al (2005)
report that the extent and the determinants of panel attrition in ECHP vary between countries and across
waves within one country, but these differences do not bias the analysis of income mobility via transition
matrices, of individual rank stability measures, of standard cross-sectional measures of inequality such
as the Gini-index or the ranking of national results. Ayala et al (2011) confirm that attrition does not
seem to significantly affect the aggregated mobility indicators. In Sologon and O’Donoghue (2011b),
we explore the correlations between several mobility indicators using the ECHP: the Shorrocks index,
the Fields index (Fields, 2009), the Dickens index (Dickens, 2000a), the Immobility Ratio based on
the transition matrix approach and the Immobility Ratio defined as the ratio between persistent and
transitory inequality (Kalwij and Alessie, 2003). On aggregate, conclusions in relation to mobility are
reasonably robust to the measure used, with a rank correlation of mobility measures over 0.8. Since
overall inequality and earnings mobility are closely linked to the permanent and transitory components
of earnings inequality, we expect the same limited impact of attrition also on permanent and transitory
earnings. Ayala et al (2011) correct for attrition by applying alternative longitudinal weighting schemes
and show that the income mobility indicators have a certain sensitivity to the weighting system. The
weighting system applied in our study is the one recommended by the ECHP User Guide 16 and the
Eurostat for conducting longitudinal studies, namely the "base weights" (at individual level only) of the
last wave observed for each individual, bounded between 0.25 and 10.
Details on the inflows and outflows of the sample of positive earnings over time for each country are
provided in Table 1. The third row shows the share of individuals present in the sample in year t − 1
which record positive earnings in year t. The lowest shares are in Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, where
less than 55% of those who are in the sample with positive earnings in the previous year record positive
earnings in the current year.
The first two rows in Table 1 show the evolution of mean hourly earnings and the variance of log
hourly earnings for the sample with positive earnings. Mean hourly earnings increase in all countries,
except in Austria where they record a slight decrease. Overall inequality, measured by the variance of
ln hourly earnings increases in Finland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Italy, and Portugal, and
decreases in the rest. In 2001, Portugal has the highest inequality and Denmark the lowest.
16http://epunet.essex.ac.uk/echp_userguide_toc_content.htm
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The panel length we rely on to estimate parameters of the covariance structure of earnings and to
predict the permanent and the transitory inequality is 8 years. Whereas several established studies rely
on a similar panel length to estimate the error component models and identify the persistent and transitory
components of earnings inequality, such as Ramos (2003) for the UK, Biewen (2005) for East Germany,
Daly and Valetta (2008) for the UK and Reunified Germany and Gustavsson (2007) for Sweden, Cervini-
Pla and Ramos (2008, 2011) for Spain, most studies in the literature are based on panels longer than
10 years. Given that the permanent component is mainly identified from the longer-lag covariances,
it is reasonable to question under what conditions 8 years of panel are sufficient to identify the two
components of inequality. Doris et al (2010b) explore this question by evaluating the appropriateness of
the ECHP for the GMM estimation of the covariance structure of earnings. They explore the sensitivity
of the parameter estimates to the panel length, the degree of persistence of transitory shocks and the
evolution of inequality. They consider a model similar to Model (3) (without cohort effects) and argue
that the same conditions hold also for more complex models, e.g. incorporating a random-growth in age
in the permanent component. The results presented in our paper largely meet the identification demands
presented by Doris et al (2010b). They write: the "analysis shows that when ρ is less than or equal to 0.6,
the model is well identified using relatively short panels (T = 8) for any reasonable set of time trends. The
transitory inequality would have to increase by approximately 300% relative to the permanent variance
over an 8 year period before problems of identification would arise". Meeting these conditions, together
with the robustness of our findings to models with different levels of complexity, as we show in the
results section, increases our confidence in the appropriateness of the ECHP for achieving the goals of
this study.
Cross-national comparative studies, due to limitations in terms of sample size and study length,
typically cannot compete with national specific analyses in terms of the complexity of the structure
that can be estimated. In defining the national parameters for an error component structure, clearly long
national panels are the gold standard: e.g. the PSID in the US (Moffitt and Gottschalk, 1995, 1998, 2002,
2011, Baker, 1997, Haider, 2001), the New Earnings Survey Panel in the UK (Dickens, 2000b, Kalwij
and Alessie, 2003), the dataset from the Italian National Social Security Institute (Cappellari, 2004), the
database developed by Statistics Canada from the T-4 Supplementary Tax File maintained by Revenue
Canada (Baker and Solon, 2003), the Swedish longitudinal database LINDA (Longitudinal Individual
Data for Sweden) (Gustavsson, 2008) and the professional career file from the General Inspectorate of
Social Security in Luxembourg (Sologon and O’Donoghue, 2010). The national panels, however, are not
harmonized, impeding the comparability of results across countries.
The ECHP covers a shorter period relative to the national datasets, but at the same time is the longest
panel data which covers such a high number of countries, collected in a harmonized fashion, with con-
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sistency in definitions, periods of analysis and units of analysis. We believe there is scientific merit in
undertaking this comparative cross-country analysis, particularly given the different labour market, pol-
icy and institutional conditions prevailing in each country. Much can be learned from this approach, as a
complementary mechanism in parallel to more sophisticated national studies using longer panels.
3.2 The dynamic autocovariance structure of hourly earnings
We describe next the variance-covariance structure of individual log hourly earnings for 14 European
countries. The model used to fit the autocovariance structure of earnings must be consistent with the
trends observed in the dynamic autocovariance structure. Figure 2 displays the overall autocovariance
structure of earnings.
The overall autocovariance structure of earnings displays both similar and diverging patterns across
countries. Common to all countries, the autocovariances of all lags have, in general, a similar pattern to
the variance. They are positive and quite large in magnitude relative to the variances, with the distance
between autocovariances at consecutive lags falling at a decreasing rate. The variances reflect both
the permanent and the transitory components of earnings, whereas higher order covariances reflect the
permanent component of earnings. Therefore, the evolution of the covariances, at all orders, suggests
the presence of a permanent individual component of wages and a transitory component which is serially
correlated. The serial correlation in the transitory component is modelled by an AR(1) process. Both
mean earnings (Table 1) and the autocovariances at different lags(Figure 2) vary over time, which signals
the presence of nonstationarity in the dynamic structure of earnings. The non-stationarity is incorporated
by time shifters on both components of earnings variation.
Although not reported here for reasons of brevity, Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009) and Sologon
(2010) find that the autocovariances display different patterns across cohorts in all countries, supporting
the hypothesis of cohort heterogeneity with respect to individual earnings dynamics. In most countries,
the variance of earnings for all cohorts follows the evolution of the overall variance. Mixed trends across
cohorts, however, are observed in a number of countries. The evolution of the variance is not monotonic
and the rate of change differs among cohorts. In general, when a change in the variance is recorded,
the older the cohort, the steeper the change. Moreover, the younger the cohort is, the lower are the
autocovariances. Given that higher order autocovariances capture the permanent component of earnings,
it is reasonable to expect that in all countries, for younger cohorts, the transitory variance plays a larger
role in the earnings formation than the permanent component compared with older cohorts. For all
cohorts, the autocovariances of all lags show, in general, a similar pattern as the variance, in line with the
overall pattern. The cohort heterogeneity is incorporated by cohort-specific shifters on both components.
Additionally, we consider cohort-specific initial transitory variances.
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To look at life cycle effects, it is necessary to remove the time effect that is present in the within-
cohort autocovariances. The smoothed life cycle profiles illustrate that, on average, the autocovariances
of all lags increase with age at a decreasing rate, similar with Dickens (2000b). This is consistent with
the presence of a permanent component of earnings that rises with age at a diminishing rate. This feature
can be captured by modelling the persistent component as a random growth in age.
4 Results
4.1 Error component estimates
The general specifications of the common error component models outlined in Section 2, encompassing
most of the important features of earnings dynamics, are fit to the elements of the variance-covariance
matrix of each country, for all cohorts pooled together.17 Similar to Dickens (2000b), all variances
are restricted to be positive by estimating the variance equal to the exponent of the parameter. In the
Appendix (Tables A2 - A7), we report and we discuss in detail the parameter estimates across the 14
European countries for all models in order to give an insight into the country-differences with respect
to the main parameter estimates. The SE and the 95% confidence intervals are reported in parantheses.
Before exploring the predicted persistent inequality and earnings instability across Europe, we briefly
summarize the cross-country differences in a few parameter estimates.
Most parameter estimates are significant at 5% level. Overall, based on each model specification,
we find many significant cross-national differences in the parameters estimates. Controlling for the time
and the cohort effects, the country estimates of persistent inequality, σ2µ (Tables A2 - A5), indicate a
country clustering which mirrors the regional/institutional clustering identified in Figure 1. The Scan-
dinavian countries, Denmark and Finland, have the lowest persistent inequality, followed by Belgium,
the Netherlands and Austria. These countries form the Nordic/Flexicurity cluster. The highest is found
in the Mediterranean countries (Portugal and Spain), followed by France. This ranking is, in general,
consistent across models. Most country differences are statistically significant at 5% level, with a few
exceptions that occur at least once across different models: Denmark and Finland, Belgium and the
Netherlands, the UK and Ireland, Germany and Luxembourg. Consistent across models, the time shifters
for persistent inequality indicate significant changes in persistent inequality between the early 1990s and
2001 in most countries. The t-tests indicate that the returns to persistent characteristics in 2001 differ
significantly across most European countries, both within and between the institutional/regional clusters.
More similarities are found within the Mediterranean cluster.
17There are 144 autocovariances for the countries observed over 8 waves, 122 for those with 7 waves and 84 for those with
6 waves.
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We also find many significant cross-national differences for the parameter estimates of the transitory
component. The autoregressive parameter, which captures the degree of persistence of transitory shocks,
has values below or close to .6 in most countries and most models. Portugal has values close to .7 in three
models, and Austria above .7 in most models. The time shifters for the transitory component indicate
significant changes in transitory inequality over time across Europe. They signal a possible convergence
in transitory inequality across Europe.
4.2 Trends in permanent inequality and earnings instability across Europe
We now use the estimated parameters in Tables A2 to A7 to decompose earnings inequality into per-
manent and transitory inequality in each country. Given that the labour market changes affect people
differently at different life cycle stages, that young people are exposed to a larger extent to temporary
contracts, more frequent promotions and more earnings volatility compared with older workers, inequal-
ity is decomposed by cohorts.18 The predicted components by cohorts indicate a fairly common age
effect across all countries: both in relative and absolute terms, the within-cohort earnings inequality con-
tains a highly permanent component for the oldest three cohorts and a highly transitory component for
the youngest cohort. This is consistent with the evidence of life cycle earnings divergence, showing that
earnings volatility is higher at younger ages.19
The aggregated persistent and aggregated transitory inequality for each country is computed from the
within-cohort persistent and transitory differentials using the Shorrocks sub-group inequality decompo-
sition (Shorrocks 1984; Chakravarty 2001). The aggregated within-cohort overall inequality equals:
4∑
c=1
scIc =
4∑
c=1
(scPVc) +
4∑
c=1
(scTVc) (6)
sc, PVc, TVc are the share in the population, the permanent variance and the transitory variance of
ln(earnings) of cohort c. The overall permanent inequality
∑4
c=1 (scPVc) and the overall transitory
inequality
∑4
c=1 (scTVc) are the weighted average of permanent inequality and the weighted average of
transitory inequality across cohorts.20
We compare first the trends in actual inequality measured by the aggregated within-cohort variance
of log hourly earnings for men aged 20 to 57 (Figure 3). Inequality increases are recorded in Portugal,
18Our decompositions control for cohort effects, but age and period effects are confounded. Since our scope is to decompose
the within-cohort inequality into the two components, the age effect is considered part of the permanent component, and thus
its specific identification is disregarded.
19These results are similar to those found by Dickens (2000b) and Ramos (2003) for the UK, Cervini-Pla and Ramos (2008,
2011) for Spain and Cappellari (2004) for Italy.
20To control for the change in the share of each cohort in the population due to retirement or new entrants into the labour
market, when we evaluate the evolution of the aggregated permanent and transitory inequality we maintain the shares of each
cohort equal to their averages computed over the sample period.
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Luxembourg, Greece, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Finland. These trends are, in general, con-
firmed by the predicted aggregated within-cohort inequality in all models, as shown in Table 2, which
summarizes the evolution in actual and predicted earnings inequality, ranking countries by their inequal-
ity in 2001.21 In 2001, Denmark, followed by Belgium, Austria and Finland have the lowest inequality,
and Portugal, followed by Luxembourg, France, Spain and Greece the highest. The ranking is consistent
across models, as confirmed by the high Spearman rank correlation between the actual and the predicted
aggregate within-cohort inequality in Table 3: between .987 and 1 for Models (1) to (5) and .934 for
Model (6). The rank correlation for Model (3) is equal to 1, showing that this model predicts perfectly
the country ranking in overall inequality.
In Figure 3 we identify two country clusters. The upper cluster is formed by the Mediterranean
countries, the Continental countries (Luxembourg, France, Germany) and the Anglo-Saxon countries,
and has a consistently higher overall inequality between the early 1990s and 2001. We find a sub-
stantial degree of convergence in the overall inequality among these countries, except Portugal with a
divergent increasing trend. As will be seen below in Table 7, this convergence is confirmed by the de-
crease of 17.4% in the coefficient of variation for the actual aggregated inequality among these countries
(Continental/Anglo-Saxon/Mediterranean*). Is this convergence the result of converging trends within
or between the regional / institutional country clusters? Figure 3 points to a convergence among coun-
tries belonging to different institutional clusters. France, Luxembourg and Spain converge in the early
2000s to a level lower than Portugal. The UK, Ireland, Germany and Greece converge to levels which are
lower than the first group. To check whether the convergence occurs also within the regional/institutional
clusters, Table 7 reports the evolution of the coefficient of variation for the overall inequality within each
regional/institutional cluster, and for groupings of regional clusters. The Mediterranean countries (Portu-
gal, Spain, Greece and Italy) record a divergent trend in their aggregated inequality (an increase of 23% in
the coefficient of variation). The Continental countries (Germany, France and Luxembourg) converge in
their overall inequality. The Anglo-Saxon countries record a strong convergence, confirmed by a decrease
of 95% in the coefficient of variation. Within the Continental/Anglo-Saxon cluster we find a convergent
trend, which amplifies when we add the Mediteranean countries (Spain, Greece and Italy) (Table 7). We
conclude that the convergent trend occurs both within and between the regional/institutional clusters. All
models confirm these trends in the aggregated inequality (Table 7).
The cluster with lower levels of aggregated inequality is formed by the Nordic countries (Denmark,
Finland, the Netherlands) and the Continental Belgium and Austria. This is the Nordic/Flexicurity coun-
try cluster. Across these countries we find a divergent trend in overall inequality, confirmed by the
21Model (1) (canonical) predicts opposite trends for Germany and the UK. Model (2) predicts opposite trends for Germany.
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increase of 32% in the coefficient of variation (Table 7). The coefficient of variation for the predicted
aggregated inequality confirms this trend consistently across models (Table 7).
In order to see whether these converging and diverging trends in overall inequality across Europe
reflect trends in permanent inequality or earnings instability, we explore the trends in persistent inequality
and transitory inequality across Europe.
Trends in permanent inequality across Europe
The panels A.1 and A.2 in Figures 4 to 9 show the trends in permanent (long-term) inequality across
Europe between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s predicted by the six models considered. The countries
are grouped in two clusters. Cluster (1), which groups the Mediterranean, the Continental and the Anglo-
Saxon countries, is represented in panel A.1; cluster (2), which groups the Nordic/Flexicurity countries,
in panel A.2.
The graphical inspection of the trends in persistent inequality in A.1 (Figures 4 to 9) indicates a con-
vergence in permanent inequality in the early 2000s between the Mediterranean, the Continental and the
Anglo-Saxon countries. Portugal is the only country which diverges in this cluster, as it does in overall
inequality. These are the same countries which start in the mid-1990s with a relatively higher persistent
inequality and a higher overall inequality. Table 7 shows the coefficient of variation for permanent in-
equality within each regional/institutional cluster and for groupings of clusters, for each model. Within
the Mediterranean cluster, the coefficient of variation in permanent inequality decreases over time, con-
firming the convergence between the early 1990s and 2001.22 Within the Continental cluster we find
an increasing coefficient of variation, implying a divergent trend.23 Within the Anglo-Saxon cluster,
Models (1), (3), (4) predict a convergent trend. Pooling the Continental/Anglo-Saxon countries, we find
a strong divergent trend, confirmed across models. Pooling the Continental, the Anglo-Saxon and the
Mediterranean countries (Portugal is excluded in order to isolate its strong divergence effect), we find a
convergent trend in permanent inequality, confirmed by all models, but at different degrees: Model (1)
predicts a decrease of 20% in the coefficient of variation, Model (4) a decrease of 6%, and Model (6)
a decrease of 35% (Table 7). The convergence within this cluster stems mainly from the convergence
between the regional/institutional clusters. We conclude that the convergence in overall inequality be-
tween the Mediterranean, the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon countries is partly due to a convergence
in permanent differentials.
The graphical inspection of the trends in persistent inequality in panel A.2 (Figures 4 to 9) indicates
22Model (3) is an exception.
23Model (6) is an exception.
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a divergence in permanent inequality in the early 2000s within the Nordic/Flexicurity cluster formed by
the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium. The divergence is confirmed by the
strong increase in the coefficient of variation in permanent inequality in all models (Table 7): e.g. Model
(1) predicts an increase of 35%, Model (3) an increase of 30%, and Model (5) an increase of 36%. We
conclude that the divergence in overall inequality within the Nordic/Flexicurity cluster is partly due to
the divergence in permanent inequality.
The trends in persistent inequality are summarized in Table 4, which ranks countries by their actual
inequality in 2001, the same as in Table 2. The trends in persistent inequality are, in general, consistent
across models. Persistent inequality increased across Europe in the 1990s, except in Denmark, Belgium
and Austria where it decreased. The canonical model for Spain, Ireland, Austria and Belgium, Model (5)
for Spain, Model (2) for the UK, and Models (3), (4) for Germany indicate an opposite trend. The country
ranking in the overall inequality in 2001 is reflected in the country ranking in permanent inequality,
which suggests that the main determinant of the country differences in overall inequality is permanent
inequality. The country ranking in permanent inequality is robust across all models, as confirmed by the
high Spearman rank correlations (between .96 and .99) in Table 5. The countries identified as having
the highest levels of overall inequality, also have the highest levels of permanent inequality. Portugal,
followed by Luxembourg, France and Spain have among the highest persistent differentials. Next we find
Ireland and the UK, followed by Greece, Germany and Italy. We identify a few small rank differences
between models for Greece and Germany relative to the Anglo-Saxon countries. Denmark has the lowest
persistent inequality, followed by Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands and Finland. Belgium and Austria
switch ranks between models. Overall, the canonical model displays more rank differences relative to
the other models (the rank correlations are slightly smaller for Model (1)).
The changes in the two components have implications for another distributional aspect, earnings mo-
bility, defined as the degree to which individuals’ ranks change within the wage distribution (Kalwij and
Alessie, 2003). A large contribution of permanent inequality to overall inequality implies that individual
earnings are highly correlated over time and individuals do not change their income position to a large
extent, experiencing low rates of earnings mobility. To evaluate the degree of mobility across Europe,
in Table 4 we summarize in parentheses the evolution of the share of persistent inequality in the overall
inequality. In most countries where permanent inequality is high (the Mediterranean, the Continental
and the Anglo-Saxon countries), the share of permanent inequality in the overall inequality is dominant
(above 50%). Additionally, the dominance of persistent inequality is maintained over time. For the
Nordic/Flexicurity countries, the shares of persistent inequality are, on average, lower. These findings
are robust across models. The country ranking with respect to the share of permanent inequality in the
overall inequality is, in general, robust across models as indicated by the high Spearman rank correlations
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(between 85% and 97%) for 2001.24 The canonical model (Model (1)) has the highest degree of rank dif-
ferences relative to the other models. In 2001, Portugal and Luxembourg, followed by Spain and France,
have the highest persistent inequality and among the highest persistent shares in the overall inequality
across Europe (between 78.7% and 68.7% based on Model (3)). Denmark, followed by Belgium, Austria
and the Netherlands have the lowest absolute levels of persistent inequality and among the lowest shares
in the overall inequality (between 42.4% and 49.4% based on Model (3)). Similar ranges are observed
in the other models. Thus the Nordic/Flexicurity countries have among the lowest persistent inequality,
both absolute and relative. Additionally, except for Finland, in these countries the share of permanent
inequality in 2001 is below or close to 50% in all models. An exception is the canonical model which
overestimates the share of the transitory component. These are the countries identified in Figure 1 as
having a policy mix with relatively low levels of regulation in the labour market coupled with relatively
high levels of unemployment benefits and ALMPs, a high corporatism, among the highest union densi-
ties (except the Netherlands) and tax wedges, and among the lowest PMR. This signals that "Flexicurity"
has the potential to reduce persistent inequality. We return to this after discussing the trends in transitory
inequality.
Trends in transitory inequality across Europe
The trends in transitory inequality are illustrated in panels B.1. and B.2. in Figures 4 to 9. The
graphical inspection suggests a higher degree of convergence across Europe in the degree of earnings
instability than for persistent inequality. The convergence in transitory inequality occurs among all re-
gional/institutional country clusters. The degree of convergence appears more pronounced in Models (1),
(5) and (6), than in Models (2), (3) and (4), where Greece and Portugal appear to diverge starting with
1997. Table 7 shows the evolution of the coefficient of variation for transitory inequality within each
regional/institutional cluster and for clusters pooled together. The coefficient of variations for the Con-
tinental and for the Anglo-Saxon countries decreases over time in all models, suggesting a convergence
within each cluster. Pooling these clusters, we find strong evidence of convergence between these coun-
tries. Pooling also the Mediterranean countries (except Greece and Portugal), the coefficient of variation
decreases in all models, at different rates ranging between 25% (Model (3)) to 47% (Model (2)). This
suggests a strong convergence in transitory inequality between these countries, which, together with the
convergence in permanent inequality, contribute to the convergence in overall inequality between these
countries.
Within the Nordic/Flexicurity cluster, the coefficient of variation increases over time signalling a
24Table 6 shows the Spearman rank correlation for the share of permanent inequality in the aggregate inequality in 2001
across models.
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strong divergence, consistent across models. The largest increase is predicted by Model (3) (60%). We
conclude that the divergence within the Nordic / Flexicurity cluster in the overall inequality is driven by
a divergence in both persistent and transitory inequality.
Pooling all countries (except Portugal and Greece which diverge in a few models), we find evidence
of a strong convergence across Europe in transitory inequality: the coefficient of variation of transitory
inequality decreases in all models, at different rates, ranging between 22% and 40%.25
Table 4 summarizes the evolution of transitory inequality, ranking the countries by their actual in-
equality in 2001, the same as in Table 2. Increases in transitory inequality are recorded in Portugal,
Greece26, Germany27 and the Netherlands. The other countries experience a decrease in transitory in-
equality, consistent across models.28 In 2001, the country ranking in transitory inequality is less robust
across models than the country ranking in persistent inequality. The rank correlations are still high,
ranging between .8 and .98 (Table 5). Given that for Model (3), the Spearman rank correlation between
the predicted aggregated inequality and the actual inequality is 1 and the rank correlation for the pre-
dicted permanent inequality is very high, we report the country ranking in transitory inequality based
on Model (3). The highest levels of transitory inequality are recorded in Greece and Portugal, followed
by Germany. The Netherlands records an increase in earnings instability, diverging from this cluster
and reaching the fourth highest level of earnings instability across Europe in 2001. Next we find Spain
and France, followed by the Anglo-Saxon countries. The lowest levels of earnings instability are in the
Scandinavian countries and Italy, followed closely by Luxembourg, Austria and Belgium.
The Netherlands and Denmark have both gone down the "Flexicurity" route, but the earnings instabil-
ity outcome is very different. Salverda (2008) shows that the Dutch model, which is based on part-time
job flexibility, a relatively good social security and the fastest growing active labour market policies
(ALMPs) in Europe, which reached in 2001 a level twice that of the Danish one (Figure 1), determined
an impressive employment growth in the 1990s. The growth, however, was entirely in part-time jobs,
which represent 70% of all low-wage workers. Salverda (2008) shows that this vulnerable segment of
the economy suffered from insufficient protection from the collective agreements, reflected also by the
low union density in Figure 1. This may explain the staggering increase in earnings instability. Thus the
increase in low pay and working poverty has become a concern in the Netherlands.
25The CV decreases by 22% in Model 1, by 35% in Model (2), by 24% in Model (3), by 30% in Model (4), by 35% in Model
(5) and by 40% in Model (6).
26Exceptions are Models (1), (5) and (6).
27Exceptions are Models (1) and (2).
28Exceptions are Models (2) and (3) for Belgium.
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Labour market factors and the two inequality components
As a last step we relate the cross-country differences in the two components of inequality to the corre-
sponding cross-country differences in the labour market policies/institutions linked to the wage-setting
mechanism. Union density and the degree of corporatism are important institutional variables in the de-
termination of wages and, implicitly, wage inequality (Calmfors, 1993, Teulings and Hartog, 2008). They
are expected to be associated with more compressed wage distributions and with more stable earnings
profiles. The employment protection legislation (EPL), which is considered a source of labour market
rigidity as it increases the cost of layoffs and hirings, affects the two components of earnings inequality
through its impact on permanent and fixed-term contacts (Cazes and Nesporova, 2004). The degree of
labour market support, such as the unemployment benefits replacement rates (UBRR) and the spending
on labour market programs (ALMPs), is aimed to improve job-matching and enhance human capital,
thereby reducing persistent differentials and earnings instability for the vulnerable group (Bassanini and
Duval, 2006a,b). Non-wage labour costs (tax wedge) influence the two components of wage inequality
through their influence on human capital price (Weizsacker, 1993). As regulated sectors have on average
more compressed wage structures and are better at capturing rents than non-regulated sectors, product
market regulation (PMR) is expected to be associated with the two components of earnings inequality
(Fortin and Lemieux, 1997).
To test the claims we made in the previous section regarding the link between the two components
of earnings inequality and the labour market factors, we estimate the associations between the predicted
components of earnings inequality and the labour market polices and institutions, pooling all years. We
report only the correlations for Model (3) in Table 8.29 The results are consistent across all models.
The selected labour market policies and institutions are significantly associated with permanent in-
equality. We find strong associations for union density (-.65) and corporatism (-.6), and moderate as-
sociations for the other factors (around .3 in absolute value). They show that the stricter the regulation
in the labour market and in the product market, the higher the persistent inequality. A negative asso-
ciation is found for the remaining factors: the higher the labour market support, the higher the union
density, the higher the degree of corporatism and the higher the tax wedge, the lower the permanent
inequality. These labour market policies and institutions have the potential to help us understand the
cross-national differences in persistent inequality across Europe. In Table 9 we test these association in
an OLS setting including all factors and the time effects. The institutions are expressed in deviation from
the sample mean, so that the parameter estimates capture the associations for a country with an average
29We choose Model (3) as the Spearman rank correlation between the predicted inequality based on Model (3) and actual
inequality is 1.
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mix of institutions and a low corporatism. Most factors maintain their sign and significance, except the
labour market support which turns insignificant. Additionally, in Figures 10 and 11 we show the scatter
plots for persistent inequality against the labour market factors in 2001, in order to gauge the possible
non-linear relationships between these institutions and persistent inequality. We find evidence of a pos-
sible U-shaped relationship for the EPL and a hump-shaped relationship for corporatism. Thus, strict
labour markets and intermediate levels of corporatism are associated with the highest levels of persistent
inequality.
For transitory inequality, we find significant moderate negative associations for corporatism, union
density, the tax wedge and the unemployment benefit replacement rate (Table 8). The European evidence
suggests that the higher the protection of collective agreements and the higher the degree of coordination,
the better the unemployment protection and the higher the tax wedge, the lower the earnings instability.
The OLS estimates in Table 9 confirm the direction of these associations, but only the degree of cor-
poratism maintains its significance. The scatter plots in Figures 10 and 11 indicate a possible U-shaped
relationship between the EPL and transitory inequality, and a hump-shaped relationship with corporatism
and the tax wedge.
These findings show that low to moderate levels of labour market regulation, coupled with a high
degree of labour market support such as ALMPs and generous unemployment benefit replacement rates,
with a high unionization and degree of corporatism, a low regulation in the product market and high tax
wedges have the potential to keep both persistent and earnings instability low.
5 Conclusion
The economic reality of the 1990s in Europe increased the pressure on the European labour markets
to change. In the context of a global and European economic integration, Europe has been moving to-
wards more flexible labour markets with a declining power of trade unions, employment-friendly reforms
which resulted in "wage modernisation becoming the norm in collective bargaining and wage setting in
Europe" (Keune, 2008). The pace of the labour market reforms was different across the EU, leading to
a continuous departure from the traditional welfare regimes, and, consequently, to an increased country
heterogeneity across Europe in welfare state characteristics and labour market institutions (Palier, 2010,
Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2008, OECD, 2004).
Using a fully harmonized panel dataset across 14 European countries between the early 1990s and
2001, the ECHP, we fill a gap in the literature with the first cross-national comparative study which
explores the trends in persistent inequality and transitory inequality across Europe. The consistent com-
parative perspective on earnings dynamics across Europe enabled by the ECHP offers a valuable insight
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with respect to persistent earnings differentials and earnings instability in countries belonging to a com-
mon economic area, but with different systems and with different rates of adaptation to the economic
reality of the 1990s.
Our comparative study of permanent inequality and earnings instability across Europe between the
mid-1990s and the early 2000s reveals substantial similarities between countries, despite their differences
in welfare regimes, labour market institutions and geographical region. We find a substantial degree
of convergence in the overall inequality among the Mediterranean countries, the Continental countries
(Germany, France and Luxembourg) and the Anglo-Saxon countries, which reflects a convergence in
both permanent and transitory inequality among these countries. Among the Nordic/Flexicurity countries
(Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium) we find a strong divergence in the overall
inequality which is driven by a divergence in both permanent and transitory inequality. Pooling most
countries in Europe, we find evidence of a strong convergence in earnings instability.
The Nordic/Flexicurity countries have a lower overall inequality, a lower persistent inequality and a
lower share of persistent inequality in the overall inequality. This suggests that these countries not only
have the lowest annual and long-run inequality, but also the highest probability of individuals changing
ranks within the wage distribution. Thus more flexible labour markets are associated with a higher
earnings mobility.
We show that these cross-national differences in persistent inequality and earnings instability across
Europe can be partly explained by the labour market policies and institutions linked to the wage-setting
mechanism. We find many significant strong associations between these labour market policies and
institutions and permanent inequality and earnings instability. The controlled associations indicate that
the more deregulation in the labour and product markets, the higher the degree of unionisation, the
higher the degree of corporatism and the higher the tax wedge, the lower the permanent inequality. For
transitory inequality, we find that countries with a high degree of corporatism have on average a lower
earnings instability than those with a low and an intermediate level.
The relationships between labour market factors and the two components of earnings inequality are
more complex than these associations show. Labour market policies and institutions interact with each
other and with macroeconomic shocks in shaping persistent inequality and earnings instability. The
study of these complex interactions and their effect on persistent inequality and earnings instability is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, these questions are explored using a non-linear least squares
approach in Sologon and O’Donoghue (2011c,a). These studies reinforce our main findings regarding
the associations between the two components of earnings inequality and labour market factors.
Labour market institutions do matter in shaping persistent inequality and earnings instability and
21
further work is required to shed light on their potential to reduce earnings inequality and economic
insecurity stemming from earnings instability .
22
Table 1: Summary Statistics
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
UK Mean 8,16 8,11 8,22 8,34 8,68 9,01 9,21 9,68
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,189 0,188 0,177 0,174 0,174 0,167 0,172 0,171
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 64,59 66,31 67,06 67,04 67,36 68,33 68,58
N 1859 1882 1967 2059 2076 2066 2065 2021
Ireland Mean 9,3 9,54 9,76 10,02 10,43 10,84 11,69 12,44
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,249 0,237 0,226 0,213 0,206 0,179 0,167 0,164
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 49,99 50,04 52,41 53,13 54,1 51,63 54,65
N 1762 1561 1393 1348 1238 1081 891 764
Denmark Mean 10,89 11,40 11,58 11,61 11,86 11,85 12,02 12,08
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,091 0,077 0,084 0,08 0,07 0,08 0,079 0,069
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 68,74 66,59 69,43 66,23 67,41 69,6 71,6
N 1360 1339 1284 1224 1125 1051 1015 997
Finland Mean 7,89 8,01 8,41 8,45 8,66 8,86
Mean ln(wage) 2,07 2,08 2,13 2,13 2,16 2,18
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,1 0,11 0,095 0,107 0,095 0,11
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 55,95 57,2 59,29 53,83 64,16
N 1613 1628 1606 1557 1293 1297
Netherlands Mean 9,69 9,56 9,59 9,7 10,02 9,88 10,04 9,91
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,119 0,126 0,14 0,125 0,114 0,106 0,114 0,152
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 69,07 71,37 68,68 67,52 67,24 68,56 69,59
N 2209 2390 2444 2416 2351 2379 2412 2371
Belgium Mean 8,48 8,82 8,71 8,75 8,81 8,83 8,92 9,1
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,121 0,097 0,101 0,105 0,096 0,101 0,092 0,103
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 63,43 63,65 64,38 63,88 64,28 65,15 64,38
N 1475 1410 1362 1304 1216 1153 1079 999
Austria Mean 9,08 8,33 8,37 8,49 8,55 8,55 8,54
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,137 0,117 0,111 0,096 0,097 0,095 0,101
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 67,96 68,2 67,49 67,2 66,51 68,21
N 1673 1673 1619 1520 1427 1309 1246
France[1] Mean 10,23 9,92 9,87 10,05 10,33 10,6 10,55 10,87
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,233 0,223 0,216 0,23 0,241 0,242 0,236 0,231
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 62,47 64,76 62 52,08 54,24 55,54 60,8
N 2960 2845 2865 2673 2146 2066 2030 2114
Germany Mean 9,43 9,49 9,61 9,52 9,57 9,48 9,6 9,72
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,176 0,183 0,174 0,169 0,165 0,182 0,177 0,17
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 66,99 67,37 66,2 63,01 64,84 64,86 64,39
N 3010 3147 3106 3025 2815 2802 2700 2550
Luxembourg Mean 16,18 15,81 16,73 17,39 17,15 17,22 17,1
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,214 0,23 0,225 0,213 0,24 0,249 0,233
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 64,75 69,48 69,33 69,81 68,71 70,39
N 1712 1436 1597 1475 1516 1363 1407
Italy Mean 7,16 6,91 6,96 7,05 7,29 7,37 7,28 7,32
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,118 0,109 0,117 0,114 0,125 0,122 0,122 0,123
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 51,58 51,19 47,18 47,34 46,87 48,73 48,86
N 3063 3107 3098 2858 2812 2616 2621 2433
Spain Mean 6,83 6,95 7,09 6,89 7,18 7,37 7,45 7,42
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,243 0,252 0,241 0,252 0,25 0,217 0,208 0,205
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 47,6 48,29 48,49 48,63 52,13 52,12 56,06
N 2905 2756 2696 2651 2530 2527 2451 2425
Portugal Mean 9,08 8,33 8,37 8,49 8,55 8,55 8,54 9,08
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,25 0,27 0,258 0,26 0,262 0,241 0,258 0,266
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 57,84 57,5 57,32 56,98 59,12 60,83 62,16
N 1912 2082 2180 2227 2253 2224 2199 2194
Greece Mean 4,95 5,03 5,23 5,59 5,63 5,85 5,7 5,77
Var(Ln Earnings) 0,179 0,184 0,176 0,197 0,199 0,221 0,215 0,205
(%t-1 |Waget >0) 45,83 45,69 44,98 42,09 43,52 46,06 49,72
N 1666 1656 1577 1500 1385 1355 1315 1365
Notes:
(i) Weighted statistics, except for N = un-weighted number of individuals with positive earnings
(ii) The mean refers to mean positive hourly earnings expressed in Euro. Var(Ln Earnings) refers
to the variance of ln hourly earnings. (%t-1 | Waget >0) is the share of individuals present in the
sample in year t− 1 which record positive earnings in year t.
(ii) The amounts for France are gross.
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Table 3: The Spearman rank correlation between the actual and the predicted aggregate inequality across
models
Actual Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Model 1 0.9868*
Model 2 0.9956* 0.9912*
Model 3 1* 0.9868* 0.9956*
Model 4 0.9956* 0.9912* 1* 0.9956*
Model 5 0.9868* 0.9736* 0.9824* 0.9868* 0.9824*
Model 6 0.9341* 0.9209* 0.9297* 0.9341* 0.9297* 0.9736*
Note: The symbol "*" marks the 0.05 significance level.
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Table 5: The Spearman rank correlation for the predicted permanent and transitory inequality across
models
Permanent Inequality
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Model 2 0.9824*
Model 3 0.9560* 0.9824*
Model 4 0.9648* 0.9868* 0.9956*
Model 5 0.9780* 0.9912* 0.9780* 0.9736*
Model 6 0.9736* 0.9824* 0.9604* 0.9648* 0.9824*
Transitory Inequality
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Model 2 0.9429*
Model 3 0.8198* 0.8989*
Model 4 0.8593* 0.9297* 0.9780*
Model 5 0.7275* 0.8066* 0.8286* 0.7978*
Model 6 0.8593* 0.8769* 0.8857* 0.8901* 0.9341*
Note: The symbol "*" marks the 0.05 significance level.
Table 6: The Spearman rank correlation for the share of permanent inequality in the aggregate inequality
in 2001 across models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Model 2 0.7934*
Model 3 0.7978* 0.8462*
Model 4 0.8637* 0.9121* 0.9516*
Model 5 0.8462* 0.8462* 0.9121* 0.9253*
Model 6 0.9121* 0.8110* 0.8593* 0.9121* 0.9692*
Note: The symbol "*" marks the 0.05 significance level.
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Table 8: The pairwise correlation between permanent and transitory inequality and the labour market
policies and institutions
Permanent Inequality Transitory Inequality
EPL 0.3083* 0.19
ALMPs -0.3235* -0.1359
Unemploymnet benefit RR -0.2654* -0.2121*
Labour market support -0.3301* -0.1779
Union density -0.6502* -0.3773*
Corporatism -0.5896* -0.4593*
PMR 0.248* 0.0124
Tax wedge -0.2823* -0.2969*
Note: The symbol "*" marks the 0.05 significance level. The number of observations N=93.
Table 9: OLS regression between permanent and transitory inequality and the labour market policies and
institutions
(1) (2)
Permanent Inequality Transitory Inequality
b/se b/se
EPL 0.009** -0.001
(0.004) (0.002)
LM Support -0.027 -0.002
(0.017) (0.009)
Union Density -0.048*** -0.013
(0.015) (0.008)
High Corporatism -0.048*** -0.011***
(0.007) (0.003)
PMR 0.011*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Tax wedge -0.178*** -0.033
(0.044) (0.023)
Constant 0.108*** 0.065***
(0.008) (0.004)
Time effects Yes Yes
r2 0.791 0.448
N 93 93
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Note: The variables for the labour market institutions are expressed in deviation from the sample mean,
so that the constant captures the variances for a country with an average mix of institutions and
low corporatism.
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A Appendix
A.1 OECD Labour Market Indicators
Table A1: Description of OECD Variables.
Source: Bassanini and Duval (2006a,b)
EPL= Employment Protection Leg-
islation
OECD summary indicator of the stringency of
Employment Protection Legislation. EPL ranges
from 0 to 6.
Union Density Trade union density rate, i.e. the share of workers
affiliated to a trade union, in %.
Degree of Corporatism Indicator of the degree of centralisation/co-
ordination of the wage bargaining processes,
which takes values 1 for decentralised and unco-
ordinated processes, and 2 and 3 for intermediate
and high
Tax Wedge The tax wedge expresses the sum of personal in-
come tax and all social security contributions as a
percentage of total labour cost.
PMR= Product Market Regulation OECD summary indicator of regulatory imped-
iments to product market competition in seven
non-manufacturing industries. The data used in
this paper cover regulations and market condi-
tions in seven energy and service industries. PMR
ranges from 0 to 6.
ALMPs = Public expenditures on
active labour market policies
Public expenditures on active labour market pro-
grammes per unemployed worker as a share of
GDP per capita, in %.
Average unemployment benefit re-
placement rate
Average unemployment benefit replacement rate
across two income situations (100% and 67% of
APW earnings), three family situations (single,
with dependent spouse, with spouse in work)
Labour Market Support Following Milberg and Winkler (2009), the labour
market support indicator is computed as the arith-
metic average of the spending on active labour
market policies (ALMPs, as% of GDP) and the
unemployment benefit replacement rate.
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A.2 Error component estimates
A.2.1 The Canonical Model: λ1,tγ1,c[σ2µ]+λ2,tγ2,c[σ2 ]
Table A2 reports the estimation results for the canonical model with time and cohort shifters in equation
(1). The SE and the 95% confidence intervals are reported in parantheses. Most parameter estimates are
highly significant at 5% level.
The country estimates of persistent inequality, σ2µ, indicate a country clustering which mirrors the re-
gional/institutional clustering identified in Figure 1. The Scandinavian countries, Denmark and Finland,
have the lowest persistent inequality, followed by Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria. These countries
form the Nordic/Flexicurity cluster. The highest is found in the Mediterranean countries (Portugal and
Spain), followed by France. Most t-tests for the country differences in persistent inequality indicate sig-
nificant differences across Europe at 5% level of significance, confirming the country rankings. We fail
to reject the null hypothesis that persistent inequality σ2µ is equal between Belgium and the Netherlands,
between Austria and Italy, and between Germany and Luxembourg. The time shifters for the permanent
component have values close to 1 and indicate a significant increase in persistent inequality between
1994 and 2001 across Europe, except in Denmark where it decreases, and in Belgium, Ireland, the UK
and Spain where the increase is not significant.
The variance of the transitory shocks, σ2 , does not indicate the same regional clustering as the esti-
mates for σ2µ. The t-tests indicate that Denmark has the lowest variance of transitory shocks and France
the highest. The time shifters for the transitory component are lower than for the permanent component
in most countries and indicate a significant decrease in transitory inequality over time across Europe,
except in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, UK and Spain, where the change is not significant.
The cohort shifters indicate a significantly higher persistent inequality for older cohorts and a signif-
icantly higher earnings instability for younger cohorts in all countries. These trends confirm the expec-
tation that permanent earnings differentials play a larger role in the formation of earnings differentials
of older cohorts compared with younger ones, which experience a higher earnings instability due to
temporary contracts and more frequent job changes.
A.2.2 Model 2: λ1,tγ1,c[σ2µ]+λ2,tγ2,c[AR(1), σ20]
Next we extend the model by incorporating an AR(1) process in the transitory component, with an ini-
tial transitory variance common across cohorts (equation (2)). Table A3 reports the estimation results.
The country estimates of persistent inequality, σ2µ confirm the regional clustering and the overall country
ranking found using the canonical model. The Scandinavian countries have a significantly lower persis-
tent variance than all other European countries, followed by the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria. The
highest persistent variance is in Portugal and Spain, followed by France. The Scandinavian countries
do not differ significantly in their persistent variance. We find the same between Belgium and Austria,
between the UK and Ireland, and between Germany and Luxembourg. Consistent with the canonical
model, the time shifters confirm that most countries experience a significant increase in persistent in-
equality. Denmark, Belgium and the UK experience a significant decrease. The change is not significant
in Austria, Ireland and Spain.
The returns to the persistent characteristics differ significantly across Europe, both within and be-
tween the regional/institutional clusters. Within the Nordic / Flexicurity cluster, the evolution of the
time shifters indicate a divergence in persistent inequality: in 2001, the returns become significantly
higher in Finland and the Netherlands than in Denmark, Belgium and Austria. Within the Continen-
tal cluster, the returns become significantly higher in Luxembourg than in Germany and France. The
returns in Ireland become significantly higher than in the UK. Within the Mediterranean cluster, only
Spain differs significantly, with a lower return than Portugal, Greece and Italy. These findings sug-
gest a potential divergence in persistent inequality within each cluster, except the Mediterranean cluster.
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We also find many significant differences between countries belonging to different regional/institutional
clusters. The Nordic/Flexicurity countries differ significantly from most countries. More similarities are
found between some countries belonging to the other institutional clusters: e.g between France and the
Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Greece and Italy), between Ireland and Spain, and between Germany
and Portugal.30 We expect a potential convergence in persistent inequality within the Continental/Anglo-
Saxon/Mediterranean cluster.
The variance of initial transitory shocks are significantly lower than the variance of subsequent tran-
sitory shocks in most countries. We find evidence that the persistence of transitory shocks varies sig-
nificantly across Europe. Portugal has a significantly higher autoregressive parameter than the other
countries, followed by Austria and Belgium, which do not differ significantly from each other. At a
significantly lower level we find Greece and the UK with similar values. At significantly lower lev-
els of shocks persistence we find Denmark, then Italy, Germany and France with similar levels. The
lowest level is in Spain, which differs significantly from most countries, except Finland, Ireland and
Luxembourg. The time shifters for the transitory component reconfirm the decreasing trends in tran-
sitory inequality, except for Luxembourg where it increases, and Finland, the Netherlands and Ireland
where the change is not significant.
A.2.3 Model 3: λ1,tγ1,c[σ2µ]+λ2,tγ2,c[AR(1), σ20,c
Next we allow the initial transitory variances to vary by cohort. Table A4 reports the estimation results.
The country estimates of persistent inequality, σ2µ, confirm, in general, the country rankings found in
the previous models: the Nordic/Flexicurity countries have the lowest persistent inequality, whereas the
Portugal and Spain, followed by France have the highest. Most country differences are statistically sig-
nificant, except between Denmark and Finland, between Belgium and the Netherlands, between Ireland
and Germany, and between Luxembourg, the UK and Greece.
Consistent with the previous models, the time trends indicate a significant increase in persistent
inequality in most countries, and a significant decrease in Denmark, Austria, Belgium, and Germany.
Insignificant changes are found in Ireland and Spain.31 Overall we find evidence that the returns to
the persistent characteristics differ significantly between countries, both within and between the re-
gional/institutional clusters. Consistent with the previous model, the time shifters indicate a divergent
trend in the returns to the persistent characteristics between countries within the Nordic/Flexicurity clus-
ter: in 2001 the returns become significantly higher in Finland than in all other countries, followed by
the Netherlands, Belgium, and, lastly, Denmark and Austria. The returns differ significantly between
these countries, except between the latter two. The returns differ significantly between the Continental
countries: Luxembourg has the highest and Germany lowest returns in 2001. Within the Mediterranean
cluster, only Spain differs significantly in 2001. The returns in the Anglo-Saxon countries do not differ
significantly. Most country differences between these regional/institutional clusters are consistent with
the previous model.
We find evidence of many significant differences between countries with respect to the persistence of
transitory shocks ρ. Compared with the previous model, some countries shuffle their ranks, but the jumps
are small. The highest levels of persistence are still in Austria, Portugal, Greece, Belgium. Portugal and
Greece do not differ significantly. Next we find Denmark and Germany with similar levels (which do not
differ significantly); then the UK with a significantly lower persistence, followed by two country clusters
within which countries do not differ significantly. Luxembourg, Finland and Spain is the cluster with the
lowest persistence in Europe. The trends in the time shifters of the transitory component are consistent
with the previous model, except for the Netherlands and Ireland where the decrease becomes significant.
30By similarities, we mean that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the country differences are significant at 5 % level of
significance.
31Germany and the UK switch trends.
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We find evidence of three country clusters which differ significantly in the estimated time shifters in
2001. Within each cluster, we failed to reject the null hypotheses that the parameter estimates are the
same at 5% level of significance. Denmark, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy form the cluster
with the lowest time shifter in 200132. Spain and Portugal form the second cluster, the Netherlands, the
UK, Ireland and Finland the third cluster. the Netherlands, however, is not statistically significant from
Spain and Portugal. The 2001 time shifters for Greece and Luxembourg differ significantly from the
other countries. We expect to find a convergence in the predicted transitory variances across Europe.
A.2.4 Model 4: λ1,tγ1,c[σ2µ]+λ2,tγ2,c[AR(1), σ20 , correction left-censoring]
Next we introduce the correction for left-censoring (Table A5). The estimate of ξ is significantly dif-
ferent from 0 in seven countries. The parameter estimates of the permanent and transitory components
are robust to the correction for left-censoring. The trends, magnitudes and significance are consistent
with the model with cohort-specific initial transitory variances. The country ranking with respect to the
estimated persistent inequality σ2µ confirms the country ranking from the previous model.
The estimates of the autoregressive parameters are consistent with the previous models. Overall, the
ranks are maintained. Austria, Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Denmark and Germany still hold the highest
ranks. The country differences in the estimated autoregressive parameter are significantly different from
0, except for Austria and Portugal, Greece and Belgium, Denmark and Germany. At a lower rank we
find the UK with a significantly lower parameter than the other countries. Luxembourg has the low-
est autoregressive parameter, significantly different from the other European countries, expect Finland,
which in turn is significantly lower than the other countries except Ireland and Spain. The time shifters
for the transitory component are robust to the correction for left-censoring. The trends and the levels
are consistent with the model with cohort-specific initial transitory variances. The three country clusters
with respect to the estimated time shifters in 2001 are, in general, confirmed by this model.
A.2.5 Model 5: λ1,tγ1,c[RG]+λ2,tγ2,c[AR(1), σ2c,0]
Next we extend the previous model by incorporating a random growth in age in the permanent compo-
nent of earnings (Table A6). Most estimates are highly significant. In addition to the previous models,
this specification identifies the heterogeneity in age-earnings profiles and the covariance between initial
heterogeneity and life cycle heterogeneity. We find a high degree of similarity across the European coun-
tries with respect to the heterogeneity in the individual growth rates.33 Italy, Spain, Austria, Denmark,
Finland and France have among the lowest variances in the earnings earnings growth rates and do not
differ significantly. Greece and Ireland have a significantly higher variance than Denmark, Finland and
Italy, but not the rest. The Netherlands has a significantly higher heterogeneity in earnings growth rates
than Denmark, Finland, Italy and the UK. At a significant higher level we find Belgium, then a cluster
formed by Luxembourg, Germany and Portugal with similar levels which do not differ significantly. The
estimates imply that, for example, in Denmark the hourly earnings growth for an individual located one
standard deviation above the mean in the distribution of ϕ is with .93% (= 100 ∗
√
σ2ϕ) faster than the
cohort mean, in the UK with 1.08%, in Belgium with 2.4% and in Germany with 4.8% faster than the
cohort mean.
Most countries record a significant negative covariance between the heterogeneity in initial earnings
and the heterogeneity in the slope of the earnings growth cov(µϕ), which suggests the presence of mo-
bility in the distribution of permanent earnings over the life cycle. Denmark and Spain record a negative
but insignificant covariance. France and Italy record a significant positive covariance which implies a
positive association between initial and life cycle heterogeneity, equivalent to increasing persistent dif-
32The equality in the estimates between Denmark and Austria is rejected at 5% significance level, but not at 1%.
33The level of confidence is 0.05, unless mentioned otherwise.
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ferentials over the life cycle. Austria, Ireland and the UK have a positive but insignificant covariance.
Considering only the significant parameters, the t-test for the country differences reveal that most dif-
ferences are significant, except for the difference between Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal, between
Finland and Greece, and between France and Italy.
Controlling for the age effect, the time trend indicates a significant widening of persistent differentials
between the first and the last wave in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal, and a significant
decrease in the rest of Europe. In Finland, Italy and Spain the change is not significant. The t-tests
bring evidence of many significant cross-country differences in the estimates of the 2001 time shifters,
confirming the divergent trend in persistent differentials identified in the previous models. Among the
countries identified in the previous models as having a low overall persistent inequality, Denmark, Fin-
land, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Italy, most cross-country differences in the estimates of the
time shifter in 2001 are significant. Exceptions are Denmark and Austria, Finland and Italy. Most dif-
ferences are significant also among the countries identified as having a high overall persistent inequality.
Exceptions are the UK and Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal.
The estimates of the transitory component are precisely estimated. The variances of initial transitory
shocks are, in general, lower than the variance of subsequent transitory shocks. The autoregressive
parameter which captures the degree of shocks persistence varies significantly across Europe. The levels
of the estimated ρ are consistent with the previous models, except for Portugal, Greece, Germany and
France which drop to .54, .46, .35, .25 in this specification. Portugal’s rank is still in the top, after
Austria and Belgium, at a level significantly higher than the other EU countries. Denmark and Portugal
do not differ significantly. Greece drops to a level which does not differ significantly from the UK, and
which is significantly higher than the other countries. Germany drops to the same level as Italy, which
is significantly higher than the other countries. Consistent with the previous model, Luxembourg has
the lowest autoregressive parameter, followed by Spain, France, Ireland and Finland with similar levels
which do not differ significantly at 5% level.
The time loading factors for the transitory component decline significantly over the sample period
in most countries, except in Luxembourg where they increase, and Ireland where the change is not
significant, confirming most trends from the previous models. The country homogeneity in the 2001 time
factor identified in the previous model is confirmed as well. The country clusters are shuffled slightly
compared with the previous models . Denmark, Belgium and Germany are not statistically different. The
same holds for the Netherlands, Portugal, France, Greece, Italy and Germany. Spain and Finland differ
significantly from most countries, except Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK. The remaining countries
differ significantly from the other European countries, with isolated exceptions.
A.2.6 Model 6: λ1,tγ1,c[RG]+λ2,tγ2,c[AR(1), σ20 , correction left-censoring]
As a last step, the cohort-specific initial transitory variances are replaced by a specification that corrects
for left-censoring. The results are displayed in Table A7. The correction parameter is significantly
different from 0 in 9 countries. The parameters estimates of the permanent component are robust. We
find evidence of many significant country differences in the variance of time-invariant characteristics
at the start of the career. But we find a higher degree of similarity across the European countries with
respect to the heterogeneity in the individual growth rates compared with the previous model. Germany,
Portugal and Luxembourg have a significantly higher variance in the earnings growth rates than most
countries. Finland has a significantly higher variance than the Netherlands, Ireland and Greece. The sign
and the magnitude of the covariance between the heterogeneity in initial earnings and the heterogeneity
in the slope of the earnings growth are maintained, but the covariance is estimated to be different from
zero in 11 countries.
The estimate of the autoregressive parameter, the trends and the magnitude of the time shifters for
the transitory component are consistent with the previous model.
51
Ta
bl
e
A
2:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-C
an
on
ic
al
M
od
el
:λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[σ
2 µ
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[σ
2 
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Pe
rm
an
en
t
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 µ
-2
.1
89
-1
.9
49
-3
.1
38
-2
.9
49
-2
.7
20
-2
.6
99
-2
.5
58
-1
.8
44
-2
.0
38
-2
.0
78
-2
.5
27
-1
.6
89
-1
.4
34
-2
.3
60
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
27
]
(-
2.
22
8,
-2
.1
49
)
(-
2.
01
2,
-1
.8
86
)
(-
3.
21
7,
-3
.0
59
)
(-
3.
02
3,
-2
.8
75
)
(-
2.
77
8,
-2
.6
62
)
(-
2.
73
8,
-2
.6
61
)
(-
2.
62
2,
-2
.4
95
)
(-
1.
89
8,
-1
.7
89
)
(-
2.
08
9,
-1
.9
88
)
(-
2.
12
1,
-2
.0
35
)
(-
2.
57
2,
-2
.4
83
)
(-
1.
73
8,
-1
.6
39
)
(-
1.
48
9,
-1
.3
78
)
(-
2.
41
3,
-2
.3
07
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
1
,1
9
9
5
1.
04
5
1.
03
9
1.
11
0
.
1.
08
2
0.
95
4
.
1.
07
5
1.
09
1
.
1.
01
8
1.
05
1
1.
04
0
1.
13
6
[0
.0
07
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
19
]
[.
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
10
]
[.
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
09
]
[.
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
11
]
(1
.0
31
,1
.0
60
)
(1
.0
20
,1
.0
59
)
(1
.0
72
,1
.1
48
)
(.
,.
)
(1
.0
49
,1
.1
16
)
(0
.9
35
,0
.9
73
)
(.
,.
)
(1
.0
50
,1
.0
99
)
(1
.0
73
,1
.1
09
)
(.
,.
)
(1
.0
01
,1
.0
35
)
(1
.0
36
,1
.0
66
)
(1
.0
18
,1
.0
62
)
(1
.1
14
,1
.1
58
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
6
1.
01
8
1.
01
8
1.
12
0
.
1.
14
3
1.
05
4
1.
09
0
1.
12
3
1.
10
8
0.
98
7
1.
08
1
1.
04
2
1.
09
7
1.
19
2
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
19
]
[.
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
13
]
(1
.0
03
,1
.0
33
)
(0
.9
96
,1
.0
39
)
(1
.0
83
,1
.1
56
)
(.
,.
)
(1
.1
09
,1
.1
78
)
(1
.0
37
,1
.0
70
)
(1
.0
57
,1
.1
23
)
(1
.1
01
,1
.1
46
)
(1
.0
89
,1
.1
27
)
(0
.9
49
,1
.0
24
)
(1
.0
61
,1
.1
01
)
(1
.0
26
,1
.0
57
)
(1
.0
74
,1
.1
19
)
(1
.1
66
,1
.2
17
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
7
1.
06
8
1.
08
3
1.
07
3
1.
19
7
1.
13
1
1.
01
2
1.
13
7
1.
17
7
1.
09
0
1.
10
3
1.
06
8
1.
07
4
1.
12
1
1.
28
5
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
15
]
(1
.0
52
,1
.0
84
)
(1
.0
60
,1
.1
07
)
(1
.0
36
,1
.1
09
)
(1
.1
59
,1
.2
34
)
(1
.1
02
,1
.1
60
)
(0
.9
93
,1
.0
32
)
(1
.1
01
,1
.1
73
)
(1
.1
53
,1
.2
01
)
(1
.0
70
,1
.1
09
)
(1
.0
70
,1
.1
36
)
(1
.0
48
,1
.0
88
)
(1
.0
56
,1
.0
91
)
(1
.0
97
,1
.1
44
)
(1
.2
55
,1
.3
14
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
8
1.
06
3
1.
06
6
1.
07
3
1.
19
9
1.
20
2
1.
01
8
1.
08
8
1.
19
3
1.
10
4
1.
15
9
1.
18
9
1.
10
5
1.
14
6
1.
31
3
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
15
]
(1
.0
46
,1
.0
81
)
(1
.0
39
,1
.0
93
)
(1
.0
33
,1
.1
12
)
(1
.1
62
,1
.2
37
)
(1
.1
74
,1
.2
30
)
(0
.9
97
,1
.0
39
)
(1
.0
51
,1
.1
26
)
(1
.1
65
,1
.2
20
)
(1
.0
73
,1
.1
35
)
(1
.1
24
,1
.1
94
)
(1
.1
67
,1
.2
12
)
(1
.0
86
,1
.1
24
)
(1
.1
20
,1
.1
71
)
(1
.2
84
,1
.3
43
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
9
1.
05
6
1.
03
5
1.
07
2
1.
21
3
1.
12
2
0.
95
0
1.
09
2
1.
18
6
1.
15
9
1.
22
4
1.
20
5
1.
08
3
1.
10
7
1.
40
9
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
16
]
(1
.0
38
,1
.0
73
)
(1
.0
10
,1
.0
61
)
(1
.0
34
,1
.1
10
)
(1
.1
73
,1
.2
53
)
(1
.0
94
,1
.1
51
)
(0
.9
29
,0
.9
71
)
(1
.0
54
,1
.1
30
)
(1
.1
57
,1
.2
14
)
(1
.1
35
,1
.1
83
)
(1
.1
85
,1
.2
64
)
(1
.1
80
,1
.2
30
)
(1
.0
63
,1
.1
03
)
(1
.0
78
,1
.1
37
)
(1
.3
78
,1
.4
41
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
0
0.
99
8
0.
99
5
1.
00
2
1.
17
5
1.
13
5
1.
03
2
1.
10
2
1.
11
8
1.
16
6
1.
24
2
1.
18
8
1.
02
9
1.
20
5
1.
29
1
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
17
]
(0
.9
78
,1
.0
18
)
(0
.9
63
,1
.0
28
)
(0
.9
59
,1
.0
45
)
(1
.1
36
,1
.2
14
)
(1
.1
06
,1
.1
64
)
(1
.0
08
,1
.0
57
)
(1
.0
58
,1
.1
46
)
(1
.0
86
,1
.1
50
)
(1
.1
41
,1
.1
91
)
(1
.1
90
,1
.2
94
)
(1
.1
63
,1
.2
12
)
(1
.0
06
,1
.0
52
)
(1
.1
72
,1
.2
39
)
(1
.2
58
,1
.3
23
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
1
1.
01
6
0.
99
1
0.
95
6
1.
21
9
1.
19
0
1.
00
5
1.
07
3
1.
11
9
1.
07
2
1.
18
8
1.
17
5
1.
00
1
1.
17
9
1.
27
3
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.9
96
,1
.0
36
)
(0
.9
54
,1
.0
28
)
(0
.9
18
,0
.9
94
)
(1
.1
72
,1
.2
65
)
(1
.1
53
,1
.2
26
)
(0
.9
81
,1
.0
30
)
(1
.0
29
,1
.1
17
)
(1
.0
87
,1
.1
52
)
(1
.0
40
,1
.1
05
)
(1
.1
52
,1
.2
24
)
(1
.1
46
,1
.2
03
)
(0
.9
76
,1
.0
27
)
(1
.1
46
,1
.2
13
)
(1
.2
38
,1
.3
07
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
1
,5
1
−
6
0
1.
01
1
0.
98
0
0.
95
3
0.
91
8
0.
89
1
1.
01
5
0.
88
2
0.
86
3
0.
96
3
0.
95
5
0.
92
2
0.
98
5
0.
92
2
0.
91
2
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
12
]
(0
.9
88
,1
.0
34
)
(0
.9
39
,1
.0
21
)
(0
.9
14
,0
.9
93
)
(0
.8
77
,0
.9
60
)
(0
.8
66
,0
.9
17
)
(0
.9
91
,1
.0
40
)
(0
.8
48
,0
.9
15
)
(0
.8
36
,0
.8
90
)
(0
.9
33
,0
.9
94
)
(0
.9
20
,0
.9
91
)
(0
.8
94
,0
.9
49
)
(0
.9
57
,1
.0
14
)
(0
.8
89
,0
.9
54
)
(0
.8
89
,0
.9
35
)
γ
1
,6
1
−
7
0
0.
94
6
0.
87
5
0.
83
0
0.
83
7
0.
73
5
0.
80
8
0.
84
0
0.
79
6
0.
75
5
0.
94
2
0.
72
2
0.
78
8
0.
80
1
0.
72
1
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
09
]
(0
.9
23
,0
.9
70
)
(0
.8
38
,0
.9
12
)
(0
.8
03
,0
.8
58
)
(0
.8
07
,0
.8
67
)
(0
.7
16
,0
.7
55
)
(0
.7
89
,0
.8
26
)
(0
.7
97
,0
.8
83
)
(0
.7
71
,0
.8
21
)
(0
.7
31
,0
.7
78
)
(0
.9
07
,0
.9
77
)
(0
.6
99
,0
.7
44
)
(0
.7
63
,0
.8
12
)
(0
.7
71
,0
.8
32
)
(0
.7
03
,0
.7
39
)
γ
1
,7
1
−
8
0
0.
70
2
0.
64
3
0.
78
1
0.
74
0
0.
59
5
0.
49
0
0.
63
2
0.
56
0
0.
48
4
0.
61
7
0.
59
4
0.
48
8
0.
45
4
0.
59
0
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
13
]
(0
.6
76
,0
.7
27
)
(0
.6
03
,0
.6
83
)
(0
.7
45
,0
.8
17
)
(0
.6
92
,0
.7
87
)
(0
.5
68
,0
.6
22
)
(0
.4
73
,0
.5
08
)
(0
.6
03
,0
.6
60
)
(0
.5
32
,0
.5
87
)
(0
.4
60
,0
.5
08
)
(0
.5
83
,0
.6
50
)
(0
.5
71
,0
.6
17
)
(0
.4
68
,0
.5
08
)
(0
.4
35
,0
.4
74
)
(0
.5
64
,0
.6
15
)
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
52
C
on
tin
ue
d:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-C
an
on
ic
al
M
od
el
:λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[σ
2 µ
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[σ
2 
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Tr
an
si
to
ry
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 
-2
.8
45
-2
.6
51
-3
.5
57
-2
.9
45
-3
.3
27
-3
.1
28
-2
.6
15
-2
.3
07
-2
.8
25
-3
.2
78
-3
.3
96
-2
.9
33
-2
.9
73
-2
.5
49
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.0
56
]
[0
.0
69
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
54
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.0
52
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.0
65
]
[0
.0
30
]
(-
2.
91
2,
-2
.7
79
)
(-
2.
75
0,
-2
.5
52
)
(-
3.
65
1,
-3
.4
63
)
(-
3.
05
5,
-2
.8
36
)
(-
3.
46
1,
-3
.1
92
)
(-
3.
19
6,
-3
.0
61
)
(-
2.
72
0,
-2
.5
09
)
(-
2.
40
5,
-2
.2
09
)
(-
2.
92
7,
-2
.7
23
)
(-
3.
42
2,
-3
.1
33
)
(-
3.
47
7,
-3
.3
15
)
(-
3.
03
1,
-2
.8
34
)
(-
3.
10
0,
-2
.8
45
)
(-
2.
60
8,
-2
.4
90
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
2
,1
9
9
5
0.
95
8
0.
76
7
0.
72
0
.
0.
91
4
0.
76
4
.
0.
74
3
0.
85
4
.
0.
85
6
0.
93
4
1.
11
8
0.
92
4
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
27
]
[.
]
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
18
]
[.
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
26
]
[.
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
17
]
(0
.9
14
,1
.0
01
)
(0
.7
31
,0
.8
04
)
(0
.6
67
,0
.7
73
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.8
27
,1
.0
01
)
(0
.7
27
,0
.8
00
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.6
84
,0
.8
01
)
(0
.8
03
,0
.9
05
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.8
18
,0
.8
93
)
(0
.8
82
,0
.9
85
)
(1
.0
56
,1
.1
79
)
(0
.8
90
,0
.9
57
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
6
0.
93
8
0.
76
4
0.
81
4
.
0.
89
5
0.
64
5
0.
70
8
0.
57
9
0.
74
0
1.
48
4
0.
95
4
0.
86
6
0.
91
5
0.
81
4
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
30
]
[.
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
67
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
13
]
(0
.8
98
,0
.9
78
)
(0
.7
29
,0
.7
99
)
(0
.7
55
,0
.8
74
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.8
24
,0
.9
66
)
(0
.6
20
,0
.6
70
)
(0
.6
59
,0
.7
56
)
(0
.5
23
,0
.6
34
)
(0
.6
91
,0
.7
90
)
(1
.3
52
,1
.6
15
)
(0
.9
01
,1
.0
08
)
(0
.8
20
,0
.9
13
)
(0
.8
56
,0
.9
73
)
(0
.7
89
,0
.8
39
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
7
0.
80
3
0.
64
2
0.
84
1
0.
90
5
0.
89
8
0.
75
3
0.
60
7
0.
58
7
0.
68
1
1.
06
5
0.
84
6
0.
87
7
0.
89
9
0.
73
3
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
13
]
(0
.7
70
,0
.8
35
)
(0
.6
08
,0
.6
75
)
(0
.7
88
,0
.8
95
)
(0
.8
45
,0
.9
65
)
(0
.8
16
,0
.9
80
)
(0
.7
22
,0
.7
84
)
(0
.5
64
,0
.6
51
)
(0
.5
38
,0
.6
36
)
(0
.6
34
,0
.7
27
)
(0
.9
83
,1
.1
47
)
(0
.8
07
,0
.8
85
)
(0
.8
30
,0
.9
23
)
(0
.8
39
,0
.9
58
)
(0
.7
08
,0
.7
57
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
8
0.
81
4
0.
69
5
0.
73
9
0.
70
0
0.
55
9
0.
74
3
0.
47
0
0.
69
3
0.
67
5
0.
77
9
0.
85
6
0.
90
2
0.
93
8
0.
72
1
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
13
]
(0
.7
85
,0
.8
43
)
(0
.6
60
,0
.7
30
)
(0
.6
84
,0
.7
95
)
(0
.6
48
,0
.7
52
)
(0
.5
13
,0
.6
05
)
(0
.7
08
,0
.7
78
)
(0
.4
41
,0
.4
99
)
(0
.6
38
,0
.7
48
)
(0
.6
28
,0
.7
22
)
(0
.7
07
,0
.8
52
)
(0
.8
13
,0
.9
00
)
(0
.8
53
,0
.9
51
)
(0
.8
80
,0
.9
96
)
(0
.6
96
,0
.7
46
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
9
0.
82
4
0.
67
3
0.
93
2
0.
89
6
0.
68
9
0.
95
2
0.
59
6
0.
67
0
0.
77
3
0.
89
1
0.
76
8
0.
79
7
1.
00
3
0.
68
9
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
12
]
(0
.7
92
,0
.8
56
)
(0
.6
38
,0
.7
07
)
(0
.8
74
,0
.9
91
)
(0
.8
31
,0
.9
60
)
(0
.6
30
,0
.7
47
)
(0
.9
15
,0
.9
89
)
(0
.5
50
,0
.6
42
)
(0
.6
11
,0
.7
28
)
(0
.7
28
,0
.8
19
)
(0
.8
25
,0
.9
58
)
(0
.7
27
,0
.8
10
)
(0
.7
53
,0
.8
40
)
(0
.9
36
,1
.0
69
)
(0
.6
65
,0
.7
12
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
0
1.
00
2
0.
69
4
0.
92
4
0.
77
4
0.
80
2
0.
72
2
0.
60
2
0.
71
5
0.
59
8
0.
99
8
0.
81
1
0.
92
2
0.
94
0
0.
85
9
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
14
]
(0
.9
64
,1
.0
40
)
(0
.6
57
,0
.7
31
)
(0
.8
71
,0
.9
78
)
(0
.7
27
,0
.8
22
)
(0
.7
37
,0
.8
68
)
(0
.6
94
,0
.7
50
)
(0
.5
62
,0
.6
43
)
(0
.6
64
,0
.7
65
)
(0
.5
63
,0
.6
33
)
(0
.9
25
,1
.0
70
)
(0
.7
71
,0
.8
51
)
(0
.8
72
,0
.9
71
)
(0
.8
75
,1
.0
05
)
(0
.8
31
,0
.8
87
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
1
0.
99
0
0.
74
6
0.
82
9
0.
83
0
1.
02
5
0.
94
6
0.
63
9
0.
71
3
0.
83
7
1.
06
1
0.
87
6
0.
98
4
1.
19
4
0.
87
7
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
16
]
(0
.9
56
,1
.0
24
)
(0
.7
02
,0
.7
90
)
(0
.7
79
,0
.8
78
)
(0
.7
73
,0
.8
87
)
(0
.9
50
,1
.1
00
)
(0
.8
95
,0
.9
97
)
(0
.5
96
,0
.6
82
)
(0
.6
59
,0
.7
66
)
(0
.7
91
,0
.8
83
)
(0
.9
92
,1
.1
30
)
(0
.8
35
,0
.9
18
)
(0
.9
32
,1
.0
37
)
(1
.1
17
,1
.2
71
)
(0
.8
46
,0
.9
08
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
2
,5
1
−
6
0
0.
87
4
0.
97
0
1.
06
0
0.
87
6
1.
06
0
0.
98
4
0.
86
4
0.
90
1
1.
03
2
0.
90
2
1.
00
5
1.
01
0
0.
76
9
0.
90
4
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
13
]
(0
.8
46
,0
.9
01
)
(0
.9
09
,1
.0
30
)
(1
.0
24
,1
.0
97
)
(0
.8
33
,0
.9
19
)
(1
.0
07
,1
.1
14
)
(0
.9
57
,1
.0
10
)
(0
.8
09
,0
.9
20
)
(0
.8
59
,0
.9
44
)
(0
.9
78
,1
.0
85
)
(0
.8
48
,0
.9
56
)
(0
.9
70
,1
.0
40
)
(0
.9
68
,1
.0
52
)
(0
.7
19
,0
.8
19
)
(0
.8
79
,0
.9
30
)
γ
2
,6
1
−
7
0
0.
99
1
1.
10
0
1.
17
7
0.
92
8
1.
08
6
0.
91
6
0.
93
3
0.
86
9
0.
93
3
1.
03
7
1.
10
6
1.
01
9
0.
85
9
1.
02
9
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
14
]
(0
.9
61
,1
.0
21
)
(1
.0
38
,1
.1
61
)
(1
.1
41
,1
.2
14
)
(0
.8
84
,0
.9
72
)
(1
.0
35
,1
.1
38
)
(0
.8
93
,0
.9
39
)
(0
.8
75
,0
.9
90
)
(0
.8
32
,0
.9
05
)
(0
.8
88
,0
.9
78
)
(0
.9
66
,1
.1
08
)
(1
.0
70
,1
.1
42
)
(0
.9
78
,1
.0
59
)
(0
.8
09
,0
.9
09
)
(1
.0
01
,1
.0
57
)
γ
2
,7
1
−
8
0
1.
07
8
1.
22
8
1.
75
9
1.
20
1
1.
79
6
1.
21
9
1.
15
9
1.
45
1
1.
51
0
1.
32
2
1.
30
6
1.
29
3
1.
01
3
0.
97
3
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
19
]
(1
.0
44
,1
.1
13
)
(1
.1
63
,1
.2
92
)
(1
.7
05
,1
.8
14
)
(1
.1
35
,1
.2
66
)
(1
.7
08
,1
.8
83
)
(1
.1
83
,1
.2
54
)
(1
.0
84
,1
.2
35
)
(1
.3
82
,1
.5
21
)
(1
.4
34
,1
.5
86
)
(1
.2
23
,1
.4
21
)
(1
.2
58
,1
.3
55
)
(1
.2
43
,1
.3
43
)
(0
.9
55
,1
.0
71
)
(0
.9
36
,1
.0
10
)
SS
R
0.
01
7
0.
03
7
0.
01
4
0.
00
6
0.
01
4
0.
01
1
0.
00
9
0.
03
1
0.
02
5
0.
03
1
0.
00
5
0.
01
4
0.
04
4
0.
03
2
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
53
Ta
bl
e
A
3:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-M
od
el
2:
λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[σ
2 µ
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[A
R
(1
),
σ
2 0
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Pe
rm
an
en
t
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 µ
-2
.0
75
-1
.9
94
-2
.9
26
-3
.0
43
-2
.7
27
-2
.5
67
-2
.5
12
-1
.8
23
-2
.0
44
-2
.1
08
-2
.4
73
-1
.6
76
-1
.3
62
-2
.2
43
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
33
]
(-
2.
12
4,
-2
.0
26
)
(-
2.
06
3,
-1
.9
24
)
(-
3.
00
9,
-2
.8
44
)
(-
3.
13
3,
-2
.9
53
)
(-
2.
79
2,
-2
.6
61
)
(-
2.
61
1,
-2
.5
24
)
(-
2.
60
0,
-2
.4
24
)
(-
1.
88
0,
-1
.7
65
)
(-
2.
09
8,
-1
.9
90
)
(-
2.
15
4,
-2
.0
61
)
(-
2.
51
9,
-2
.4
26
)
(-
1.
72
7,
-1
.6
26
)
(-
1.
42
2,
-1
.3
03
)
(-
2.
30
8,
-2
.1
78
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
1
,1
9
9
5
0.
97
1
1.
03
3
1.
00
3
.
1.
06
4
0.
90
5
.
1.
06
1
1.
06
9
.
0.
98
3
1.
04
0
0.
97
7
1.
05
6
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
20
]
[.
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
11
]
[.
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
09
]
[.
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
14
]
(0
.9
54
,0
.9
89
)
(1
.0
13
,1
.0
53
)
(0
.9
63
,1
.0
42
)
(.
,.
)
(1
.0
26
,1
.1
01
)
(0
.8
83
,0
.9
27
)
(.
,.
)
(1
.0
35
,1
.0
87
)
(1
.0
52
,1
.0
87
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
65
,1
.0
01
)
(1
.0
24
,1
.0
56
)
(0
.9
53
,1
.0
00
)
(1
.0
29
,1
.0
83
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
6
0.
89
4
1.
01
0
0.
98
6
.
1.
10
3
0.
95
5
1.
01
1
1.
11
4
1.
08
7
0.
96
3
1.
02
1
1.
02
6
1.
04
1
1.
09
2
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
20
]
[.
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.8
73
,0
.9
16
)
(0
.9
87
,1
.0
32
)
(0
.9
46
,1
.0
25
)
(.
,.
)
(1
.0
64
,1
.1
41
)
(0
.9
34
,0
.9
77
)
(0
.9
63
,1
.0
59
)
(1
.0
88
,1
.1
40
)
(1
.0
66
,1
.1
08
)
(0
.9
23
,1
.0
04
)
(0
.9
97
,1
.0
44
)
(1
.0
09
,1
.0
43
)
(1
.0
17
,1
.0
66
)
(1
.0
57
,1
.1
27
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
7
0.
93
2
1.
09
6
0.
90
6
1.
16
4
1.
10
2
0.
87
0
1.
05
7
1.
14
7
1.
07
0
1.
09
2
1.
00
1
1.
05
1
1.
01
8
1.
20
3
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
22
]
(0
.9
06
,0
.9
57
)
(1
.0
67
,1
.1
24
)
(0
.8
65
,0
.9
47
)
(1
.1
21
,1
.2
08
)
(1
.0
66
,1
.1
38
)
(0
.8
44
,0
.8
95
)
(1
.0
01
,1
.1
13
)
(1
.1
17
,1
.1
76
)
(1
.0
48
,1
.0
92
)
(1
.0
55
,1
.1
29
)
(0
.9
76
,1
.0
26
)
(1
.0
32
,1
.0
71
)
(0
.9
90
,1
.0
45
)
(1
.1
60
,1
.2
45
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
8
0.
91
8
1.
07
4
0.
91
2
1.
19
1
1.
19
9
0.
83
8
0.
98
4
1.
14
7
1.
07
6
1.
15
7
1.
11
5
1.
08
0
1.
01
9
1.
13
9
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
23
]
(0
.8
88
,0
.9
47
)
(1
.0
43
,1
.1
05
)
(0
.8
65
,0
.9
59
)
(1
.1
41
,1
.2
41
)
(1
.1
64
,1
.2
33
)
(0
.8
10
,0
.8
66
)
(0
.9
27
,1
.0
41
)
(1
.1
13
,1
.1
81
)
(1
.0
43
,1
.1
10
)
(1
.1
17
,1
.1
97
)
(1
.0
86
,1
.1
44
)
(1
.0
59
,1
.1
01
)
(0
.9
88
,1
.0
49
)
(1
.0
94
,1
.1
84
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
9
0.
91
6
1.
03
9
0.
81
8
1.
18
7
1.
11
8
0.
73
3
0.
90
8
1.
14
3
1.
12
9
1.
21
5
1.
14
1
1.
06
3
0.
98
7
1.
20
5
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
25
]
(0
.8
85
,0
.9
46
)
(1
.0
09
,1
.0
70
)
(0
.7
70
,0
.8
65
)
(1
.1
25
,1
.2
49
)
(1
.0
83
,1
.1
53
)
(0
.7
05
,0
.7
61
)
(0
.8
34
,0
.9
82
)
(1
.1
08
,1
.1
78
)
(1
.1
02
,1
.1
56
)
(1
.1
70
,1
.2
60
)
(1
.1
10
,1
.1
72
)
(1
.0
41
,1
.0
85
)
(0
.9
54
,1
.0
21
)
(1
.1
57
,1
.2
53
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
0
0.
85
7
0.
99
9
0.
78
9
1.
17
5
1.
11
8
0.
86
8
0.
94
0
1.
07
6
1.
15
2
1.
23
4
1.
12
8
1.
01
0
1.
09
2
1.
06
6
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
24
]
(0
.8
26
,0
.8
88
)
(0
.9
61
,1
.0
37
)
(0
.7
41
,0
.8
37
)
(1
.1
21
,1
.2
30
)
(1
.0
82
,1
.1
54
)
(0
.8
39
,0
.8
97
)
(0
.8
64
,1
.0
17
)
(1
.0
39
,1
.1
12
)
(1
.1
24
,1
.1
79
)
(1
.1
76
,1
.2
92
)
(1
.0
97
,1
.1
58
)
(0
.9
85
,1
.0
35
)
(1
.0
54
,1
.1
31
)
(1
.0
19
,1
.1
14
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
1
0.
93
2
1.
00
9
0.
81
4
1.
30
3
1.
19
0
0.
86
4
0.
94
2
1.
09
9
1.
05
9
1.
19
9
1.
13
7
0.
99
3
1.
07
6
1.
13
3
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
24
]
(0
.9
03
,0
.9
61
)
(0
.9
67
,1
.0
51
)
(0
.7
71
,0
.8
57
)
(1
.2
45
,1
.3
61
)
(1
.1
48
,1
.2
33
)
(0
.8
35
,0
.8
94
)
(0
.8
67
,1
.0
18
)
(1
.0
63
,1
.1
35
)
(1
.0
24
,1
.0
94
)
(1
.1
59
,1
.2
40
)
(1
.1
04
,1
.1
69
)
(0
.9
66
,1
.0
19
)
(1
.0
37
,1
.1
15
)
(1
.0
85
,1
.1
81
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
1
,5
1
−
6
0
1.
00
7
0.
98
3
0.
92
3
0.
92
9
0.
88
4
1.
00
7
0.
89
2
0.
86
1
0.
96
6
0.
95
8
0.
91
8
0.
98
5
0.
93
4
0.
89
4
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
13
]
(0
.9
81
,1
.0
33
)
(0
.9
39
,1
.0
27
)
(0
.8
84
,0
.9
63
)
(0
.8
82
,0
.9
76
)
(0
.8
57
,0
.9
11
)
(0
.9
81
,1
.0
34
)
(0
.8
53
,0
.9
31
)
(0
.8
33
,0
.8
89
)
(0
.9
34
,0
.9
99
)
(0
.9
21
,0
.9
95
)
(0
.8
89
,0
.9
47
)
(0
.9
56
,1
.0
15
)
(0
.8
99
,0
.9
69
)
(0
.8
67
,0
.9
20
)
γ
1
,6
1
−
7
0
0.
91
8
0.
86
6
0.
77
4
0.
84
4
0.
71
4
0.
77
3
0.
83
5
0.
79
0
0.
74
9
0.
93
9
0.
70
5
0.
78
1
0.
76
9
0.
63
5
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
10
]
(0
.8
92
,0
.9
44
)
(0
.8
27
,0
.9
06
)
(0
.7
45
,0
.8
03
)
(0
.8
10
,0
.8
78
)
(0
.6
93
,0
.7
35
)
(0
.7
53
,0
.7
93
)
(0
.7
84
,0
.8
87
)
(0
.7
64
,0
.8
16
)
(0
.7
24
,0
.7
74
)
(0
.9
03
,0
.9
75
)
(0
.6
81
,0
.7
29
)
(0
.7
56
,0
.8
06
)
(0
.7
37
,0
.8
01
)
(0
.6
15
,0
.6
55
)
γ
1
,7
1
−
8
0
0.
60
5
0.
62
4
0.
54
8
0.
68
7
0.
50
3
0.
13
3
0.
45
9
0.
50
8
0.
41
0
0.
58
2
0.
54
3
0.
45
8
0.
31
4
0.
52
0
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
19
]
(0
.5
69
,0
.6
40
)
(0
.5
77
,0
.6
71
)
(0
.4
86
,0
.6
09
)
(0
.6
29
,0
.7
44
)
(0
.4
65
,0
.5
41
)
(0
.0
54
,0
.2
13
)
(0
.4
02
,0
.5
17
)
(0
.4
74
,0
.5
41
)
(0
.3
77
,0
.4
44
)
(0
.5
45
,0
.6
20
)
(0
.5
14
,0
.5
73
)
(0
.4
34
,0
.4
81
)
(0
.2
74
,0
.3
54
)
(0
.4
83
,0
.5
57
)
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
54
C
on
tin
ue
d:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-M
od
el
2:
λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[σ
2 µ
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[A
R
(1
),
σ
2 0
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Tr
an
si
to
ry
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 0
-3
.0
73
-2
.5
36
-3
.6
21
-2
.8
37
-3
.3
02
-3
.1
99
-2
.5
88
-2
.3
25
-2
.7
07
-3
.1
22
-3
.4
18
-2
.9
40
-3
.1
52
-2
.6
83
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
49
]
[0
.0
56
]
[0
.0
70
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
65
]
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
70
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
54
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.0
40
]
(-
3.
17
3,
-2
.9
73
)
(-
2.
64
4,
-2
.4
29
)
(-
3.
71
8,
-3
.5
24
)
(-
2.
94
7,
-2
.7
26
)
(-
3.
43
9,
-3
.1
65
)
(-
3.
27
0,
-3
.1
28
)
(-
2.
71
6,
-2
.4
61
)
(-
2.
43
0,
-2
.2
21
)
(-
2.
81
5,
-2
.5
99
)
(-
3.
25
9,
-2
.9
85
)
(-
3.
50
8,
-3
.3
27
)
(-
3.
04
5,
-2
.8
36
)
(-
3.
34
3,
-2
.9
61
)
(-
2.
76
2,
-2
.6
04
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 
-1
.7
31
-3
.0
78
-1
.4
68
-3
.3
40
-3
.0
25
-0
.6
15
-0
.7
28
-0
.2
53
-1
.7
08
-3
.6
38
-0
.6
93
-1
.5
96
-1
.3
53
-0
.8
33
[0
.1
92
]
[0
.2
07
]
[0
.2
60
]
[0
.2
19
]
[0
.2
05
]
[0
.1
70
]
[0
.1
81
]
[0
.5
81
]
[0
.4
10
]
[0
.1
99
]
[0
.5
06
]
[0
.3
46
]
[0
.2
07
]
[0
.1
92
]
(-
2.
10
7,
-1
.3
55
)
(-
3.
48
4,
-2
.6
73
)
(-
1.
97
8,
-0
.9
58
)
(-
3.
76
9,
-2
.9
11
)
(-
3.
42
7,
-2
.6
23
)
(-
0.
94
8,
-0
.2
82
)
(-
1.
08
3,
-0
.3
73
)
(-
1.
39
1,
0.
88
4)
(-
2.
51
2,
-0
.9
04
)
(-
4.
02
8,
-3
.2
47
)
(-
1.
68
6,
0.
29
9)
(-
2.
27
4,
-0
.9
18
)
(-
1.
75
8,
-0
.9
48
)
(-
1.
20
8,
-0
.4
57
)
ρ
0.
58
9
0.
31
4
0.
54
2
0.
28
3
0.
32
6
0.
64
6
0.
70
1
0.
35
7
0.
40
2
0.
30
2
0.
40
0
0.
27
1
0.
77
8
0.
61
1
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
15
]
(0
.5
65
,0
.6
13
)
(0
.2
62
,0
.3
65
)
(0
.5
16
,0
.5
68
)
(0
.2
43
,0
.3
22
)
(0
.3
04
,0
.3
48
)
(0
.6
28
,0
.6
64
)
(0
.6
44
,0
.7
58
)
(0
.3
04
,0
.4
10
)
(0
.3
59
,0
.4
44
)
(0
.2
70
,0
.3
35
)
(0
.3
67
,0
.4
33
)
(0
.2
42
,0
.3
01
)
(0
.7
49
,0
.8
08
)
(0
.5
82
,0
.6
40
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
2
,1
9
9
5
0.
52
3
0.
96
0
0.
27
0
.
0.
77
0
0.
20
8
.
0.
26
4
0.
52
4
.
0.
22
8
0.
47
9
0.
50
6
0.
38
0
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
94
]
[0
.0
33
]
[.
]
[0
.0
70
]
[0
.0
19
]
[.
]
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.1
07
]
[.
]
[0
.0
58
]
[0
.0
83
]
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.0
37
]
(0
.4
23
,0
.6
23
)
(0
.7
76
,1
.1
43
)
(0
.2
04
,0
.3
35
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.6
32
,0
.9
08
)
(0
.1
71
,0
.2
46
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.1
10
,0
.4
18
)
(0
.3
14
,0
.7
34
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.1
14
,0
.3
43
)
(0
.3
15
,0
.6
42
)
(0
.4
03
,0
.6
09
)
(0
.3
07
,0
.4
53
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
6
0.
49
0
0.
98
7
0.
26
0
.
0.
76
9
0.
16
9
0.
29
3
0.
18
5
0.
43
0
1.
74
0
0.
24
3
0.
43
6
0.
31
2
0.
29
5
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.1
04
]
[0
.0
35
]
[.
]
[0
.0
83
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.1
71
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.0
30
]
(0
.3
90
,0
.5
89
)
(0
.7
83
,1
.1
90
)
(0
.1
91
,0
.3
29
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.6
07
,0
.9
30
)
(0
.1
39
,0
.1
98
)
(0
.2
36
,0
.3
50
)
(0
.0
77
,0
.2
93
)
(0
.2
56
,0
.6
03
)
(1
.4
05
,2
.0
75
)
(0
.1
22
,0
.3
65
)
(0
.2
85
,0
.5
86
)
(0
.2
40
,0
.3
84
)
(0
.2
35
,0
.3
54
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
7
0.
43
6
0.
79
4
0.
26
0
1.
15
1
0.
75
6
0.
18
8
0.
20
9
0.
20
9
0.
39
1
1.
29
6
0.
21
8
0.
45
4
0.
35
4
0.
23
8
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.1
21
]
[0
.0
79
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.1
36
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
25
]
(0
.3
51
,0
.5
22
)
(0
.6
37
,0
.9
52
)
(0
.1
92
,0
.3
29
)
(0
.9
15
,1
.3
88
)
(0
.6
01
,0
.9
10
)
(0
.1
55
,0
.2
20
)
(0
.1
65
,0
.2
53
)
(0
.0
88
,0
.3
30
)
(0
.2
30
,0
.5
52
)
(1
.0
29
,1
.5
62
)
(0
.1
09
,0
.3
26
)
(0
.3
01
,0
.6
08
)
(0
.2
79
,0
.4
29
)
(0
.1
89
,0
.2
87
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
8
0.
44
1
0.
87
4
0.
22
8
0.
92
2
0.
49
6
0.
19
4
0.
17
2
0.
25
1
0.
40
4
1.
00
4
0.
22
6
0.
47
6
0.
37
2
0.
28
8
[0
.0
43
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.1
04
]
[0
.0
49
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
72
]
[0
.0
85
]
[0
.0
90
]
[0
.0
57
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
28
]
(0
.3
56
,0
.5
25
)
(0
.7
09
,1
.0
38
)
(0
.1
68
,0
.2
88
)
(0
.7
18
,1
.1
27
)
(0
.3
99
,0
.5
92
)
(0
.1
61
,0
.2
26
)
(0
.1
34
,0
.2
11
)
(0
.1
09
,0
.3
92
)
(0
.2
39
,0
.5
70
)
(0
.8
28
,1
.1
79
)
(0
.1
14
,0
.3
37
)
(0
.3
17
,0
.6
34
)
(0
.2
95
,0
.4
50
)
(0
.2
33
,0
.3
43
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
9
0.
43
8
0.
87
1
0.
30
5
1.
16
3
0.
57
9
0.
23
3
0.
22
7
0.
24
1
0.
46
1
1.
17
5
0.
20
2
0.
41
6
0.
35
5
0.
30
4
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.1
20
]
[0
.0
60
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
69
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.1
06
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.0
29
]
(0
.3
57
,0
.5
20
)
(0
.7
12
,1
.0
30
)
(0
.2
28
,0
.3
82
)
(0
.9
27
,1
.3
99
)
(0
.4
61
,0
.6
96
)
(0
.1
94
,0
.2
72
)
(0
.1
83
,0
.2
71
)
(0
.1
05
,0
.3
77
)
(0
.2
71
,0
.6
50
)
(0
.9
66
,1
.3
83
)
(0
.1
03
,0
.3
02
)
(0
.2
77
,0
.5
56
)
(0
.2
83
,0
.4
28
)
(0
.2
47
,0
.3
62
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
0
0.
50
3
0.
90
3
0.
29
7
0.
99
5
0.
68
4
0.
18
9
0.
22
0
0.
25
6
0.
36
2
1.
28
0
0.
21
2
0.
46
9
0.
34
8
0.
35
0
[0
.0
49
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.1
02
]
[0
.0
70
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.1
16
]
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
34
]
(0
.4
08
,0
.5
98
)
(0
.7
30
,1
.0
76
)
(0
.2
21
,0
.3
72
)
(0
.7
96
,1
.1
95
)
(0
.5
46
,0
.8
21
)
(0
.1
57
,0
.2
20
)
(0
.1
77
,0
.2
63
)
(0
.1
10
,0
.4
01
)
(0
.2
12
,0
.5
11
)
(1
.0
52
,1
.5
08
)
(0
.1
08
,0
.3
16
)
(0
.3
12
,0
.6
27
)
(0
.2
77
,0
.4
19
)
(0
.2
83
,0
.4
17
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
1
0.
46
8
0.
93
5
0.
26
8
0.
96
6
0.
85
4
0.
22
5
0.
22
5
0.
24
7
0.
48
6
1.
29
0
0.
22
0
0.
49
1
0.
39
2
0.
32
7
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
96
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.1
05
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
72
]
[0
.1
03
]
[0
.1
22
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
32
]
(0
.3
78
,0
.5
57
)
(0
.7
47
,1
.1
24
)
(0
.1
99
,0
.3
37
)
(0
.7
60
,1
.1
72
)
(0
.6
83
,1
.0
26
)
(0
.1
88
,0
.2
62
)
(0
.1
80
,0
.2
70
)
(0
.1
06
,0
.3
88
)
(0
.2
84
,0
.6
88
)
(1
.0
51
,1
.5
29
)
(0
.1
12
,0
.3
28
)
(0
.3
26
,0
.6
57
)
(0
.3
14
,0
.4
71
)
(0
.2
65
,0
.3
90
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
2
,5
1
−
6
0
0.
95
4
0.
95
1
1.
13
3
0.
85
2
1.
06
9
1.
02
1
0.
84
1
0.
90
9
0.
97
2
0.
89
8
1.
00
9
1.
00
6
0.
78
0
0.
98
0
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.9
20
,0
.9
87
)
(0
.8
86
,1
.0
16
)
(1
.0
88
,1
.1
77
)
(0
.8
09
,0
.8
96
)
(1
.0
15
,1
.1
23
)
(0
.9
90
,1
.0
52
)
(0
.7
91
,0
.8
91
)
(0
.8
66
,0
.9
52
)
(0
.9
17
,1
.0
27
)
(0
.8
46
,0
.9
50
)
(0
.9
71
,1
.0
48
)
(0
.9
62
,1
.0
50
)
(0
.7
05
,0
.8
55
)
(0
.9
44
,1
.0
15
)
γ
2
,6
1
−
7
0
1.
07
6
1.
10
1
1.
22
0
0.
88
7
1.
12
2
0.
96
8
0.
89
9
0.
90
5
0.
90
9
1.
02
7
1.
09
3
1.
03
7
1.
01
0
1.
14
2
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
21
]
(1
.0
40
,1
.1
12
)
(1
.0
34
,1
.1
68
)
(1
.1
82
,1
.2
58
)
(0
.8
42
,0
.9
32
)
(1
.0
67
,1
.1
77
)
(0
.9
44
,0
.9
91
)
(0
.8
44
,0
.9
53
)
(0
.8
66
,0
.9
44
)
(0
.8
62
,0
.9
57
)
(0
.9
57
,1
.0
96
)
(1
.0
55
,1
.1
32
)
(0
.9
93
,1
.0
80
)
(0
.9
32
,1
.0
88
)
(1
.1
01
,1
.1
84
)
γ
2
,7
1
−
8
0
1.
17
8
1.
16
1
1.
84
8
1.
18
8
1.
81
5
1.
28
3
1.
19
8
1.
47
8
1.
44
2
1.
27
6
1.
32
5
1.
31
5
1.
10
7
0.
99
5
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
47
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
23
]
(1
.1
35
,1
.2
21
)
(1
.0
92
,1
.2
29
)
(1
.7
87
,1
.9
09
)
(1
.1
24
,1
.2
52
)
(1
.7
25
,1
.9
05
)
(1
.2
46
,1
.3
21
)
(1
.1
16
,1
.2
79
)
(1
.4
07
,1
.5
49
)
(1
.3
62
,1
.5
21
)
(1
.1
85
,1
.3
68
)
(1
.2
72
,1
.3
77
)
(1
.2
61
,1
.3
69
)
(1
.0
27
,1
.1
87
)
(0
.9
50
,1
.0
40
)
SS
R
0.
00
9
0.
03
3
0.
00
7
0.
00
5
0.
01
1
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
02
5
0.
02
0
0.
02
6
0.
00
2
0.
01
1
0.
02
9
0.
02
0
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
55
Ta
bl
e
A
4:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-M
od
el
3:
λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[σ
2 µ
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[A
R
(1
),
σ
2 c,
0
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Pe
rm
an
en
t
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 µ
-2
.2
64
-1
.9
88
-2
.9
49
-3
.0
47
-2
.6
15
-2
.6
62
-2
.3
52
-1
.8
00
-1
.9
24
-2
.2
34
-2
.4
88
-1
.6
89
-1
.4
59
-2
.2
13
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
54
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
38
]
(-
2.
31
0,
-2
.2
19
)
(-
2.
06
1,
-1
.9
16
)
(-
3.
03
8,
-2
.8
60
)
(-
3.
13
2,
-2
.9
61
)
(-
2.
67
3,
-2
.5
57
)
(-
2.
71
1,
-2
.6
14
)
(-
2.
45
8,
-2
.2
46
)
(-
1.
85
8,
-1
.7
43
)
(-
1.
97
6,
-1
.8
72
)
(-
2.
28
4,
-2
.1
85
)
(-
2.
53
6,
-2
.4
41
)
(-
1.
74
0,
-1
.6
38
)
(-
1.
53
3,
-1
.3
85
)
(-
2.
28
7,
-2
.1
38
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
1
,1
9
9
5
1.
03
5
1.
03
5
1.
01
4
.
1.
00
6
0.
94
2
.
1.
05
1
0.
98
8
.
0.
98
9
1.
04
6
1.
01
3
1.
03
0
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
21
]
[.
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
12
]
[.
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
09
]
[.
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
16
]
(1
.0
18
,1
.0
52
)
(1
.0
13
,1
.0
57
)
(0
.9
74
,1
.0
55
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
75
,1
.0
38
)
(0
.9
19
,0
.9
65
)
(.
,.
)
(1
.0
26
,1
.0
76
)
(0
.9
69
,1
.0
06
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
71
,1
.0
08
)
(1
.0
30
,1
.0
61
)
(0
.9
85
,1
.0
41
)
(0
.9
99
,1
.0
61
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
6
0.
98
8
1.
01
2
0.
99
9
.
1.
03
3
1.
00
4
0.
90
8
1.
10
6
0.
99
4
1.
02
2
1.
02
9
1.
03
2
1.
08
8
1.
06
7
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
21
]
[.
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
21
]
(0
.9
69
,1
.0
06
)
(0
.9
88
,1
.0
36
)
(0
.9
59
,1
.0
40
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
97
,1
.0
68
)
(0
.9
80
,1
.0
28
)
(0
.8
48
,0
.9
67
)
(1
.0
80
,1
.1
31
)
(0
.9
70
,1
.0
18
)
(0
.9
78
,1
.0
65
)
(1
.0
06
,1
.0
51
)
(1
.0
16
,1
.0
49
)
(1
.0
56
,1
.1
19
)
(1
.0
25
,1
.1
09
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
7
1.
05
0
1.
09
5
0.
91
9
1.
17
1
1.
03
1
0.
92
2
0.
92
8
1.
13
4
0.
97
6
1.
18
1
1.
01
0
1.
06
0
1.
07
8
1.
17
4
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
26
]
(1
.0
28
,1
.0
71
)
(1
.0
66
,1
.1
25
)
(0
.8
74
,0
.9
64
)
(1
.1
32
,1
.2
10
)
(1
.0
02
,1
.0
60
)
(0
.8
94
,0
.9
51
)
(0
.8
65
,0
.9
91
)
(1
.1
06
,1
.1
62
)
(0
.9
51
,1
.0
01
)
(1
.1
40
,1
.2
22
)
(0
.9
85
,1
.0
34
)
(1
.0
40
,1
.0
79
)
(1
.0
43
,1
.1
13
)
(1
.1
22
,1
.2
26
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
8
1.
05
4
1.
06
9
0.
92
6
1.
19
8
1.
12
6
0.
89
2
0.
85
6
1.
13
0
0.
95
7
1.
24
9
1.
12
5
1.
08
9
1.
08
7
1.
08
1
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
28
]
(1
.0
29
,1
.0
79
)
(1
.0
36
,1
.1
02
)
(0
.8
76
,0
.9
76
)
(1
.1
51
,1
.2
45
)
(1
.0
98
,1
.1
55
)
(0
.8
60
,0
.9
23
)
(0
.7
85
,0
.9
26
)
(1
.0
96
,1
.1
63
)
(0
.9
22
,0
.9
92
)
(1
.2
06
,1
.2
93
)
(1
.0
96
,1
.1
54
)
(1
.0
68
,1
.1
10
)
(1
.0
49
,1
.1
25
)
(1
.0
27
,1
.1
35
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
9
1.
05
0
1.
03
6
0.
83
1
1.
19
7
1.
04
8
0.
78
5
0.
77
3
1.
12
6
1.
01
2
1.
32
0
1.
15
2
1.
07
1
1.
05
6
1.
15
6
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
29
]
(1
.0
25
,1
.0
75
)
(1
.0
03
,1
.0
68
)
(0
.7
81
,0
.8
81
)
(1
.1
43
,1
.2
51
)
(1
.0
18
,1
.0
78
)
(0
.7
54
,0
.8
17
)
(0
.6
98
,0
.8
48
)
(1
.0
90
,1
.1
61
)
(0
.9
83
,1
.0
41
)
(1
.2
72
,1
.3
69
)
(1
.1
20
,1
.1
84
)
(1
.0
49
,1
.0
92
)
(1
.0
15
,1
.0
97
)
(1
.0
98
,1
.2
14
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
0
0.
98
6
0.
99
6
0.
80
2
1.
18
3
1.
04
6
0.
92
5
0.
80
2
1.
05
8
1.
04
8
1.
34
2
1.
13
9
1.
01
8
1.
16
5
1.
01
1
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
29
]
(0
.9
60
,1
.0
12
)
(0
.9
56
,1
.0
35
)
(0
.7
49
,0
.8
54
)
(1
.1
33
,1
.2
33
)
(1
.0
15
,1
.0
78
)
(0
.8
91
,0
.9
58
)
(0
.7
23
,0
.8
81
)
(1
.0
21
,1
.0
95
)
(1
.0
21
,1
.0
76
)
(1
.2
81
,1
.4
04
)
(1
.1
08
,1
.1
71
)
(0
.9
93
,1
.0
43
)
(1
.1
18
,1
.2
12
)
(0
.9
54
,1
.0
68
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
1
1.
05
0
1.
00
6
0.
82
6
1.
30
6
1.
11
2
0.
92
1
0.
81
1
1.
08
4
0.
94
9
1.
29
8
1.
14
7
1.
00
0
1.
15
2
1.
09
0
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
29
]
(1
.0
25
,1
.0
75
)
(0
.9
62
,1
.0
50
)
(0
.7
79
,0
.8
72
)
(1
.2
50
,1
.3
62
)
(1
.0
76
,1
.1
48
)
(0
.8
90
,0
.9
51
)
(0
.7
33
,0
.8
89
)
(1
.0
48
,1
.1
21
)
(0
.9
13
,0
.9
86
)
(1
.2
54
,1
.3
41
)
(1
.1
13
,1
.1
81
)
(0
.9
73
,1
.0
26
)
(1
.1
06
,1
.1
99
)
(1
.0
33
,1
.1
47
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
1
,5
1
−
6
0
1.
01
7
0.
97
8
0.
92
4
0.
92
6
0.
88
2
1.
01
3
0.
90
3
0.
85
9
0.
98
5
0.
95
6
0.
91
8
0.
98
6
0.
93
8
0.
88
6
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
14
]
(0
.9
91
,1
.0
43
)
(0
.9
34
,1
.0
22
)
(0
.8
84
,0
.9
65
)
(0
.8
80
,0
.9
73
)
(0
.8
55
,0
.9
08
)
(0
.9
86
,1
.0
40
)
(0
.8
63
,0
.9
43
)
(0
.8
32
,0
.8
86
)
(0
.9
51
,1
.0
20
)
(0
.9
19
,0
.9
93
)
(0
.8
89
,0
.9
47
)
(0
.9
57
,1
.0
15
)
(0
.8
99
,0
.9
76
)
(0
.8
58
,0
.9
13
)
γ
1
,6
1
−
7
0
0.
94
0
0.
86
0
0.
77
5
0.
84
1
0.
71
0
0.
77
8
0.
84
3
0.
78
0
0.
74
6
0.
94
0
0.
70
6
0.
78
2
0.
78
6
0.
60
6
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
12
]
(0
.9
14
,0
.9
66
)
(0
.8
21
,0
.8
99
)
(0
.7
45
,0
.8
04
)
(0
.8
07
,0
.8
74
)
(0
.6
89
,0
.7
31
)
(0
.7
57
,0
.7
98
)
(0
.7
91
,0
.8
95
)
(0
.7
54
,0
.8
05
)
(0
.7
19
,0
.7
73
)
(0
.9
04
,0
.9
76
)
(0
.6
82
,0
.7
30
)
(0
.7
57
,0
.8
07
)
(0
.7
51
,0
.8
21
)
(0
.5
83
,0
.6
29
)
γ
1
,7
1
−
8
0
0.
64
0
0.
62
0
0.
55
1
0.
68
7
0.
50
1
0.
14
2
0.
42
7
0.
50
0
0.
36
0
0.
59
3
0.
54
2
0.
45
8
0.
33
2
0.
50
0
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
21
]
(0
.6
08
,0
.6
73
)
(0
.5
72
,0
.6
68
)
(0
.4
89
,0
.6
13
)
(0
.6
29
,0
.7
44
)
(0
.4
63
,0
.5
39
)
(0
.0
67
,0
.2
18
)
(0
.3
62
,0
.4
91
)
(0
.4
65
,0
.5
35
)
(0
.3
13
,0
.4
07
)
(0
.5
57
,0
.6
29
)
(0
.5
13
,0
.5
72
)
(0
.4
35
,0
.4
81
)
(0
.2
96
,0
.3
68
)
(0
.4
58
,0
.5
41
)
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
56
C
on
tin
ue
d:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-M
od
el
3:
λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[σ
2 µ
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[A
R
(1
),
σ
2 c,
0
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Tr
an
si
to
ry
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 4
0
−
5
0
,0
-2
.3
69
-2
.4
02
-3
.4
00
-2
.7
83
-3
.7
81
-2
.7
50
-2
.9
20
-2
.2
64
-3
.8
73
-2
.5
87
-3
.3
64
-3
.1
29
-2
.4
39
-2
.5
69
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
66
]
[0
.0
79
]
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.1
07
]
[0
.0
49
]
[0
.1
87
]
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.0
60
]
[0
.0
92
]
[0
.0
96
]
[0
.0
56
]
(-
2.
44
1,
-2
.2
98
)
(-
2.
53
1,
-2
.2
72
)
(-
3.
55
5,
-3
.2
44
)
(-
2.
90
8,
-2
.6
59
)
(-
3.
96
7,
-3
.5
94
)
(-
2.
83
5,
-2
.6
64
)
(-
3.
13
0,
-2
.7
10
)
(-
2.
36
0,
-2
.1
68
)
(-
4.
24
0,
-3
.5
06
)
(-
2.
71
2,
-2
.4
62
)
(-
3.
48
2,
-3
.2
45
)
(-
3.
30
9,
-2
.9
49
)
(-
2.
62
7,
-2
.2
51
)
(-
2.
67
9,
-2
.4
58
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 5
1
−
6
0
,0
-2
.6
13
-2
.8
39
-3
.8
71
-2
.9
12
-3
.7
36
-3
.3
33
-2
.8
44
-2
.3
94
-2
.5
46
-2
.2
41
-3
.4
26
-2
.6
49
-2
.5
43
-3
.3
38
[0
.0
63
]
[0
.1
05
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.0
73
]
[0
.1
23
]
[0
.0
66
]
[0
.1
50
]
[0
.0
90
]
[0
.0
86
]
[0
.1
11
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.2
43
]
[0
.1
02
]
(-
2.
73
7,
-2
.4
90
)
(-
3.
04
5,
-2
.6
32
)
(-
4.
03
3,
-3
.7
10
)
(-
3.
05
4,
-2
.7
70
)
(-
3.
97
8,
-3
.4
94
)
(-
3.
46
3,
-3
.2
03
)
(-
3.
13
8,
-2
.5
50
)
(-
2.
57
1,
-2
.2
17
)
(-
2.
71
6,
-2
.3
77
)
(-
2.
45
8,
-2
.0
23
)
(-
3.
54
8,
-3
.3
03
)
(-
2.
79
5,
-2
.5
03
)
(-
3.
02
0,
-2
.0
66
)
(-
3.
53
8,
-3
.1
39
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 6
1
−
7
0
,0
-2
.9
91
-2
.8
04
-3
.5
46
-2
.9
27
-3
.8
05
-3
.2
39
-2
.6
85
-3
.0
23
-3
.2
75
-2
.7
00
-3
.2
01
-2
.6
37
-3
.4
26
-2
.6
97
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.0
67
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
54
]
[0
.1
23
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.1
08
]
[0
.1
14
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.2
16
]
[0
.0
52
]
(-
3.
15
6,
-2
.8
26
)
(-
2.
99
0,
-2
.6
18
)
(-
3.
67
8,
-3
.4
15
)
(-
3.
08
3,
-2
.7
71
)
(-
3.
97
7,
-3
.6
32
)
(-
3.
34
4,
-3
.1
34
)
(-
2.
92
6,
-2
.4
44
)
(-
3.
18
9,
-2
.8
58
)
(-
3.
48
6,
-3
.0
63
)
(-
2.
92
3,
-2
.4
78
)
(-
3.
30
2,
-3
.1
01
)
(-
2.
75
9,
-2
.5
15
)
(-
3.
84
9,
-3
.0
03
)
(-
2.
79
9,
-2
.5
94
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 7
1
−
8
0
,0
-3
.3
90
-2
.6
28
-3
.6
69
-2
.8
81
-3
.1
21
-3
.3
61
-2
.3
17
-2
.3
48
-2
.1
97
-3
.7
94
-3
.5
26
-2
.9
97
-3
.4
32
-2
.5
22
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.1
01
]
[0
.0
70
]
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.0
93
]
[0
.0
60
]
[0
.1
02
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.0
69
]
[0
.1
22
]
[0
.0
85
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.0
74
]
(-
3.
54
8,
-3
.2
33
)
(-
2.
82
5,
-2
.4
30
)
(-
3.
80
7,
-3
.5
32
)
(-
3.
06
7,
-2
.6
95
)
(-
3.
30
3,
-2
.9
38
)
(-
3.
47
7,
-3
.2
44
)
(-
2.
51
7,
-2
.1
16
)
(-
2.
53
7,
-2
.1
59
)
(-
2.
33
2,
-2
.0
62
)
(-
4.
03
3,
-3
.5
55
)
(-
3.
69
2,
-3
.3
60
)
(-
3.
17
0,
-2
.8
24
)
(-
3.
61
9,
-3
.2
45
)
(-
2.
66
6,
-2
.3
78
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 
-2
.9
93
-3
.1
49
-1
.5
42
-3
.4
63
-2
.6
94
-1
.4
11
-0
.1
16
-0
.2
27
-0
.1
80
-3
.9
87
-1
.2
40
-1
.9
78
-2
.2
49
-1
.4
47
[0
.1
08
]
[0
.1
89
]
[0
.2
75
]
[0
.2
14
]
[0
.2
08
]
[0
.1
52
]
[0
.2
32
]
[0
.5
78
]
[0
.5
25
]
[0
.1
67
]
[0
.3
87
]
[0
.2
93
]
[0
.1
92
]
[0
.1
46
]
(-
3.
20
5,
-2
.7
81
)
(-
3.
51
9,
-2
.7
79
)
(-
2.
08
1,
-1
.0
04
)
(-
3.
88
2,
-3
.0
44
)
(-
3.
10
1,
-2
.2
87
)
(-
1.
70
9,
-1
.1
12
)
(-
0.
57
0,
0.
33
8)
(-
1.
36
0,
0.
90
6)
(-
1.
20
8,
0.
84
9)
(-
4.
31
5,
-3
.6
59
)
(-
2.
00
0,
-0
.4
81
)
(-
2.
55
3,
-1
.4
03
)
(-
2.
62
6,
-1
.8
72
)
(-
1.
73
4,
-1
.1
60
)
ρ
0.
48
0
0.
34
1
0.
53
8
0.
27
5
0.
34
2
0.
62
8
0.
77
8
0.
39
9
0.
57
3
0.
23
9
0.
39
7
0.
26
3
0.
71
9
0.
67
7
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
13
]
(0
.4
55
,0
.5
04
)
(0
.2
93
,0
.3
90
)
(0
.5
11
,0
.5
66
)
(0
.2
34
,0
.3
15
)
(0
.3
20
,0
.3
64
)
(0
.6
08
,0
.6
48
)
(0
.7
41
,0
.8
16
)
(0
.3
50
,0
.4
49
)
(0
.5
32
,0
.6
15
)
(0
.2
07
,0
.2
71
)
(0
.3
67
,0
.4
27
)
(0
.2
34
,0
.2
91
)
(0
.6
87
,0
.7
50
)
(0
.6
51
,0
.7
04
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
2
,1
9
9
5
0.
92
1
0.
91
5
0.
27
4
.
0.
68
5
0.
29
4
.
0.
25
2
0.
29
0
.
0.
29
9
0.
59
0
0.
73
0
0.
50
3
[0
.0
43
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.0
36
]
[.
]
[0
.0
67
]
[0
.0
23
]
[.
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
76
]
[.
]
[0
.0
58
]
[0
.0
87
]
[0
.0
60
]
[0
.0
36
]
(0
.8
37
,1
.0
05
)
(0
.7
56
,1
.0
75
)
(0
.2
04
,0
.3
44
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.5
54
,0
.8
16
)
(0
.2
50
,0
.3
38
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.1
07
,0
.3
97
)
(0
.1
42
,0
.4
38
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.1
85
,0
.4
12
)
(0
.4
20
,0
.7
59
)
(0
.6
13
,0
.8
47
)
(0
.4
32
,0
.5
74
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
6
0.
92
3
0.
93
1
0.
26
4
.
0.
68
0
0.
24
0
0.
24
0
0.
17
0
0.
22
1
1.
97
7
0.
31
9
0.
54
0
0.
48
3
0.
38
5
[0
.0
54
]
[0
.0
90
]
[0
.0
37
]
[.
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.0
57
]
[0
.1
49
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.0
30
]
(0
.8
18
,1
.0
28
)
(0
.7
54
,1
.1
09
)
(0
.1
91
,0
.3
36
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.5
36
,0
.8
24
)
(0
.2
04
,0
.2
75
)
(0
.1
84
,0
.2
97
)
(0
.0
71
,0
.2
69
)
(0
.1
09
,0
.3
33
)
(1
.6
86
,2
.2
69
)
(0
.1
97
,0
.4
41
)
(0
.3
83
,0
.6
97
)
(0
.3
89
,0
.5
77
)
(0
.3
27
,0
.4
43
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
7
0.
81
6
0.
76
1
0.
26
5
1.
19
7
0.
66
4
0.
26
8
0.
17
1
0.
19
6
0.
19
3
1.
44
0
0.
28
5
0.
56
0
0.
54
2
0.
31
4
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.1
25
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
57
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.1
38
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.0
25
]
(0
.7
28
,0
.9
05
)
(0
.6
21
,0
.9
01
)
(0
.1
93
,0
.3
36
)
(0
.9
52
,1
.4
43
)
(0
.5
26
,0
.8
03
)
(0
.2
28
,0
.3
07
)
(0
.1
31
,0
.2
12
)
(0
.0
84
,0
.3
09
)
(0
.0
92
,0
.2
93
)
(1
.1
70
,1
.7
10
)
(0
.1
77
,0
.3
94
)
(0
.4
01
,0
.7
19
)
(0
.4
39
,0
.6
45
)
(0
.2
66
,0
.3
63
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
8
0.
80
1
0.
85
7
0.
23
1
0.
96
3
0.
44
2
0.
27
8
0.
14
0
0.
23
7
0.
21
4
1.
08
2
0.
29
6
0.
58
3
0.
58
0
0.
38
8
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.1
06
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.0
57
]
[0
.0
92
]
[0
.0
56
]
[0
.0
83
]
[0
.0
56
]
[0
.0
28
]
(0
.7
22
,0
.8
80
)
(0
.7
09
,1
.0
05
)
(0
.1
68
,0
.2
94
)
(0
.7
55
,1
.1
71
)
(0
.3
54
,0
.5
31
)
(0
.2
37
,0
.3
19
)
(0
.1
06
,0
.1
74
)
(0
.1
05
,0
.3
70
)
(0
.1
02
,0
.3
26
)
(0
.9
02
,1
.2
61
)
(0
.1
85
,0
.4
07
)
(0
.4
20
,0
.7
46
)
(0
.4
71
,0
.6
89
)
(0
.3
33
,0
.4
42
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
9
0.
80
4
0.
84
8
0.
31
0
1.
21
3
0.
51
4
0.
33
7
0.
17
2
0.
22
8
0.
23
2
1.
24
2
0.
26
4
0.
51
5
0.
56
2
0.
39
9
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
72
]
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.1
24
]
[0
.0
54
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
65
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.1
02
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.0
28
]
(0
.7
27
,0
.8
82
)
(0
.7
06
,0
.9
89
)
(0
.2
29
,0
.3
92
)
(0
.9
69
,1
.4
57
)
(0
.4
08
,0
.6
21
)
(0
.2
87
,0
.3
87
)
(0
.1
32
,0
.2
13
)
(0
.1
01
,0
.3
56
)
(0
.1
11
,0
.3
53
)
(1
.0
43
,1
.4
42
)
(0
.1
66
,0
.3
62
)
(0
.3
70
,0
.6
60
)
(0
.4
58
,0
.6
65
)
(0
.3
44
,0
.4
54
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
0
0.
95
4
0.
87
9
0.
30
2
1.
04
0
0.
60
4
0.
27
0
0.
16
6
0.
24
3
0.
18
6
1.
36
4
0.
27
7
0.
58
1
0.
55
1
0.
45
3
[0
.0
52
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.1
06
]
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
70
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.1
13
]
[0
.0
52
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
52
]
[0
.0
32
]
(0
.8
53
,1
.0
55
)
(0
.7
27
,1
.0
31
)
(0
.2
22
,0
.3
82
)
(0
.8
32
,1
.2
47
)
(0
.4
80
,0
.7
28
)
(0
.2
31
,0
.3
10
)
(0
.1
27
,0
.2
05
)
(0
.1
07
,0
.3
80
)
(0
.0
88
,0
.2
84
)
(1
.1
43
,1
.5
85
)
(0
.1
74
,0
.3
79
)
(0
.4
17
,0
.7
44
)
(0
.4
49
,0
.6
53
)
(0
.3
90
,0
.5
16
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
1
0.
89
0
0.
91
1
0.
27
3
1.
01
8
0.
75
4
0.
32
6
0.
16
6
0.
23
5
0.
24
8
1.
40
0
0.
28
7
0.
60
8
0.
62
5
0.
42
3
[0
.0
49
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.1
08
]
[0
.0
79
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.0
67
]
[0
.1
19
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
59
]
[0
.0
30
]
(0
.7
95
,0
.9
86
)
(0
.7
46
,1
.0
77
)
(0
.2
00
,0
.3
45
)
(0
.8
06
,1
.2
30
)
(0
.5
99
,0
.9
09
)
(0
.2
75
,0
.3
76
)
(0
.1
27
,0
.2
05
)
(0
.1
02
,0
.3
67
)
(0
.1
17
,0
.3
78
)
(1
.1
66
,1
.6
34
)
(0
.1
80
,0
.3
94
)
(0
.4
36
,0
.7
80
)
(0
.5
09
,0
.7
42
)
(0
.3
64
,0
.4
82
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
2
,5
1
−
6
0
0.
93
1
1.
05
5
1.
17
0
0.
87
5
1.
07
2
1.
05
5
0.
81
9
0.
93
8
0.
80
8
0.
85
7
1.
01
4
0.
96
5
0.
74
7
1.
03
3
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
22
]
(0
.8
95
,0
.9
68
)
(0
.9
77
,1
.1
33
)
(1
.1
13
,1
.2
26
)
(0
.8
23
,0
.9
27
)
(1
.0
14
,1
.1
30
)
(1
.0
18
,1
.0
93
)
(0
.7
65
,0
.8
73
)
(0
.8
81
,0
.9
96
)
(0
.7
62
,0
.8
55
)
(0
.7
88
,0
.9
27
)
(0
.9
73
,1
.0
55
)
(0
.9
22
,1
.0
08
)
(0
.6
69
,0
.8
24
)
(0
.9
90
,1
.0
75
)
γ
2
,6
1
−
7
0
1.
07
2
1.
21
3
1.
23
6
0.
91
4
1.
13
2
1.
00
0
0.
85
4
1.
04
7
0.
86
2
1.
04
4
1.
07
6
0.
99
1
0.
99
5
1.
15
6
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
43
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
25
]
(1
.0
31
,1
.1
13
)
(1
.1
24
,1
.3
01
)
(1
.1
91
,1
.2
80
)
(0
.8
64
,0
.9
64
)
(1
.0
73
,1
.1
92
)
(0
.9
72
,1
.0
27
)
(0
.7
99
,0
.9
09
)
(0
.9
87
,1
.1
06
)
(0
.8
18
,0
.9
07
)
(0
.9
60
,1
.1
29
)
(1
.0
35
,1
.1
17
)
(0
.9
49
,1
.0
33
)
(0
.9
15
,1
.0
75
)
(1
.1
08
,1
.2
04
)
γ
2
,7
1
−
8
0
1.
23
6
1.
22
8
1.
88
9
1.
21
0
1.
71
7
1.
35
7
1.
07
1
1.
51
2
1.
19
9
1.
43
2
1.
34
2
1.
29
9
1.
18
0
0.
98
0
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
60
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
25
]
(1
.1
87
,1
.2
86
)
(1
.1
31
,1
.3
26
)
(1
.8
19
,1
.9
60
)
(1
.1
39
,1
.2
81
)
(1
.6
26
,1
.8
08
)
(1
.3
11
,1
.4
03
)
(0
.9
83
,1
.1
59
)
(1
.4
21
,1
.6
03
)
(1
.1
29
,1
.2
68
)
(1
.3
15
,1
.5
48
)
(1
.2
83
,1
.4
01
)
(1
.2
47
,1
.3
52
)
(1
.0
92
,1
.2
69
)
(0
.9
31
,1
.0
30
)
SS
R
0.
00
7
0.
03
2
0.
00
7
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
02
4
0.
01
7
0.
02
2
0.
00
2
0.
01
1
0.
02
7
0.
01
9
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
57
Ta
bl
e
A
5:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-M
od
el
4:
λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[σ
2 µ
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[A
R
(1
),
σ
2 0
,c
or
re
ct
io
n
le
ft
-c
en
so
ri
ng
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Pe
rm
an
en
t
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 µ
-2
.2
61
-2
.0
14
-2
.9
43
-3
.0
59
-2
.6
28
-2
.7
11
-2
.4
33
-1
.8
36
-1
.9
36
-2
.2
16
-2
.4
85
-1
.6
71
-1
.4
46
-2
.2
24
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
35
]
(-
2.
30
8,
-2
.2
14
)
(-
2.
08
7,
-1
.9
41
)
(-
3.
03
0,
-2
.8
55
)
(-
3.
14
5,
-2
.9
73
)
(-
2.
68
6,
-2
.5
70
)
(-
2.
76
3,
-2
.6
60
)
(-
2.
52
2,
-2
.3
45
)
(-
1.
89
3,
-1
.7
78
)
(-
1.
98
9,
-1
.8
82
)
(-
2.
26
5,
-2
.1
67
)
(-
2.
53
3,
-2
.4
37
)
(-
1.
72
2,
-1
.6
19
)
(-
1.
52
4,
-1
.3
68
)
(-
2.
29
3,
-2
.1
55
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
1
,1
9
9
5
1.
03
4
1.
04
1
1.
01
1
.
1.
01
4
0.
96
1
.
1.
06
8
0.
99
6
.
0.
98
9
1.
03
7
1.
01
3
1.
04
8
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
20
]
[.
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
12
]
[.
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
09
]
[.
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
15
]
(1
.0
17
,1
.0
51
)
(1
.0
20
,1
.0
63
)
(0
.9
71
,1
.0
51
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
82
,1
.0
46
)
(0
.9
37
,0
.9
85
)
(.
,.
)
(1
.0
43
,1
.0
94
)
(0
.9
78
,1
.0
14
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
71
,1
.0
07
)
(1
.0
22
,1
.0
52
)
(0
.9
86
,1
.0
39
)
(1
.0
19
,1
.0
77
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
6
0.
98
6
1.
02
1
0.
99
5
.
1.
04
3
1.
03
2
0.
95
8
1.
12
2
1.
00
3
1.
02
0
1.
02
8
1.
02
2
1.
08
6
1.
08
2
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
20
]
[.
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
19
]
(0
.9
67
,1
.0
06
)
(0
.9
97
,1
.0
45
)
(0
.9
55
,1
.0
34
)
(.
,.
)
(1
.0
07
,1
.0
79
)
(1
.0
09
,1
.0
55
)
(0
.9
10
,1
.0
07
)
(1
.0
97
,1
.1
47
)
(0
.9
81
,1
.0
25
)
(0
.9
77
,1
.0
63
)
(1
.0
05
,1
.0
51
)
(1
.0
06
,1
.0
38
)
(1
.0
58
,1
.1
14
)
(1
.0
44
,1
.1
20
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
7
1.
04
8
1.
10
9
0.
91
5
1.
17
6
1.
04
0
0.
95
1
0.
98
8
1.
15
6
0.
98
7
1.
17
6
1.
00
9
1.
04
8
1.
07
3
1.
18
9
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
24
]
(1
.0
25
,1
.0
71
)
(1
.0
79
,1
.1
39
)
(0
.8
71
,0
.9
59
)
(1
.1
37
,1
.2
14
)
(1
.0
10
,1
.0
69
)
(0
.9
21
,0
.9
80
)
(0
.9
34
,1
.0
43
)
(1
.1
29
,1
.1
84
)
(0
.9
63
,1
.0
10
)
(1
.1
36
,1
.2
16
)
(0
.9
85
,1
.0
33
)
(1
.0
28
,1
.0
67
)
(1
.0
42
,1
.1
05
)
(1
.1
42
,1
.2
36
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
8
1.
05
1
1.
08
8
0.
92
1
1.
20
5
1.
13
5
0.
92
0
0.
91
8
1.
15
7
0.
97
2
1.
24
6
1.
12
4
1.
07
6
1.
07
9
1.
12
1
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
25
]
(1
.0
25
,1
.0
77
)
(1
.0
55
,1
.1
22
)
(0
.8
73
,0
.9
70
)
(1
.1
59
,1
.2
52
)
(1
.1
07
,1
.1
64
)
(0
.8
89
,0
.9
52
)
(0
.8
66
,0
.9
70
)
(1
.1
25
,1
.1
90
)
(0
.9
40
,1
.0
05
)
(1
.2
03
,1
.2
88
)
(1
.0
96
,1
.1
53
)
(1
.0
55
,1
.0
96
)
(1
.0
47
,1
.1
12
)
(1
.0
71
,1
.1
71
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
9
1.
04
8
1.
05
3
0.
82
7
1.
20
4
1.
05
6
0.
81
4
0.
83
5
1.
15
3
1.
02
5
1.
31
3
1.
15
0
1.
05
9
1.
04
8
1.
18
8
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
27
]
(1
.0
21
,1
.0
75
)
(1
.0
20
,1
.0
85
)
(0
.7
78
,0
.8
75
)
(1
.1
50
,1
.2
58
)
(1
.0
26
,1
.0
86
)
(0
.7
82
,0
.8
47
)
(0
.7
68
,0
.9
01
)
(1
.1
19
,1
.1
87
)
(0
.9
99
,1
.0
51
)
(1
.2
66
,1
.3
61
)
(1
.1
19
,1
.1
82
)
(1
.0
38
,1
.0
80
)
(1
.0
11
,1
.0
85
)
(1
.1
35
,1
.2
41
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
0
0.
98
4
1.
01
2
0.
79
8
1.
19
1
1.
05
5
0.
95
4
0.
86
6
1.
08
6
1.
06
1
1.
33
8
1.
13
7
1.
00
6
1.
15
7
1.
05
0
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
27
]
(0
.9
58
,1
.0
10
)
(0
.9
72
,1
.0
52
)
(0
.7
47
,0
.8
50
)
(1
.1
42
,1
.2
40
)
(1
.0
24
,1
.0
86
)
(0
.9
19
,0
.9
88
)
(0
.7
98
,0
.9
34
)
(1
.0
50
,1
.1
21
)
(1
.0
37
,1
.0
85
)
(1
.2
76
,1
.3
99
)
(1
.1
05
,1
.1
68
)
(0
.9
82
,1
.0
31
)
(1
.1
19
,1
.1
95
)
(0
.9
97
,1
.1
02
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
1
1.
04
8
1.
02
1
0.
82
3
1.
31
7
1.
12
2
0.
95
1
0.
87
5
1.
10
8
0.
96
3
1.
29
0
1.
14
5
0.
98
9
1.
14
3
1.
11
8
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
26
]
(1
.0
23
,1
.0
73
)
(0
.9
77
,1
.0
65
)
(0
.7
77
,0
.8
68
)
(1
.2
61
,1
.3
74
)
(1
.0
86
,1
.1
58
)
(0
.9
19
,0
.9
82
)
(0
.8
07
,0
.9
43
)
(1
.0
73
,1
.1
44
)
(0
.9
29
,0
.9
96
)
(1
.2
48
,1
.3
32
)
(1
.1
11
,1
.1
79
)
(0
.9
63
,1
.0
15
)
(1
.1
05
,1
.1
82
)
(1
.0
66
,1
.1
69
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
1
,5
1
−
6
0
1.
01
6
0.
98
3
0.
92
4
0.
92
8
0.
88
1
1.
01
7
0.
90
0
0.
86
1
0.
98
3
0.
94
9
0.
91
8
0.
98
6
0.
93
8
0.
89
1
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
13
]
(0
.9
91
,1
.0
42
)
(0
.9
40
,1
.0
27
)
(0
.8
84
,0
.9
64
)
(0
.8
82
,0
.9
75
)
(0
.8
55
,0
.9
08
)
(0
.9
90
,1
.0
45
)
(0
.8
61
,0
.9
39
)
(0
.8
33
,0
.8
89
)
(0
.9
49
,1
.0
17
)
(0
.9
11
,0
.9
86
)
(0
.8
89
,0
.9
47
)
(0
.9
56
,1
.0
15
)
(0
.9
00
,0
.9
75
)
(0
.8
65
,0
.9
17
)
γ
1
,6
1
−
7
0
0.
94
0
0.
86
6
0.
77
5
0.
84
3
0.
71
2
0.
78
1
0.
84
4
0.
78
9
0.
75
1
0.
93
4
0.
70
5
0.
78
1
0.
78
2
0.
63
1
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
10
]
(0
.9
13
,0
.9
66
)
(0
.8
27
,0
.9
05
)
(0
.7
45
,0
.8
04
)
(0
.8
09
,0
.8
77
)
(0
.6
91
,0
.7
33
)
(0
.7
60
,0
.8
02
)
(0
.7
92
,0
.8
96
)
(0
.7
64
,0
.8
15
)
(0
.7
25
,0
.7
78
)
(0
.8
98
,0
.9
70
)
(0
.6
81
,0
.7
29
)
(0
.7
56
,0
.8
07
)
(0
.7
49
,0
.8
16
)
(0
.6
11
,0
.6
52
)
γ
1
,7
1
−
8
0
0.
64
0
0.
62
2
0.
54
9
0.
68
7
0.
50
1
0.
16
5
0.
44
4
0.
50
8
0.
37
2
0.
59
2
0.
54
4
0.
45
7
0.
34
0
0.
51
9
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
19
]
(0
.6
07
,0
.6
73
)
(0
.5
75
,0
.6
70
)
(0
.4
87
,0
.6
11
)
(0
.6
30
,0
.7
44
)
(0
.4
63
,0
.5
39
)
(0
.1
00
,0
.2
29
)
(0
.3
83
,0
.5
05
)
(0
.4
74
,0
.5
42
)
(0
.3
27
,0
.4
16
)
(0
.5
56
,0
.6
27
)
(0
.5
14
,0
.5
73
)
(0
.4
34
,0
.4
81
)
(0
.3
05
,0
.3
75
)
(0
.4
81
,0
.5
56
)
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
58
C
on
tin
ue
d:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-M
od
el
4:
λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[σ
2 µ
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[A
R
(1
),
σ
2 0
,c
or
re
ct
io
n
le
ft
-c
en
so
ri
ng
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Tr
an
si
to
ry
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 0
-3
.4
63
-2
.6
49
-3
.6
38
-2
.8
91
-3
.1
13
-3
.4
54
-2
.3
87
-2
.3
80
-2
.2
19
-4
.1
44
-3
.4
64
-2
.8
97
-3
.6
81
-2
.6
55
[0
.0
87
]
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.0
72
]
[0
.0
98
]
[0
.0
94
]
[0
.0
66
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.1
01
]
[0
.0
67
]
[0
.1
63
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.1
86
]
[0
.0
62
]
(-
3.
63
4,
-3
.2
92
)
(-
2.
83
5,
-2
.4
63
)
(-
3.
77
9,
-3
.4
97
)
(-
3.
08
3,
-2
.6
98
)
(-
3.
29
8,
-2
.9
29
)
(-
3.
58
3,
-3
.3
25
)
(-
2.
57
7,
-2
.1
98
)
(-
2.
57
7,
-2
.1
83
)
(-
2.
34
9,
-2
.0
88
)
(-
4.
46
3,
-3
.8
25
)
(-
3.
61
3,
-3
.3
15
)
(-
3.
04
9,
-2
.7
44
)
(-
4.
04
4,
-3
.3
17
)
(-
2.
77
7,
-2
.5
33
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 
-2
.9
77
-3
.3
66
-1
.5
34
-3
.4
54
-2
.7
15
-1
.5
26
-0
.3
40
-0
.4
87
-0
.0
57
-4
.4
19
-1
.0
08
-1
.4
37
-1
.9
10
-0
.7
39
[0
.1
19
]
[0
.1
80
]
[0
.2
68
]
[0
.2
10
]
[0
.2
06
]
[0
.1
43
]
[0
.1
99
]
[0
.5
43
]
[0
.5
72
]
[0
.1
78
]
[0
.4
56
]
[0
.3
68
]
[0
.3
22
]
[0
.2
01
]
(-
3.
21
0,
-2
.7
44
)
(-
3.
71
9,
-3
.0
13
)
(-
2.
06
0,
-1
.0
08
)
(-
3.
86
5,
-3
.0
43
)
(-
3.
11
9,
-2
.3
10
)
(-
1.
80
6,
-1
.2
45
)
(-
0.
72
9,
0.
04
9)
(-
1.
55
1,
0.
57
6)
(-
1.
17
9,
1.
06
5)
(-
4.
76
9,
-4
.0
69
)
(-
1.
90
2,
-0
.1
14
)
(-
2.
15
7,
-0
.7
16
)
(-
2.
54
2,
-1
.2
78
)
(-
1.
13
3,
-0
.3
46
)
ξ
0.
06
9
0.
00
9
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
-0
.0
21
0.
03
5
-0
.0
11
0.
00
5
-0
.0
28
0.
15
3
0.
00
5
-0
.0
04
0.
08
3
-0
.0
03
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
04
]
[0
.0
04
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
06
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
01
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
04
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
03
]
(0
.0
49
,0
.0
89
)
(-
0.
00
1,
0.
01
9)
(-
0.
00
5,
0.
01
1)
(-
0.
00
5,
0.
01
2)
(-
0.
02
7,
-0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
23
,0
.0
47
)
(-
0.
01
7,
-0
.0
05
)
(-
0.
00
4,
0.
01
3)
(-
0.
03
0,
-0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
90
,0
.2
16
)
(-
0.
00
3,
0.
01
3)
(-
0.
01
0,
0.
00
3)
(0
.0
26
,0
.1
39
)
(-
0.
00
9,
0.
00
3)
ρ
0.
48
1
0.
30
9
0.
54
0
0.
27
3
0.
33
7
0.
61
6
0.
74
2
0.
35
0
0.
54
6
0.
22
3
0.
39
5
0.
27
4
0.
71
9
0.
62
1
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
15
]
(0
.4
55
,0
.5
07
)
(0
.2
62
,0
.3
57
)
(0
.5
12
,0
.5
67
)
(0
.2
33
,0
.3
13
)
(0
.3
15
,0
.3
60
)
(0
.5
96
,0
.6
37
)
(0
.6
93
,0
.7
91
)
(0
.3
00
,0
.4
00
)
(0
.5
04
,0
.5
89
)
(0
.1
90
,0
.2
56
)
(0
.3
65
,0
.4
24
)
(0
.2
46
,0
.3
03
)
(0
.6
86
,0
.7
52
)
(0
.5
92
,0
.6
50
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
2
,1
9
9
5
0.
91
3
1.
06
6
0.
27
7
.
0.
69
4
0.
31
5
.
0.
29
1
0.
27
1
.
0.
26
5
0.
44
6
0.
63
0
0.
36
3
[0
.0
47
]
[0
.0
91
]
[0
.0
35
]
[.
]
[0
.0
67
]
[0
.0
22
]
[.
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
78
]
[.
]
[0
.0
60
]
[0
.0
83
]
[0
.0
87
]
[0
.0
37
]
(0
.8
21
,1
.0
05
)
(0
.8
87
,1
.2
45
)
(0
.2
08
,0
.3
47
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.5
63
,0
.8
26
)
(0
.2
71
,0
.3
59
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.1
34
,0
.4
49
)
(0
.1
19
,0
.4
23
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.1
46
,0
.3
83
)
(0
.2
83
,0
.6
08
)
(0
.4
60
,0
.8
01
)
(0
.2
90
,0
.4
36
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
6
0.
91
3
1.
11
5
0.
26
7
.
0.
68
7
0.
25
4
0.
25
9
0.
20
4
0.
20
8
2.
18
0
0.
28
3
0.
40
6
0.
40
2
0.
28
0
[0
.0
58
]
[0
.1
04
]
[0
.0
37
]
[.
]
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
57
]
[0
.0
59
]
[0
.1
70
]
[0
.0
65
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.0
63
]
[0
.0
30
]
(0
.8
00
,1
.0
26
)
(0
.9
10
,1
.3
19
)
(0
.1
95
,0
.3
40
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.5
41
,0
.8
34
)
(0
.2
19
,0
.2
90
)
(0
.2
06
,0
.3
13
)
(0
.0
93
,0
.3
16
)
(0
.0
92
,0
.3
24
)
(1
.8
47
,2
.5
14
)
(0
.1
56
,0
.4
09
)
(0
.2
57
,0
.5
55
)
(0
.2
79
,0
.5
25
)
(0
.2
21
,0
.3
39
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
7
0.
80
8
0.
89
5
0.
26
8
1.
20
2
0.
67
6
0.
28
7
0.
18
6
0.
23
1
0.
18
2
1.
61
0
0.
25
3
0.
42
3
0.
45
9
0.
22
7
[0
.0
49
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.1
22
]
[0
.0
72
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
63
]
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.1
54
]
[0
.0
58
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
24
]
(0
.7
13
,0
.9
04
)
(0
.7
38
,1
.0
52
)
(0
.1
97
,0
.3
40
)
(0
.9
63
,1
.4
42
)
(0
.5
35
,0
.8
17
)
(0
.2
47
,0
.3
27
)
(0
.1
46
,0
.2
26
)
(0
.1
07
,0
.3
55
)
(0
.0
78
,0
.2
85
)
(1
.3
07
,1
.9
12
)
(0
.1
40
,0
.3
66
)
(0
.2
72
,0
.5
75
)
(0
.3
20
,0
.5
97
)
(0
.1
79
,0
.2
75
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
8
0.
79
4
0.
98
3
0.
23
5
0.
96
4
0.
44
8
0.
29
9
0.
15
2
0.
27
8
0.
20
0
1.
19
0
0.
26
2
0.
44
3
0.
49
4
0.
27
6
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.1
04
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
58
]
[0
.1
02
]
[0
.0
59
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.0
28
]
(0
.7
07
,0
.8
80
)
(0
.8
19
,1
.1
47
)
(0
.1
72
,0
.2
97
)
(0
.7
60
,1
.1
68
)
(0
.3
59
,0
.5
37
)
(0
.2
58
,0
.3
41
)
(0
.1
18
,0
.1
85
)
(0
.1
32
,0
.4
23
)
(0
.0
86
,0
.3
14
)
(0
.9
90
,1
.3
89
)
(0
.1
47
,0
.3
78
)
(0
.2
86
,0
.5
99
)
(0
.3
44
,0
.6
43
)
(0
.2
22
,0
.3
30
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
9
0.
79
6
0.
98
2
0.
31
4
1.
21
6
0.
52
3
0.
36
4
0.
19
4
0.
26
7
0.
22
0
1.
40
0
0.
23
5
0.
38
8
0.
47
8
0.
29
0
[0
.0
43
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.1
21
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.1
16
]
[0
.0
52
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
73
]
[0
.0
29
]
(0
.7
11
,0
.8
81
)
(0
.8
22
,1
.1
42
)
(0
.2
33
,0
.3
95
)
(0
.9
78
,1
.4
53
)
(0
.4
15
,0
.6
31
)
(0
.3
13
,0
.4
15
)
(0
.1
55
,0
.2
33
)
(0
.1
27
,0
.4
06
)
(0
.0
95
,0
.3
45
)
(1
.1
72
,1
.6
27
)
(0
.1
32
,0
.3
37
)
(0
.2
50
,0
.5
27
)
(0
.3
35
,0
.6
21
)
(0
.2
34
,0
.3
47
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
0
0.
94
4
1.
01
8
0.
30
6
1.
04
0
0.
61
4
0.
29
1
0.
18
8
0.
28
3
0.
17
4
1.
51
2
0.
24
6
0.
43
7
0.
46
8
0.
33
3
[0
.0
56
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.1
03
]
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.1
25
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
72
]
[0
.0
33
]
(0
.8
35
,1
.0
54
)
(0
.8
45
,1
.1
92
)
(0
.2
26
,0
.3
85
)
(0
.8
38
,1
.2
41
)
(0
.4
88
,0
.7
40
)
(0
.2
51
,0
.3
31
)
(0
.1
50
,0
.2
26
)
(0
.1
34
,0
.4
32
)
(0
.0
74
,0
.2
74
)
(1
.2
68
,1
.7
56
)
(0
.1
38
,0
.3
54
)
(0
.2
81
,0
.5
93
)
(0
.3
27
,0
.6
09
)
(0
.2
68
,0
.3
98
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
1
0.
88
1
1.
05
9
0.
27
6
1.
01
0
0.
76
6
0.
35
1
0.
18
8
0.
27
3
0.
23
4
1.
57
3
0.
25
5
0.
45
7
0.
53
3
0.
31
1
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.1
04
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.1
36
]
[0
.0
57
]
[0
.0
83
]
[0
.0
83
]
[0
.0
31
]
(0
.7
77
,0
.9
84
)
(0
.8
69
,1
.2
48
)
(0
.2
04
,0
.3
48
)
(0
.8
06
,1
.2
15
)
(0
.6
09
,0
.9
22
)
(0
.3
00
,0
.4
03
)
(0
.1
49
,0
.2
27
)
(0
.1
28
,0
.4
19
)
(0
.1
00
,0
.3
68
)
(1
.3
06
,1
.8
39
)
(0
.1
43
,0
.3
67
)
(0
.2
94
,0
.6
21
)
(0
.3
70
,0
.6
95
)
(0
.2
50
,0
.3
73
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
2
,5
1
−
6
0
0.
93
9
0.
95
7
1.
13
2
0.
85
8
1.
06
1
1.
00
4
0.
81
1
0.
91
4
0.
83
3
1.
03
4
1.
01
3
1.
00
0
0.
75
0
0.
98
7
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
19
]
(0
.9
06
,0
.9
72
)
(0
.8
88
,1
.0
25
)
(1
.0
88
,1
.1
76
)
(0
.8
13
,0
.9
02
)
(1
.0
05
,1
.1
17
)
(0
.9
75
,1
.0
32
)
(0
.7
62
,0
.8
61
)
(0
.8
68
,0
.9
61
)
(0
.7
86
,0
.8
80
)
(0
.9
74
,1
.0
94
)
(0
.9
74
,1
.0
53
)
(0
.9
56
,1
.0
43
)
(0
.6
86
,0
.8
14
)
(0
.9
50
,1
.0
24
)
γ
2
,6
1
−
7
0
1.
07
3
1.
12
8
1.
22
4
0.
89
7
1.
08
9
0.
98
3
0.
84
4
0.
91
6
0.
80
9
1.
21
8
1.
10
4
1.
02
8
0.
99
7
1.
14
1
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
23
]
(1
.0
36
,1
.1
10
)
(1
.0
51
,1
.2
05
)
(1
.1
84
,1
.2
64
)
(0
.8
47
,0
.9
47
)
(1
.0
31
,1
.1
46
)
(0
.9
58
,1
.0
07
)
(0
.7
87
,0
.9
01
)
(0
.8
64
,0
.9
68
)
(0
.7
67
,0
.8
52
)
(1
.1
23
,1
.3
12
)
(1
.0
62
,1
.1
46
)
(0
.9
83
,1
.0
72
)
(0
.9
16
,1
.0
78
)
(1
.0
97
,1
.1
86
)
γ
2
,7
1
−
8
0
1.
23
9
1.
20
1
1.
85
7
1.
20
8
1.
72
0
1.
34
9
1.
11
1
1.
50
9
1.
22
3
1.
59
0
1.
34
0
1.
30
1
1.
16
4
0.
98
9
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
49
]
[0
.0
25
]
(1
.1
91
,1
.2
86
)
(1
.1
12
,1
.2
90
)
(1
.7
94
,1
.9
20
)
(1
.1
38
,1
.2
77
)
(1
.6
30
,1
.8
10
)
(1
.3
05
,1
.3
93
)
(1
.0
21
,1
.2
00
)
(1
.4
23
,1
.5
94
)
(1
.1
53
,1
.2
93
)
(1
.4
52
,1
.7
29
)
(1
.2
80
,1
.4
00
)
(1
.2
48
,1
.3
55
)
(1
.0
69
,1
.2
60
)
(0
.9
40
,1
.0
38
)
SS
R
0.
00
7
0.
03
3
0.
00
7
0.
00
5
0.
01
1
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
02
5
0.
01
8
0.
02
3
0.
00
2
0.
01
1
0.
02
8
0.
02
0
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
59
Ta
bl
e
A
6:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-M
od
el
6:
λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[R
G
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[A
R
(1
),
σ
2 c,
0
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Pe
rm
an
en
t
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 µ
-4
.9
10
-5
.3
74
-4
.6
76
-5
.1
21
-3
.0
10
-0
.1
44
-3
.5
32
-5
.9
26
1.
08
9
0.
74
0
-4
.4
77
-0
.6
86
1.
21
1
-5
.7
69
[0
.2
41
]
[0
.3
49
]
[0
.2
45
]
[0
.5
36
]
[0
.1
30
]
[0
.1
25
]
[0
.8
74
]
[0
.5
62
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.2
14
]
[0
.3
81
]
[0
.5
75
]
[0
.1
29
]
[0
.1
82
]
(-
5.
38
2,
-4
.4
38
)
(-
6.
05
8,
-4
.6
90
)
(-
5.
15
7,
-4
.1
96
)
(-
6.
17
2,
-4
.0
70
)
(-
3.
26
5,
-2
.7
55
)
(-
0.
38
9,
0.
10
1)
(-
5.
24
4,
-1
.8
20
)
(-
7.
02
8,
-4
.8
25
)
(0
.9
31
,1
.2
46
)
(0
.3
21
,1
.1
59
)
(-
5.
22
4,
-3
.7
30
)
(-
1.
81
3,
0.
44
1)
(0
.9
59
,1
.4
63
)
(-
6.
12
6,
-5
.4
11
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 ϕ
-9
.0
40
-8
.7
40
-9
.3
68
-9
.3
49
-8
.7
16
-7
.4
57
-9
.9
77
-9
.1
68
-6
.0
33
-6
.4
63
-1
0.
33
2
-9
.8
59
-6
.0
59
-8
.8
22
[0
.1
03
]
[0
.1
43
]
[0
.2
09
]
[0
.1
40
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.1
73
]
[1
.9
72
]
[0
.3
95
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.2
57
]
[0
.8
08
]
[3
.6
59
]
[0
.1
66
]
[0
.0
52
]
(-
9.
24
2,
-8
.8
38
)
(-
9.
02
1,
-8
.4
59
)
(-
9.
77
8,
-8
.9
59
)
(-
9.
62
3,
-9
.0
75
)
(-
8.
87
2,
-8
.5
60
)
(-
7.
79
7,
-7
.1
18
)
(-
13
.8
41
,-6
.1
12
)
(-
9.
94
2,
-8
.3
94
)
(-
6.
22
3,
-5
.8
43
)
(-
6.
96
7,
-5
.9
60
)
(-
11
.9
15
,-8
.7
48
)
(-
17
.0
31
,-2
.6
87
)
(-
6.
38
4,
-5
.7
35
)
(-
8.
92
4,
-8
.7
19
)
C
ov
(µ
ϕ
)
0.
00
02
0.
00
03
-0
.0
00
4
-0
.0
00
5
-0
.0
01
9
-0
.0
22
1
0.
00
04
0.
00
17
-0
.0
83
3
-0
.0
56
4
0.
00
08
-0
.0
06
3
-0
.0
87
4
-0
.0
00
3
[0
.0
00
2]
[0
.0
00
3]
[0
.0
00
3]
[0
.0
00
2]
[0
.0
00
2]
[0
.0
03
3]
[0
.0
01
1]
[0
.0
00
5]
[0
.0
07
5]
[0
.0
13
4]
[0
.0
00
3]
[0
.0
07
7]
[0
.0
13
0]
[0
.0
00
1]
(-
0.
00
01
,0
.0
01
)
(-
0.
00
02
,0
.0
01
)
(-
0.
00
09
,0
.0
00
)
(-
0.
00
09
,-0
.0
00
)
(-
0.
00
23
,-0
.0
01
)
(-
0.
02
85
,-0
.0
16
)
(-
0.
00
17
,0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
00
7,
0.
00
3)
(-
0.
09
79
,-0
.0
69
)
(-
0.
08
27
,-0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
00
2,
0.
00
1)
(-
0.
02
15
,0
.0
09
)
(-
0.
11
28
,-0
.0
62
)
(-
0.
00
05
,-0
.0
00
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
1
,1
9
9
5
0.
99
2
0.
97
8
0.
96
0
.
0.
97
4
0.
99
4
.
1.
01
3
1.
07
3
.
0.
96
7
1.
06
7
1.
08
2
1.
02
6
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
21
]
[.
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
12
]
[.
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
08
]
[.
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
13
]
(0
.9
75
,1
.0
08
)
(0
.9
56
,1
.0
01
)
(0
.9
19
,1
.0
00
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
43
,1
.0
05
)
(0
.9
71
,1
.0
17
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
88
,1
.0
37
)
(1
.0
57
,1
.0
90
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
46
,0
.9
87
)
(1
.0
40
,1
.0
95
)
(1
.0
56
,1
.1
09
)
(1
.0
01
,1
.0
52
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
6
0.
90
7
0.
92
3
0.
90
7
.
0.
97
5
1.
12
3
0.
88
3
1.
03
2
1.
15
0
1.
07
0
0.
98
4
1.
08
0
1.
21
1
1.
00
8
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
22
]
[.
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
16
]
(0
.8
87
,0
.9
27
)
(0
.8
98
,0
.9
48
)
(0
.8
64
,0
.9
50
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
41
,1
.0
08
)
(1
.0
96
,1
.1
51
)
(0
.8
10
,0
.9
56
)
(1
.0
04
,1
.0
60
)
(1
.1
28
,1
.1
72
)
(1
.0
28
,1
.1
12
)
(0
.9
50
,1
.0
17
)
(1
.0
31
,1
.1
29
)
(1
.1
81
,1
.2
40
)
(0
.9
77
,1
.0
39
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
7
0.
92
3
0.
96
0
0.
79
5
1.
12
6
0.
93
3
1.
10
1
0.
88
0
1.
03
9
1.
20
3
1.
29
9
0.
94
6
1.
13
6
1.
30
3
1.
05
6
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.8
98
,0
.9
47
)
(0
.9
27
,0
.9
93
)
(0
.7
46
,0
.8
44
)
(1
.0
89
,1
.1
64
)
(0
.9
02
,0
.9
64
)
(1
.0
66
,1
.1
36
)
(0
.7
81
,0
.9
79
)
(1
.0
05
,1
.0
73
)
(1
.1
75
,1
.2
31
)
(1
.2
56
,1
.3
43
)
(0
.9
06
,0
.9
86
)
(1
.0
63
,1
.2
08
)
(1
.2
68
,1
.3
38
)
(1
.0
20
,1
.0
91
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
8
0.
89
4
0.
91
4
0.
77
3
1.
07
8
0.
98
8
1.
11
8
0.
80
0
1.
02
0
1.
27
2
1.
44
5
1.
03
8
1.
18
8
1.
39
6
1.
03
9
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.8
65
,0
.9
22
)
(0
.8
78
,0
.9
50
)
(0
.7
17
,0
.8
29
)
(1
.0
32
,1
.1
23
)
(0
.9
54
,1
.0
21
)
(1
.0
75
,1
.1
61
)
(0
.6
75
,0
.9
26
)
(0
.9
77
,1
.0
62
)
(1
.2
30
,1
.3
14
)
(1
.3
96
,1
.4
94
)
(0
.9
85
,1
.0
91
)
(1
.0
93
,1
.2
82
)
(1
.3
53
,1
.4
39
)
(1
.0
03
,1
.0
75
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
9
0.
85
7
0.
85
6
0.
66
9
1.
01
7
0.
89
6
1.
04
5
0.
70
8
0.
98
9
1.
40
8
1.
60
4
1.
04
7
1.
19
0
1.
42
0
1.
08
1
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
61
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.8
27
,0
.8
87
)
(0
.8
18
,0
.8
94
)
(0
.6
21
,0
.7
17
)
(0
.9
64
,1
.0
71
)
(0
.8
60
,0
.9
32
)
(0
.9
99
,1
.0
92
)
(0
.5
75
,0
.8
42
)
(0
.9
41
,1
.0
38
)
(1
.3
71
,1
.4
45
)
(1
.5
43
,1
.6
64
)
(0
.9
84
,1
.1
11
)
(1
.0
70
,1
.3
10
)
(1
.3
63
,1
.4
76
)
(1
.0
44
,1
.1
17
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
0
0.
78
0
0.
79
3
0.
62
7
0.
95
5
0.
87
5
1.
29
2
0.
72
2
0.
90
8
1.
51
5
1.
72
8
1.
02
2
1.
15
4
1.
65
5
0.
94
6
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
73
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.7
48
,0
.8
12
)
(0
.7
51
,0
.8
35
)
(0
.5
74
,0
.6
80
)
(0
.9
03
,1
.0
08
)
(0
.8
37
,0
.9
13
)
(1
.2
34
,1
.3
51
)
(0
.5
65
,0
.8
79
)
(0
.8
55
,0
.9
61
)
(1
.4
72
,1
.5
59
)
(1
.6
55
,1
.8
01
)
(0
.9
51
,1
.0
92
)
(1
.0
10
,1
.2
98
)
(1
.5
91
,1
.7
20
)
(0
.9
12
,0
.9
81
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
1
0.
79
8
0.
77
7
0.
63
0
1.
03
0
0.
91
0
1.
36
4
0.
72
4
0.
89
8
1.
47
4
1.
75
4
1.
00
8
1.
15
5
1.
73
6
0.
94
4
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
90
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.7
64
,0
.8
32
)
(0
.7
28
,0
.8
26
)
(0
.5
75
,0
.6
85
)
(0
.9
69
,1
.0
90
)
(0
.8
69
,0
.9
50
)
(1
.2
98
,1
.4
30
)
(0
.5
47
,0
.9
01
)
(0
.8
41
,0
.9
55
)
(1
.4
19
,1
.5
29
)
(1
.6
80
,1
.8
28
)
(0
.9
28
,1
.0
89
)
(0
.9
83
,1
.3
26
)
(1
.6
63
,1
.8
09
)
(0
.9
09
,0
.9
79
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
1
,5
1
−
6
0
1.
41
3
1.
35
9
1.
37
4
1.
38
2
1.
27
5
0.
53
1
1.
10
5
1.
11
7
0.
44
0
0.
46
4
1.
13
1
0.
78
1
0.
47
3
1.
32
4
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
69
]
[0
.0
49
]
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.2
08
]
[0
.0
43
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.0
93
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
22
]
(1
.3
54
,1
.4
72
)
(1
.2
73
,1
.4
46
)
(1
.2
39
,1
.5
09
)
(1
.2
87
,1
.4
77
)
(1
.1
92
,1
.3
58
)
(0
.4
87
,0
.5
75
)
(0
.6
96
,1
.5
13
)
(1
.0
32
,1
.2
02
)
(0
.4
12
,0
.4
68
)
(0
.3
96
,0
.5
32
)
(1
.0
05
,1
.2
57
)
(0
.5
99
,0
.9
63
)
(0
.4
31
,0
.5
15
)
(1
.2
81
,1
.3
67
)
γ
1
,6
1
−
7
0
2.
04
6
2.
01
3
1.
96
2
2.
44
0
1.
31
7
0.
26
7
1.
28
0
1.
56
8
0.
20
3
0.
27
7
1.
15
6
0.
52
0
0.
25
3
1.
93
6
[0
.0
99
]
[0
.1
62
]
[0
.2
28
]
[0
.1
70
]
[0
.1
14
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.4
91
]
[0
.1
39
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.1
39
]
[0
.1
13
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
77
]
(1
.8
52
,2
.2
40
)
(1
.6
95
,2
.3
31
)
(1
.5
16
,2
.4
08
)
(2
.1
06
,2
.7
74
)
(1
.0
93
,1
.5
41
)
(0
.2
38
,0
.2
97
)
(0
.3
17
,2
.2
43
)
(1
.2
96
,1
.8
40
)
(0
.1
86
,0
.2
20
)
(0
.2
22
,0
.3
31
)
(0
.8
84
,1
.4
28
)
(0
.2
98
,0
.7
42
)
(0
.2
24
,0
.2
83
)
(1
.7
85
,2
.0
88
)
γ
1
,7
1
−
8
0
2.
45
1
2.
98
1
1.
65
1
2.
97
9
0.
78
9
0.
06
1
0.
75
1
2.
26
5
0.
08
6
0.
12
8
1.
27
6
0.
27
0
0.
09
1
3.
85
2
[0
.2
43
]
[0
.5
00
]
[0
.1
59
]
[0
.7
97
]
[0
.0
70
]
[0
.0
06
]
[0
.3
69
]
[0
.3
40
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.2
31
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.0
07
]
[0
.4
62
]
(1
.9
74
,2
.9
29
)
(2
.0
02
,3
.9
60
)
(1
.3
40
,1
.9
62
)
(1
.4
16
,4
.5
42
)
(0
.6
51
,0
.9
27
)
(0
.0
48
,0
.0
73
)
(0
.0
29
,1
.4
74
)
(1
.5
99
,2
.9
31
)
(0
.0
77
,0
.0
95
)
(0
.0
98
,0
.1
57
)
(0
.8
23
,1
.7
29
)
(0
.1
12
,0
.4
29
)
(0
.0
78
,0
.1
04
)
(2
.9
47
,4
.7
58
)
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
60
C
on
tin
ue
d:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-M
od
el
6:
λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[R
G
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[A
R
(1
),
σ
2 c,
0
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Tr
an
si
to
ry
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 4
0
−
5
0
,0
-2
.5
72
-2
.6
46
-3
.5
59
-2
.9
00
-3
.7
82
-2
.8
88
-2
.9
66
-2
.3
67
-5
.4
19
-2
.8
44
-3
.4
39
-3
.1
71
-2
.8
88
-2
.5
53
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.0
96
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
91
]
[0
.0
52
]
[0
.1
19
]
[0
.0
52
]
[0
.7
32
]
[0
.1
05
]
[0
.0
65
]
[0
.0
93
]
[0
.1
48
]
[0
.0
49
]
(-
2.
65
8,
-2
.4
87
)
(-
2.
80
8,
-2
.4
84
)
(-
3.
74
6,
-3
.3
72
)
(-
3.
04
6,
-2
.7
55
)
(-
3.
96
1,
-3
.6
04
)
(-
2.
99
0,
-2
.7
87
)
(-
3.
20
0,
-2
.7
32
)
(-
2.
47
0,
-2
.2
65
)
(-
6.
85
3,
-3
.9
85
)
(-
3.
05
0,
-2
.6
38
)
(-
3.
56
6,
-3
.3
13
)
(-
3.
35
4,
-2
.9
88
)
(-
3.
17
9,
-2
.5
97
)
(-
2.
64
8,
-2
.4
58
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 5
1
−
6
0
,0
-2
.5
40
-2
.6
77
-3
.7
72
-2
.8
34
-3
.6
09
-3
.2
98
-2
.8
00
-2
.2
54
-2
.8
79
-2
.4
25
-3
.3
05
-2
.5
92
-2
.7
13
-2
.7
75
[0
.0
60
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.0
70
]
[0
.1
21
]
[0
.0
61
]
[0
.1
35
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.1
08
]
[0
.0
59
]
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.1
87
]
[0
.0
64
]
(-
2.
65
8,
-2
.4
21
)
(-
2.
86
6,
-2
.4
88
)
(-
3.
92
1,
-3
.6
22
)
(-
2.
97
2,
-2
.6
97
)
(-
3.
84
5,
-3
.3
72
)
(-
3.
41
7,
-3
.1
79
)
(-
3.
06
5,
-2
.5
36
)
(-
2.
41
1,
-2
.0
96
)
(-
3.
05
3,
-2
.7
05
)
(-
2.
63
6,
-2
.2
14
)
(-
3.
42
1,
-3
.1
90
)
(-
2.
73
8,
-2
.4
46
)
(-
3.
07
9,
-2
.3
47
)
(-
2.
90
1,
-2
.6
49
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 6
1
−
7
0
,0
-2
.5
90
-2
.3
63
-3
.4
34
-2
.6
49
-4
.4
93
-3
.0
25
-2
.6
36
-2
.4
42
-3
.1
73
-2
.6
60
-3
.0
56
-2
.5
33
-2
.6
52
-2
.2
88
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.0
87
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.0
73
]
[0
.2
07
]
[0
.0
52
]
[0
.1
26
]
[0
.0
73
]
[0
.0
94
]
[0
.1
07
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
66
]
[0
.1
39
]
[0
.0
41
]
(-
2.
72
3,
-2
.4
56
)
(-
2.
53
3,
-2
.1
92
)
(-
3.
58
5,
-3
.2
83
)
(-
2.
79
1,
-2
.5
06
)
(-
4.
90
0,
-4
.0
87
)
(-
3.
12
6,
-2
.9
24
)
(-
2.
88
3,
-2
.3
90
)
(-
2.
58
5,
-2
.2
99
)
(-
3.
35
7,
-2
.9
89
)
(-
2.
86
9,
-2
.4
50
)
(-
3.
16
3,
-2
.9
49
)
(-
2.
66
3,
-2
.4
04
)
(-
2.
92
5,
-2
.3
79
)
(-
2.
36
8,
-2
.2
07
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 7
1
−
8
0
,0
-3
.4
63
-2
.5
25
-3
.6
85
-3
.0
71
-3
.2
04
-3
.3
84
-2
.2
92
-2
.1
46
-2
.4
86
-3
.6
91
-3
.4
99
-2
.9
30
-3
.5
39
-2
.6
65
[0
.1
18
]
[0
.1
01
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.1
10
]
[0
.0
96
]
[0
.0
60
]
[0
.1
03
]
[0
.0
90
]
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.1
18
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.1
23
]
[0
.1
17
]
(-
3.
69
4,
-3
.2
32
)
(-
2.
72
4,
-2
.3
26
)
(-
3.
84
2,
-3
.5
28
)
(-
3.
28
6,
-2
.8
56
)
(-
3.
39
3,
-3
.0
16
)
(-
3.
50
2,
-3
.2
66
)
(-
2.
49
3,
-2
.0
91
)
(-
2.
32
3,
-1
.9
70
)
(-
2.
61
9,
-2
.3
53
)
(-
3.
92
3,
-3
.4
60
)
(-
3.
66
4,
-3
.3
34
)
(-
3.
10
4,
-2
.7
55
)
(-
3.
78
0,
-3
.2
99
)
(-
2.
89
5,
-2
.4
35
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 
-2
.6
56
-3
.5
58
-0
.6
89
-2
.8
91
-2
.0
70
-1
.0
78
-0
.0
78
-1
.8
53
-1
.3
56
-4
.4
11
-2
.0
28
-2
.4
55
-2
.2
30
-1
.7
64
[0
.1
11
]
[0
.1
65
]
[0
.7
37
]
[0
.2
20
]
[0
.3
10
]
[0
.1
89
]
[0
.3
12
]
[0
.3
18
]
[0
.5
74
]
[0
.1
94
]
[0
.2
56
]
[0
.2
19
]
[0
.1
89
]
[0
.1
40
]
(-
2.
87
4,
-2
.4
39
)
(-
3.
88
1,
-3
.2
35
)
(-
2.
13
5,
0.
75
6)
(-
3.
32
1,
-2
.4
60
)
(-
2.
67
7,
-1
.4
64
)
(-
1.
44
9,
-0
.7
07
)
(-
0.
69
0,
0.
53
3)
(-
2.
47
6,
-1
.2
30
)
(-
2.
48
1,
-0
.2
30
)
(-
4.
79
2,
-4
.0
30
)
(-
2.
52
9,
-1
.5
27
)
(-
2.
88
5,
-2
.0
26
)
(-
2.
60
1,
-1
.8
60
)
(-
2.
03
9,
-1
.4
90
)
ρ
0.
45
1
0.
29
1
0.
54
6
0.
29
0
0.
32
9
0.
59
1
0.
78
7
0.
25
7
0.
35
8
0.
20
1
0.
39
1
0.
24
8
0.
54
5
0.
46
6
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
15
]
(0
.4
27
,0
.4
76
)
(0
.2
46
,0
.3
36
)
(0
.5
22
,0
.5
71
)
(0
.2
52
,0
.3
29
)
(0
.3
06
,0
.3
52
)
(0
.5
67
,0
.6
14
)
(0
.7
51
,0
.8
23
)
(0
.2
14
,0
.2
99
)
(0
.3
15
,0
.4
02
)
(0
.1
68
,0
.2
34
)
(0
.3
61
,0
.4
21
)
(0
.2
19
,0
.2
77
)
(0
.5
04
,0
.5
86
)
(0
.4
36
,0
.4
95
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
2
,1
9
9
5
0.
82
1
1.
22
7
0.
18
2
.
0.
49
4
0.
25
1
.
0.
63
0
0.
45
3
.
0.
45
2
0.
76
6
0.
71
0
0.
64
5
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
94
]
[0
.0
68
]
[.
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.0
25
]
[.
]
[0
.1
00
]
[0
.1
30
]
[.
]
[0
.0
57
]
[0
.0
83
]
[0
.0
65
]
[0
.0
40
]
(0
.7
40
,0
.9
03
)
(1
.0
43
,1
.4
11
)
(0
.0
49
,0
.3
15
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.3
45
,0
.6
42
)
(0
.2
02
,0
.3
00
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.4
34
,0
.8
26
)
(0
.1
99
,0
.7
08
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.3
41
,0
.5
64
)
(0
.6
03
,0
.9
30
)
(0
.5
82
,0
.8
38
)
(0
.5
67
,0
.7
23
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
6
0.
81
4
1.
27
9
0.
17
5
.
0.
48
4
0.
20
3
0.
23
9
0.
47
6
0.
38
0
2.
38
8
0.
48
5
0.
70
6
0.
54
8
0.
56
3
[0
.0
47
]
[0
.1
05
]
[0
.0
66
]
[.
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.1
09
]
[0
.2
12
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.0
56
]
[0
.0
39
]
(0
.7
20
,0
.9
07
)
(1
.0
73
,1
.4
85
)
(0
.0
46
,0
.3
04
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.3
33
,0
.6
35
)
(0
.1
64
,0
.2
42
)
(0
.1
63
,0
.3
14
)
(0
.3
27
,0
.6
26
)
(0
.1
67
,0
.5
93
)
(1
.9
72
,2
.8
04
)
(0
.3
63
,0
.6
07
)
(0
.5
54
,0
.8
57
)
(0
.4
39
,0
.6
57
)
(0
.4
86
,0
.6
40
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
7
0.
71
8
1.
04
3
0.
17
8
0.
88
5
0.
48
4
0.
22
9
0.
17
1
0.
49
6
0.
34
8
1.
77
9
0.
43
3
0.
72
3
0.
57
6
0.
49
2
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.0
65
]
[0
.0
98
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.1
01
]
[0
.1
81
]
[0
.0
54
]
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.0
57
]
[0
.0
36
]
(0
.6
38
,0
.7
97
)
(0
.8
83
,1
.2
04
)
(0
.0
51
,0
.3
04
)
(0
.6
93
,1
.0
76
)
(0
.3
36
,0
.6
32
)
(0
.1
86
,0
.2
73
)
(0
.1
18
,0
.2
25
)
(0
.3
44
,0
.6
48
)
(0
.1
50
,0
.5
45
)
(1
.4
23
,2
.1
34
)
(0
.3
26
,0
.5
39
)
(0
.5
71
,0
.8
75
)
(0
.4
65
,0
.6
87
)
(0
.4
22
,0
.5
61
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
8
0.
70
2
1.
09
2
0.
15
7
0.
70
7
0.
32
9
0.
24
1
0.
13
9
0.
56
3
0.
35
1
1.
32
1
0.
44
3
0.
74
5
0.
58
9
0.
48
5
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
85
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.0
50
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.1
01
]
[0
.1
25
]
[0
.0
56
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
57
]
[0
.0
35
]
(0
.6
32
,0
.7
73
)
(0
.9
25
,1
.2
60
)
(0
.0
48
,0
.2
65
)
(0
.5
48
,0
.8
66
)
(0
.2
30
,0
.4
28
)
(0
.1
95
,0
.2
86
)
(0
.0
96
,0
.1
81
)
(0
.3
92
,0
.7
35
)
(0
.1
53
,0
.5
50
)
(1
.0
77
,1
.5
65
)
(0
.3
33
,0
.5
52
)
(0
.5
88
,0
.9
01
)
(0
.4
77
,0
.7
02
)
(0
.4
17
,0
.5
54
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
9
0.
71
4
1.
05
9
0.
21
0
0.
93
0
0.
38
8
0.
29
4
0.
17
1
0.
52
7
0.
38
9
1.
45
5
0.
38
8
0.
65
5
0.
58
8
0.
48
2
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.0
96
]
[0
.0
61
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.1
12
]
[0
.1
33
]
[0
.0
49
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
57
]
[0
.0
34
]
(0
.6
40
,0
.7
88
)
(0
.8
99
,1
.2
20
)
(0
.0
59
,0
.3
60
)
(0
.7
43
,1
.1
18
)
(0
.2
69
,0
.5
06
)
(0
.2
38
,0
.3
50
)
(0
.1
18
,0
.2
24
)
(0
.3
65
,0
.6
88
)
(0
.1
69
,0
.6
08
)
(1
.1
94
,1
.7
15
)
(0
.2
91
,0
.4
84
)
(0
.5
17
,0
.7
94
)
(0
.4
76
,0
.6
99
)
(0
.4
16
,0
.5
49
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
0
0.
84
8
1.
08
2
0.
20
4
0.
81
9
0.
45
4
0.
23
1
0.
16
5
0.
55
8
0.
29
2
1.
52
4
0.
39
8
0.
74
0
0.
52
8
0.
57
4
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.0
86
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.1
39
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
41
]
(0
.7
54
,0
.9
43
)
(0
.9
10
,1
.2
53
)
(0
.0
57
,0
.3
50
)
(0
.6
50
,0
.9
88
)
(0
.3
15
,0
.5
93
)
(0
.1
88
,0
.2
74
)
(0
.1
14
,0
.2
16
)
(0
.3
86
,0
.7
30
)
(0
.1
27
,0
.4
57
)
(1
.2
52
,1
.7
96
)
(0
.2
99
,0
.4
98
)
(0
.5
83
,0
.8
96
)
(0
.4
28
,0
.6
29
)
(0
.4
93
,0
.6
54
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
1
0.
79
8
1.
10
9
0.
18
4
0.
79
4
0.
56
3
0.
27
9
0.
16
3
0.
53
2
0.
39
6
1.
53
3
0.
41
5
0.
77
4
0.
58
4
0.
53
3
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.0
67
]
[0
.0
85
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
86
]
[0
.1
15
]
[0
.1
44
]
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
58
]
[0
.0
40
]
(0
.7
09
,0
.8
86
)
(0
.9
20
,1
.2
99
)
(0
.0
52
,0
.3
16
)
(0
.6
27
,0
.9
61
)
(0
.3
91
,0
.7
35
)
(0
.2
24
,0
.3
35
)
(0
.1
12
,0
.2
14
)
(0
.3
64
,0
.7
00
)
(0
.1
71
,0
.6
21
)
(1
.2
51
,1
.8
15
)
(0
.3
11
,0
.5
19
)
(0
.6
09
,0
.9
39
)
(0
.4
71
,0
.6
97
)
(0
.4
54
,0
.6
11
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
2
,5
1
−
6
0
0.
89
5
0.
98
9
1.
11
0
0.
86
1
1.
04
6
1.
05
0
0.
80
0
0.
90
1
0.
95
5
0.
87
9
1.
00
5
0.
95
5
0.
82
9
0.
93
6
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
52
]
[0
.0
17
]
(0
.8
62
,0
.9
28
)
(0
.9
20
,1
.0
58
)
(1
.0
60
,1
.1
61
)
(0
.8
11
,0
.9
10
)
(0
.9
88
,1
.1
03
)
(1
.0
13
,1
.0
87
)
(0
.7
51
,0
.8
49
)
(0
.8
49
,0
.9
53
)
(0
.8
96
,1
.0
13
)
(0
.8
08
,0
.9
50
)
(0
.9
63
,1
.0
47
)
(0
.9
10
,1
.0
00
)
(0
.7
27
,0
.9
31
)
(0
.9
02
,0
.9
69
)
γ
2
,6
1
−
7
0
0.
99
4
1.
09
9
1.
15
5
0.
87
1
1.
11
8
0.
95
8
0.
83
0
0.
93
5
0.
96
4
1.
07
2
1.
05
9
0.
97
5
0.
90
3
1.
01
4
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.9
58
,1
.0
29
)
(1
.0
20
,1
.1
78
)
(1
.1
06
,1
.2
04
)
(0
.8
22
,0
.9
21
)
(1
.0
57
,1
.1
79
)
(0
.9
27
,0
.9
88
)
(0
.7
75
,0
.8
84
)
(0
.8
80
,0
.9
90
)
(0
.9
12
,1
.0
17
)
(0
.9
82
,1
.1
63
)
(1
.0
16
,1
.1
02
)
(0
.9
29
,1
.0
20
)
(0
.8
02
,1
.0
03
)
(0
.9
79
,1
.0
49
)
γ
2
,7
1
−
8
0
1.
19
0
1.
15
3
1.
83
7
1.
20
7
1.
72
8
1.
35
6
1.
05
6
1.
42
7
1.
38
3
1.
48
6
1.
33
4
1.
27
7
1.
25
3
0.
94
1
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
67
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
66
]
[0
.0
27
]
(1
.1
46
,1
.2
34
)
(1
.0
63
,1
.2
43
)
(1
.7
69
,1
.9
04
)
(1
.1
39
,1
.2
75
)
(1
.6
37
,1
.8
19
)
(1
.3
10
,1
.4
03
)
(0
.9
70
,1
.1
43
)
(1
.3
46
,1
.5
07
)
(1
.3
03
,1
.4
64
)
(1
.3
55
,1
.6
17
)
(1
.2
75
,1
.3
94
)
(1
.2
21
,1
.3
34
)
(1
.1
24
,1
.3
82
)
(0
.8
88
,0
.9
94
)
SS
R
0.
00
6
0.
02
7
0.
00
7
0.
00
4
0.
01
0
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
01
8
0.
01
4
0.
02
1
0.
00
2
0.
01
0
0.
02
4
0.
01
5
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
61
Ta
bl
e
A
7:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-M
od
el
7:
λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[R
G
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[A
R
(1
),
σ
2 0
,c
or
re
ct
io
n
le
ft
-c
en
so
ri
ng
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Pe
rm
an
en
t
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 µ
)
-4
.3
84
-5
.3
95
-4
.3
08
-4
.9
81
-3
.3
44
-0
.7
00
-4
.0
40
-5
.9
76
1.
07
0
0.
35
5
-3
.9
70
-1
.0
07
1.
09
8
-5
.8
05
[0
.3
24
]
[0
.3
71
]
[0
.1
38
]
[0
.4
54
]
[0
.1
27
]
[0
.3
04
]
[1
.1
42
]
[0
.5
23
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.2
94
]
[0
.4
03
]
[0
.5
54
]
[0
.1
51
]
[0
.2
06
]
(-
5.
01
9,
-3
.7
49
)
(-
6.
12
2,
-4
.6
69
)
(-
4.
57
8,
-4
.0
38
)
(-
5.
87
1,
-4
.0
92
)
(-
3.
59
4,
-3
.0
94
)
(-
1.
29
5,
-0
.1
04
)
(-
6.
27
9,
-1
.8
01
)
(-
7.
00
1,
-4
.9
52
)
(0
.9
09
,1
.2
30
)
(-
0.
22
2,
0.
93
1)
(-
4.
75
9,
-3
.1
81
)
(-
2.
09
3,
0.
07
9)
(0
.8
03
,1
.3
94
)
(-
6.
20
9,
-5
.4
02
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 ϕ
)
-9
.7
32
-8
.7
92
-9
.1
67
-9
.3
78
-8
.9
49
-8
.3
85
-1
1.
10
1
-9
.0
28
-6
.0
51
-6
.8
72
-1
0.
75
3
-1
0.
15
0
-6
.2
04
-8
.8
85
[0
.4
73
]
[0
.1
56
]
[0
.1
45
]
[0
.1
43
]
[0
.1
10
]
[0
.5
98
]
[7
.5
69
]
[0
.2
78
]
[0
.0
99
]
[0
.3
66
]
[1
.4
17
]
[2
.4
83
]
[0
.2
00
]
[0
.0
56
]
(-
10
.6
58
,-8
.8
06
)
(-
9.
09
7,
-8
.4
87
)
(-
9.
45
1,
-8
.8
83
)
(-
9.
65
8,
-9
.0
97
)
(-
9.
16
4,
-8
.7
33
)
(-
9.
55
8,
-7
.2
13
)
(-
25
.9
36
,3
.7
33
)
(-
9.
57
2,
-8
.4
84
)
(-
6.
24
4,
-5
.8
57
)
(-
7.
59
1,
-6
.1
54
)
(-
13
.5
30
,-7
.9
77
)
(-
15
.0
17
,-5
.2
82
)
(-
6.
59
6,
-5
.8
13
)
(-
8.
99
6,
-8
.7
74
)
C
ov
(µ
ϕ
)
0.
00
09
0.
00
04
-0
.0
00
7
-0
.0
00
5
-0
.0
01
2
-0
.0
10
7
0.
00
10
0.
00
15
-0
.0
81
8
-0
.0
38
1
0.
00
08
-0
.0
03
7
-0
.0
76
7
-0
.0
00
2
[0
.0
00
4]
[0
.0
00
3]
[0
.0
00
2]
[0
.0
00
2]
[0
.0
00
2]
[0
.0
04
6]
[0
.0
01
4]
[0
.0
00
4]
[0
.0
07
5]
[0
.0
12
8]
[0
.0
00
3]
[0
.0
04
8]
[0
.0
13
5]
[0
.0
00
1]
(0
.0
00
2,
0.
00
2)
(-
0.
00
02
,0
.0
01
)
(-
0.
00
12
,-0
.0
00
)
(-
0.
00
09
,-0
.0
00
)
(-
0.
00
16
,-0
.0
01
)
(-
0.
01
96
,-0
.0
02
)
(-
0.
00
18
,0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
00
6,
0.
00
2)
(-
0.
09
64
,-0
.0
67
)
(-
0.
06
33
,-0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
00
2,
0.
00
2)
(-
0.
01
32
,0
.0
06
)
(-
0.
10
32
,-0
.0
50
)
(-
0.
00
04
,-0
.0
00
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
1
,1
9
9
5
0.
99
6
0.
97
9
0.
94
6
.
0.
98
6
0.
98
7
.
1.
01
4
1.
07
0
.
0.
97
1
1.
05
0
1.
07
0
1.
03
7
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
19
]
[.
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
12
]
[.
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
08
]
[.
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
13
]
(0
.9
77
,1
.0
14
)
(0
.9
56
,1
.0
02
)
(0
.9
09
,0
.9
84
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
55
,1
.0
17
)
(0
.9
62
,1
.0
11
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
89
,1
.0
39
)
(1
.0
54
,1
.0
86
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
49
,0
.9
93
)
(1
.0
23
,1
.0
78
)
(1
.0
44
,1
.0
95
)
(1
.0
12
,1
.0
62
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
6
0.
91
9
0.
92
4
0.
89
2
.
0.
98
9
1.
10
7
0.
91
7
1.
03
2
1.
14
5
1.
05
8
0.
99
2
1.
04
9
1.
19
1
1.
02
2
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
19
]
[.
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
16
]
(0
.8
92
,0
.9
46
)
(0
.8
99
,0
.9
49
)
(0
.8
54
,0
.9
30
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.9
55
,1
.0
23
)
(1
.0
75
,1
.1
39
)
(0
.8
48
,0
.9
86
)
(1
.0
05
,1
.0
59
)
(1
.1
24
,1
.1
66
)
(1
.0
17
,1
.0
99
)
(0
.9
54
,1
.0
29
)
(1
.0
00
,1
.0
97
)
(1
.1
63
,1
.2
20
)
(0
.9
92
,1
.0
53
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
7
0.
94
6
0.
96
4
0.
77
7
1.
13
1
0.
94
8
1.
06
9
0.
92
1
1.
03
7
1.
19
6
1.
27
3
0.
95
6
1.
08
9
1.
27
2
1.
07
3
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.9
10
,0
.9
83
)
(0
.9
30
,0
.9
98
)
(0
.7
37
,0
.8
18
)
(1
.0
93
,1
.1
70
)
(0
.9
16
,0
.9
80
)
(1
.0
26
,1
.1
13
)
(0
.8
17
,1
.0
25
)
(1
.0
05
,1
.0
68
)
(1
.1
70
,1
.2
23
)
(1
.2
31
,1
.3
14
)
(0
.9
10
,1
.0
02
)
(1
.0
19
,1
.1
60
)
(1
.2
36
,1
.3
08
)
(1
.0
38
,1
.1
09
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
8
0.
92
5
0.
91
8
0.
75
4
1.
08
4
1.
00
3
1.
07
4
0.
84
3
1.
01
7
1.
26
5
1.
40
5
1.
05
1
1.
13
0
1.
35
6
1.
06
0
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
70
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
47
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.8
81
,0
.9
69
)
(0
.8
81
,0
.9
55
)
(0
.7
08
,0
.8
01
)
(1
.0
38
,1
.1
30
)
(0
.9
69
,1
.0
38
)
(1
.0
19
,1
.1
30
)
(0
.7
06
,0
.9
80
)
(0
.9
77
,1
.0
56
)
(1
.2
24
,1
.3
05
)
(1
.3
53
,1
.4
56
)
(0
.9
89
,1
.1
13
)
(1
.0
39
,1
.2
21
)
(1
.3
12
,1
.4
00
)
(1
.0
24
,1
.0
96
)
λ
1
,1
9
9
9
0.
89
9
0.
86
1
0.
65
0
1.
03
2
0.
91
0
0.
99
1
0.
74
9
0.
98
5
1.
39
7
1.
54
2
1.
06
2
1.
12
5
1.
37
4
1.
09
5
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
58
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
19
]
(0
.8
50
,0
.9
48
)
(0
.8
23
,0
.9
00
)
(0
.6
10
,0
.6
91
)
(0
.9
78
,1
.0
86
)
(0
.8
72
,0
.9
49
)
(0
.9
28
,1
.0
53
)
(0
.5
96
,0
.9
01
)
(0
.9
41
,1
.0
29
)
(1
.3
61
,1
.4
33
)
(1
.4
75
,1
.6
09
)
(0
.9
87
,1
.1
36
)
(1
.0
11
,1
.2
38
)
(1
.3
18
,1
.4
30
)
(1
.0
58
,1
.1
31
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
0
0.
82
5
0.
79
8
0.
61
0
0.
97
0
0.
88
9
1.
21
3
0.
76
4
0.
90
3
1.
50
4
1.
64
5
1.
03
7
1.
08
1
1.
59
8
0.
96
0
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
93
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.7
72
,0
.8
77
)
(0
.7
54
,0
.8
41
)
(0
.5
65
,0
.6
55
)
(0
.9
17
,1
.0
23
)
(0
.8
48
,0
.9
29
)
(1
.1
27
,1
.2
98
)
(0
.5
82
,0
.9
45
)
(0
.8
55
,0
.9
51
)
(1
.4
62
,1
.5
46
)
(1
.5
65
,1
.7
25
)
(0
.9
54
,1
.1
20
)
(0
.9
48
,1
.2
14
)
(1
.5
32
,1
.6
64
)
(0
.9
25
,0
.9
95
)
λ
1
,2
0
0
1
0.
85
6
0.
78
2
0.
61
2
1.
03
9
0.
92
4
1.
26
7
0.
76
9
0.
89
2
1.
46
0
1.
65
2
1.
02
8
1.
07
3
1.
66
9
0.
95
9
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.1
06
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
18
]
(0
.7
97
,0
.9
16
)
(0
.7
32
,0
.8
32
)
(0
.5
64
,0
.6
61
)
(0
.9
78
,1
.1
00
)
(0
.8
80
,0
.9
68
)
(1
.1
59
,1
.3
75
)
(0
.5
61
,0
.9
78
)
(0
.8
41
,0
.9
43
)
(1
.4
08
,1
.5
12
)
(1
.5
62
,1
.7
42
)
(0
.9
33
,1
.1
22
)
(0
.9
16
,1
.2
30
)
(1
.5
94
,1
.7
45
)
(0
.9
23
,0
.9
95
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
1
,5
1
−
6
0
1.
29
1
1.
35
1
1.
42
5
1.
36
3
1.
24
0
0.
61
8
1.
07
6
1.
13
1
0.
44
6
0.
53
6
1.
09
1
0.
86
7
0.
49
7
1.
31
7
[0
.0
56
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
70
]
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.2
40
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.1
01
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
22
]
(1
.1
82
,1
.4
00
)
(1
.2
63
,1
.4
39
)
(1
.2
87
,1
.5
62
)
(1
.2
68
,1
.4
57
)
(1
.1
52
,1
.3
29
)
(0
.5
24
,0
.7
11
)
(0
.6
06
,1
.5
46
)
(1
.0
58
,1
.2
05
)
(0
.4
18
,0
.4
74
)
(0
.4
36
,0
.6
36
)
(0
.9
45
,1
.2
37
)
(0
.6
69
,1
.0
64
)
(0
.4
48
,0
.5
46
)
(1
.2
73
,1
.3
61
)
γ
1
,6
1
−
7
0
1.
62
6
1.
96
3
2.
06
8
2.
27
5
1.
34
4
0.
34
0
1.
27
2
1.
62
7
0.
20
7
0.
33
5
1.
04
9
0.
61
1
0.
27
1
1.
85
7
[0
.1
52
]
[0
.1
58
]
[0
.2
47
]
[0
.1
62
]
[0
.1
22
]
[0
.0
43
]
[0
.5
60
]
[0
.1
22
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.1
46
]
[0
.1
30
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
79
]
(1
.3
27
,1
.9
25
)
(1
.6
54
,2
.2
72
)
(1
.5
84
,2
.5
51
)
(1
.9
57
,2
.5
93
)
(1
.1
06
,1
.5
83
)
(0
.2
57
,0
.4
24
)
(0
.1
76
,2
.3
69
)
(1
.3
88
,1
.8
65
)
(0
.1
89
,0
.2
24
)
(0
.2
45
,0
.4
26
)
(0
.7
63
,1
.3
35
)
(0
.3
57
,0
.8
66
)
(0
.2
35
,0
.3
06
)
(1
.7
02
,2
.0
12
)
γ
1
,7
1
−
8
0
1.
68
6
2.
89
2
1.
46
5
2.
61
8
0.
90
8
0.
07
2
0.
86
6
2.
38
8
0.
08
7
0.
15
7
1.
05
8
0.
32
7
0.
09
5
3.
57
0
[0
.2
50
]
[0
.4
85
]
[0
.1
28
]
[0
.5
31
]
[0
.0
83
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.5
11
]
[0
.3
18
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.2
14
]
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.4
49
]
(1
.1
95
,2
.1
76
)
(1
.9
42
,3
.8
41
)
(1
.2
15
,1
.7
15
)
(1
.5
76
,3
.6
59
)
(0
.7
45
,1
.0
71
)
(0
.0
47
,0
.0
97
)
(-
0.
13
5,
1.
86
8)
(1
.7
65
,3
.0
12
)
(0
.0
78
,0
.0
96
)
(0
.1
08
,0
.2
07
)
(0
.6
38
,1
.4
77
)
(0
.1
41
,0
.5
13
)
(0
.0
79
,0
.1
11
)
(2
.6
89
,4
.4
50
)
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
62
C
on
tin
ue
d:
E
rr
or
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
st
im
at
es
-M
od
el
7:
λ
1
,t
γ
1
,c
[R
G
]+
λ
2
,t
γ
2
,c
[A
R
(1
),
σ
2 0
,c
or
re
ct
io
n
le
ft
-c
en
so
ri
ng
]
U
K
Ir
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
B
el
gi
um
A
us
tr
ia
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
It
al
y
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
G
re
ec
e
Tr
an
si
to
ry
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
C
om
po
ne
nt
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 0
-3
.2
86
-2
.4
19
-3
.6
85
-3
.0
26
-3
.1
92
-3
.3
27
-2
.2
88
-2
.1
60
-2
.4
39
-3
.9
34
-3
.4
29
-2
.8
80
-3
.4
31
-2
.4
36
[0
.0
92
]
[0
.0
90
]
[0
.0
85
]
[0
.1
08
]
[0
.1
00
]
[0
.0
63
]
[0
.1
00
]
[0
.0
92
]
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.1
43
]
[0
.0
76
]
[0
.0
85
]
[0
.1
34
]
[0
.0
67
]
(-
3.
46
6,
-3
.1
06
)
(-
2.
59
6,
-2
.2
42
)
(-
3.
85
1,
-3
.5
18
)
(-
3.
23
8,
-2
.8
15
)
(-
3.
38
7,
-2
.9
97
)
(-
3.
45
1,
-3
.2
02
)
(-
2.
48
4,
-2
.0
92
)
(-
2.
34
0,
-1
.9
81
)
(-
2.
57
2,
-2
.3
06
)
(-
4.
21
4,
-3
.6
54
)
(-
3.
57
8,
-3
.2
79
)
(-
3.
04
6,
-2
.7
14
)
(-
3.
69
4,
-3
.1
67
)
(-
2.
56
8,
-2
.3
04
)
E
xp
(e
st
im
at
e)
=
σ
2 
-2
.7
23
-3
.3
90
-0
.2
36
-3
.0
19
-2
.0
76
-1
.1
52
-0
.2
91
-1
.9
01
-1
.1
99
-4
.6
85
-1
.4
59
-1
.6
52
-2
.0
97
-1
.7
15
[0
.1
09
]
[0
.1
66
]
[0
.8
75
]
[0
.2
27
]
[0
.3
13
]
[0
.1
71
]
[0
.2
68
]
[0
.3
17
]
[0
.6
06
]
[0
.1
98
]
[0
.3
84
]
[0
.3
49
]
[0
.2
21
]
[0
.1
35
]
(-
2.
93
6,
-2
.5
10
)
(-
3.
71
4,
-3
.0
65
)
(-
1.
95
1,
1.
47
9)
(-
3.
46
4,
-2
.5
74
)
(-
2.
68
9,
-1
.4
63
)
(-
1.
48
6,
-0
.8
17
)
(-
0.
81
6,
0.
23
4)
(-
2.
52
2,
-1
.2
80
)
(-
2.
38
6,
-0
.0
12
)
(-
5.
07
2,
-4
.2
97
)
(-
2.
21
2,
-0
.7
06
)
(-
2.
33
6,
-0
.9
67
)
(-
2.
53
0,
-1
.6
63
)
(-
1.
98
1,
-1
.4
50
)
ξ
0.
04
4
-0
.0
07
0.
00
1
0.
00
6
-0
.0
19
0.
02
1
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
32
0.
10
2
0.
00
3
-0
.0
04
0.
03
2
-0
.0
04
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
04
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
01
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
04
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
03
]
(0
.0
28
,0
.0
59
)
(-
0.
01
4,
-0
.0
00
)
(-
0.
00
7,
0.
01
0)
(-
0.
00
4,
0.
01
7)
(-
0.
02
5,
-0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
11
,0
.0
31
)
(-
0.
02
0,
-0
.0
10
)
(-
0.
01
3,
-0
.0
00
)
(-
0.
03
4,
-0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
61
,0
.1
43
)
(-
0.
00
4,
0.
01
1)
(-
0.
01
1,
0.
00
3)
(0
.0
08
,0
.0
55
)
(-
0.
01
0,
0.
00
2)
ρ
0.
47
4
0.
29
7
0.
55
4
0.
27
6
0.
31
7
0.
60
5
0.
76
0
0.
25
1
0.
36
0
0.
19
6
0.
38
8
0.
26
5
0.
59
0
0.
46
2
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
15
]
(0
.4
49
,0
.4
99
)
(0
.2
51
,0
.3
42
)
(0
.5
30
,0
.5
78
)
(0
.2
38
,0
.3
14
)
(0
.2
94
,0
.3
41
)
(0
.5
83
,0
.6
28
)
(0
.7
16
,0
.8
03
)
(0
.2
08
,0
.2
94
)
(0
.3
16
,0
.4
05
)
(0
.1
63
,0
.2
29
)
(0
.3
59
,0
.4
18
)
(0
.2
36
,0
.2
94
)
(0
.5
48
,0
.6
32
)
(0
.4
33
,0
.4
91
)
Ti
m
e
sh
if
te
rs
λ
2
,1
9
9
5
0.
83
1
1.
15
1
0.
14
4
.
0.
50
1
0.
27
2
.
0.
64
4
0.
42
1
.
0.
33
5
0.
49
9
0.
66
8
0.
63
3
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
64
]
[.
]
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.0
24
]
[.
]
[0
.1
02
]
[0
.1
27
]
[.
]
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.0
88
]
[0
.0
72
]
[0
.0
39
]
(0
.7
48
,0
.9
14
)
(0
.9
77
,1
.3
25
)
(0
.0
19
,0
.2
70
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.3
49
,0
.6
54
)
(0
.2
24
,0
.3
19
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.4
45
,0
.8
43
)
(0
.1
71
,0
.6
70
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.2
09
,0
.4
61
)
(0
.3
26
,0
.6
71
)
(0
.5
28
,0
.8
08
)
(0
.5
56
,0
.7
09
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
6
0.
81
9
1.
18
6
0.
13
9
.
0.
48
9
0.
21
7
0.
26
2
0.
48
8
0.
35
2
2.
50
3
0.
35
7
0.
45
5
0.
50
1
0.
54
9
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
98
]
[0
.0
62
]
[.
]
[0
.0
79
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.1
06
]
[0
.2
19
]
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
59
]
[0
.0
38
]
(0
.7
28
,0
.9
09
)
(0
.9
95
,1
.3
78
)
(0
.0
18
,0
.2
60
)
(.
,.
)
(0
.3
34
,0
.6
44
)
(0
.1
79
,0
.2
55
)
(0
.1
87
,0
.3
36
)
(0
.3
35
,0
.6
40
)
(0
.1
44
,0
.5
61
)
(2
.0
73
,2
.9
33
)
(0
.2
23
,0
.4
91
)
(0
.2
97
,0
.6
12
)
(0
.3
86
,0
.6
16
)
(0
.4
75
,0
.6
24
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
7
0.
72
4
0.
95
4
0.
14
2
0.
92
8
0.
49
2
0.
24
6
0.
18
9
0.
50
9
0.
32
1
1.
86
7
0.
32
0
0.
47
2
0.
53
0
0.
47
7
[0
.0
40
]
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.1
06
]
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
79
]
[0
.0
98
]
[0
.1
85
]
[0
.0
61
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.0
61
]
[0
.0
34
]
(0
.6
46
,0
.8
01
)
(0
.8
08
,1
.1
01
)
(0
.0
21
,0
.2
63
)
(0
.7
21
,1
.1
36
)
(0
.3
39
,0
.6
44
)
(0
.2
03
,0
.2
88
)
(0
.1
34
,0
.2
44
)
(0
.3
55
,0
.6
64
)
(0
.1
29
,0
.5
14
)
(1
.5
03
,2
.2
31
)
(0
.2
01
,0
.4
38
)
(0
.3
11
,0
.6
33
)
(0
.4
11
,0
.6
49
)
(0
.4
10
,0
.5
43
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
8
0.
70
9
1.
00
2
0.
12
5
0.
74
8
0.
32
9
0.
25
7
0.
15
3
0.
57
8
0.
32
4
1.
37
0
0.
32
8
0.
49
2
0.
54
6
0.
46
5
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.0
87
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
98
]
[0
.1
25
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
85
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
33
]
(0
.6
40
,0
.7
78
)
(0
.8
49
,1
.1
54
)
(0
.0
21
,0
.2
30
)
(0
.5
77
,0
.9
20
)
(0
.2
29
,0
.4
29
)
(0
.2
13
,0
.3
00
)
(0
.1
09
,0
.1
96
)
(0
.4
04
,0
.7
53
)
(0
.1
31
,0
.5
17
)
(1
.1
25
,1
.6
16
)
(0
.2
06
,0
.4
51
)
(0
.3
25
,0
.6
59
)
(0
.4
23
,0
.6
68
)
(0
.4
01
,0
.5
29
)
λ
2
,1
9
9
9
0.
71
2
0.
96
4
0.
16
7
0.
97
1
0.
39
0
0.
31
2
0.
19
3
0.
54
0
0.
36
1
1.
56
7
0.
29
1
0.
43
0
0.
54
4
0.
47
6
[0
.0
37
]
[0
.0
75
]
[0
.0
73
]
[0
.1
03
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.1
10
]
[0
.1
38
]
[0
.0
55
]
[0
.0
74
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
32
]
(0
.6
39
,0
.7
85
)
(0
.8
18
,1
.1
10
)
(0
.0
25
,0
.3
10
)
(0
.7
70
,1
.1
73
)
(0
.2
69
,0
.5
11
)
(0
.2
59
,0
.3
66
)
(0
.1
41
,0
.2
45
)
(0
.3
76
,0
.7
05
)
(0
.1
46
,0
.5
76
)
(1
.2
97
,1
.8
37
)
(0
.1
82
,0
.3
99
)
(0
.2
85
,0
.5
76
)
(0
.4
22
,0
.6
65
)
(0
.4
13
,0
.5
40
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
0
0.
84
4
0.
99
3
0.
16
3
0.
85
7
0.
45
8
0.
24
9
0.
18
7
0.
57
2
0.
26
9
1.
65
5
0.
30
2
0.
48
5
0.
49
6
0.
56
5
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
71
]
[0
.0
93
]
[0
.0
72
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.1
43
]
[0
.0
58
]
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
56
]
[0
.0
39
]
(0
.7
50
,0
.9
37
)
(0
.8
36
,1
.1
50
)
(0
.0
24
,0
.3
02
)
(0
.6
75
,1
.0
39
)
(0
.3
16
,0
.6
00
)
(0
.2
06
,0
.2
92
)
(0
.1
37
,0
.2
37
)
(0
.3
97
,0
.7
47
)
(0
.1
09
,0
.4
29
)
(1
.3
75
,1
.9
34
)
(0
.1
89
,0
.4
15
)
(0
.3
22
,0
.6
49
)
(0
.3
87
,0
.6
06
)
(0
.4
89
,0
.6
42
)
λ
2
,2
0
0
1
0.
78
7
1.
02
2
0.
14
7
0.
84
3
0.
56
8
0.
29
9
0.
18
4
0.
54
6
0.
36
7
1.
69
6
0.
31
3
0.
50
8
0.
55
0
0.
52
3
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
64
]
[0
.0
93
]
[0
.0
90
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
87
]
[0
.1
12
]
[0
.1
56
]
[0
.0
60
]
[0
.0
87
]
[0
.0
63
]
[0
.0
38
]
(0
.6
99
,0
.8
74
)
(0
.8
48
,1
.1
97
)
(0
.0
22
,0
.2
73
)
(0
.6
60
,1
.0
26
)
(0
.3
92
,0
.7
44
)
(0
.2
45
,0
.3
54
)
(0
.1
34
,0
.2
34
)
(0
.3
75
,0
.7
17
)
(0
.1
47
,0
.5
87
)
(1
.3
91
,2
.0
02
)
(0
.1
96
,0
.4
30
)
(0
.3
37
,0
.6
79
)
(0
.4
26
,0
.6
74
)
(0
.4
48
,0
.5
97
)
C
oh
or
ts
hi
ft
er
s
γ
2
,5
1
−
6
0
0.
93
6
0.
96
1
1.
09
2
0.
88
0
1.
04
7
0.
99
0
0.
79
3
0.
91
0
0.
97
5
1.
00
8
1.
01
9
1.
00
1
0.
83
7
0.
90
3
[0
.0
17
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
33
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
48
]
[0
.0
15
]
(0
.9
04
,0
.9
68
)
(0
.8
90
,1
.0
32
)
(1
.0
51
,1
.1
33
)
(0
.8
35
,0
.9
25
)
(0
.9
91
,1
.1
02
)
(0
.9
61
,1
.0
19
)
(0
.7
45
,0
.8
41
)
(0
.8
62
,0
.9
58
)
(0
.9
16
,1
.0
34
)
(0
.9
44
,1
.0
72
)
(0
.9
80
,1
.0
58
)
(0
.9
56
,1
.0
46
)
(0
.7
42
,0
.9
32
)
(0
.8
73
,0
.9
33
)
γ
2
,6
1
−
7
0
1.
06
0
1.
13
0
1.
16
3
0.
92
9
1.
06
0
0.
94
4
0.
81
2
0.
88
7
0.
91
4
1.
22
6
1.
10
9
1.
02
8
0.
93
9
1.
04
3
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
30
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
28
]
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
51
]
[0
.0
19
]
(1
.0
23
,1
.0
96
)
(1
.0
55
,1
.2
05
)
(1
.1
16
,1
.2
11
)
(0
.8
80
,0
.9
78
)
(1
.0
02
,1
.1
18
)
(0
.9
17
,0
.9
72
)
(0
.7
57
,0
.8
67
)
(0
.8
36
,0
.9
38
)
(0
.8
65
,0
.9
64
)
(1
.1
26
,1
.3
26
)
(1
.0
67
,1
.1
51
)
(0
.9
81
,1
.0
75
)
(0
.8
39
,1
.0
40
)
(1
.0
07
,1
.0
80
)
γ
2
,7
1
−
8
0
1.
21
7
1.
13
0
1.
82
7
1.
21
4
1.
72
4
1.
30
5
1.
06
9
1.
43
3
1.
38
8
1.
59
4
1.
34
0
1.
29
8
1.
24
0
0.
92
5
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
45
]
[0
.0
32
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
46
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
41
]
[0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.0
31
]
[0
.0
29
]
[0
.0
66
]
[0
.0
26
]
(1
.1
71
,1
.2
62
)
(1
.0
41
,1
.2
19
)
(1
.7
63
,1
.8
90
)
(1
.1
43
,1
.2
84
)
(1
.6
34
,1
.8
14
)
(1
.2
61
,1
.3
49
)
(0
.9
87
,1
.1
51
)
(1
.3
53
,1
.5
13
)
(1
.3
05
,1
.4
70
)
(1
.4
43
,1
.7
45
)
(1
.2
79
,1
.4
00
)
(1
.2
40
,1
.3
56
)
(1
.1
11
,1
.3
69
)
(0
.8
73
,0
.9
76
)
SS
R
0.
00
7
0.
02
7
0.
00
7
0.
00
4
0.
01
0
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
01
9
0.
01
5
0.
02
2
0.
00
2
0.
01
1
0.
02
4
0.
01
5
N
ot
es
:T
he
SE
s
an
d
th
e
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
63
The UNU‐MERIT WORKING Paper Series 
 
2012-01 Maastricht reflections on innovation by Luc Soete 
2012-02 A  methodological  survey  of  dynamic  microsimulation  models  by  Jinjing  Li  and  
Cathal O'Donoghue 
2012-03 Evaluating binary alignment methods  in microsimulation models by  Jinjing Li and  
Cathal O'Donoghue 
2012-04 Estimates of the value of patent rights in China by Can Huang 
2012-05 The impact of malnutrition and post traumatic stress disorder on the performance 
of working memory in children by Elise de Neubourg and Chris de Neubourg 
2012-06 Cross‐national trends  in permanent earnings  inequality and earnings  instability  in 
Europe 1994‐2001 by Denisa Maria Sologon and Cathal O'Donoghue 
